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A REFLEXIVE POSTDEVELOPMENT CRITIQUE OF
DEVELOPMENT KNOWLEDGE:
EXPLORING BASES FOR ALLIANCE WITH
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Directed by: Professor Sangeeta Karnat
This dissertation accepts that the way that international social and economic
development is taught, practised and critiqued condemns its practitioners to co-opt
those who engage them in alliances into becoming instruments for the extension of
western hegemony. It demonstrates that this analysis and its outcome are inevitable
conclusions given the Enlightenment approaches used in the theory and practice and
the postdevelopment theory deployed in the critique of development. This dissertation
argues that the work of Jacques Lacan provides a foundation for training for. the
practice of and the critique of development that escapes these limitations.
Initial exploration for dissertation was composed within the work of Michel Fou-
cault. This perspective made it possible to see the effects of the partial use made of
Foucault by postdevelopment critics. The gap between this potential and their use
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justified field research. Research involved an iterative sequence of interviews with de-
velopment professionals that engaged both their accounts of the relationship between
knowledge and action in development and accounts of their own production and re-
production as development professionals. Following the Foucauldian argument that
there are a plurality of discourses, the content of these interviews was synthesized
into narratives that evinced a variety of relationships between knowledge and action.
Actions, however, are necessarily justified on the terms of. and therefore reinforce,
the dominant discourse.
In addition to discussing the relationship between knowledge and action, subjects
were also found to discuss dispositions like naivete and cynicism. These were not
anticipated nor are they well accommodated in Enlightenment or Foucauldian frame-
works. This surplus was productively engaged through the psychoanalytic theory of
Jacques Lacan. Lacan's notions of fantasy and the unconscious are found to provide
a terrain within which it is possible to suggest how development practitioners can
be engaged as allies in a manner that does not result in the extension of western
hegemony. His theory is also found to suggest a framework for the understanding
of education that may produce development professionals who are far more fit than
those solely educated in the Enlightenment tradition to serve as allies.
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INTRODUCTION
Development inevitably harms. This argument, as authored by postdevelopment
critics, goes beyond the tired claim that the beneficent rhetoric of development is
naught but flimsy camouflage for donor nations' disastrous pursuit of narrowly con-
ceived ends. It finds that the structure of development constrains its agents to harm
those whose empowerment they claim to champion and that these agents are limited
in their ability to recognize and powerless to mitigate these harms. These harms and
their transparency are produced by the relationship between power and knowledge in
the discourse of development. The way forward, if we accept these critics' argument,
is to celebrate the emergence of alternatives to this pernicious development and to
shun the development professionals who are its hapless agents.
This dissertation is motivated by three concerns. First, that the postdevelopment
critique just outlined does not provide terms on which activists can form alliances
with development professionals. Second, that their depiction of the field encourages
those professionals who are most likely to be sympathetic to their concerns either to
exit the field or to become cynical. And third, that development is represented as
monolithic and powerful. These, as will be discussed later, are dangerous.
This dissertation accepts that knowledge and power in development are linked
to the subordination of its objects. It accepts that every time knowledge is invoked
in guiding and justifying development practice, that the discourse of development
is strengthened. It accepts that discourses are linked inextricably to the histories
and interests of particular communities. It accepts that the discourse of development
is largeh' the product of an elite community in so called developed nations. And
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it accepts that the development cited by postdevelopment critics stabilizes global in-
equity. W’hat this dissertation asks is whether the theoretical framework within which
the postdevelopment critique is composed requires that development Ire reified, its
professionals shunned and the alternative of social movements be naively celebrated.
Taking its cue from the work of postdevelopment critics, this inquiry begins with
knowledge.
Development is entirely dependent on knowledge. When development profession-
als know, they can predict effects. When they can predict effects, and when they
structure their interventions to produce measurable consequences, they can both jus-
tify what they do and assess their actions' effects. The knowledge of development has
served as the center around which debates, both momentous and trivial, have stormed
and these debates continue to transform the held. While these debates have at times
been fierce, and their consequences have substantially changed practice, they, one and
all. have all taken place subsequent to a common understanding of knowledge.
Development, as discussed by Parpart (1995). is very much a child of the Enlight-
enment. It assumes that it is possible to build accurate mental representations of
an independent external world, that this external world is of a level of complexity
that admits of human understanding, that this understanding allows appropriately
qualified individuals to recommend courses of actions, that these actions will produce
predictable effects, that this knowledge will improve through processes of successive
approximation, that the truths thus produced are far more shaped by the world
investigated than the history, interests, or modes of thought, of those doing the in-
vestigating and that those doing the investigating and deciding are able more or less
freely to exercise their judgement. There no room in this vision for anything other
than individuals who are able to draw freely on this knowledge in making their de-
cisions and this knowledge, as it must, aspires to the status of objective truth. As
put so eloquently by Michael Welmond. World Bank senior education specialist. "Bu-
reaucracies need truths in order to justify the movement of resources" (200-5) 1 and
knowledge provides development with those truths.
The postdevelopment authors discussed here draw heavily on Foucault's explo-
ration of the relationships between power and knowledge most famously articulated
in his study of penality Discipline and Punish (1979). In this work, and in others that
date from the same period, he often spoke in terms of truth and power. For Foucault
"There can be no possible exercise of power without a certain economy of discourses
of truth. .
.
[and]. . . we cannot exercise power except through the production of truth"
(1980). While Welmond might agree that legitimate action is contingent on posses-
sion of truth, he would balk at the entailments of discourse. For Foucault, and those
who draw on his work, truths are differentiated from other assertions not primarily by
their correspondence to an external world, but by their formation in accordance with
specific procedural rules. These rules, writ large, are the laws of a discourse. They
enable the production of truths and constrain their subjects to recognize only those
assertions as legitimate. Discourses, in turn, are recognized as artifacts of specific-
histories. Their truths cannot innocently be proposed as somehow approaching the
status of an objective knowledge. Truths are subsequent to discourse, discourse is
subsequent to history and histories are necessarily local. Within this perspective, at-
tempts by subjects of a group to elevate the claims made from within their discourse
to a universal status are seen to have the effects of both naturalizing the subordi-
nation of other knowledges and of extending their own dominance. Development
professionals, despite their subjective perceptions to the contrary, are understood to
be most effective instruments by which the developed both naturalizes and extends
western hegemony. Finally, within this critique there is nothing that can be done
1 W elmond was commenting on a plenary paper that he had just presented which explored the
links between research and policy making in the context of education projects in World Bank client
countries.
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either by or with these development professionals that will avoid these two effects.
The production and invocation of knowledge within development will always extend
the hegemony of the developed.
The perspective that underwrites this dissertation emerges from the work of schol-
ars concerned with re-visioning the economy (Gibson-Graham. 1996. 2006). These
authors start from the position that how we recognize oppressive systems delimits
the range of options we have at our disposal when we attempt their transformation.
While they acknowledge the power of the exploitative economic relations associated
with global capitalism, these authors refuse to limit themselves to the terrain cre-
ated by its critique. They have found that individuals sustain themselves through a
myriad of economic relations that, while woven into and shaped by global capitalism,
emerge from and respond to very different understandings of the economy. The focus
of these authors is on finding ways of recovering for these materially significant but
rhetorically marginalized activities a place within current discussion of the economy
that will denaturalize the hegemony of capitalism. By avoiding the common step of
first rendering their object of critique discrete, monolithic and unstoppable' powerful. 2
these authors escape the contradiction of affirming the unitary existence, and thereby
stabilizing the rhetorical hegemony, of one powerful contributor to the inequities they
wish to redress. This dissertation looks at the field of development in a manner that
parallels the view this group takes of global capitalism. It acknowledges the power
of development (Crush. 1995) but does not choose to lend credence to its substance
by joining the ranks of those whose critiques have the perverse effect of reifying their
object. Where members of this group are concerned with those relationships by which
individuals secure the material means required to sustain themselves, this disserta-
2 This notion of domino-centrism, the tendency of analysts critical and otherwise to examine "the
little people from the point of view of the big people." is attributed by Diawara (2000) to Grignon
and Passeron (1989).
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tion queries professionals’ relationship To the development knowledge which all parties
agree to be a condition of their existence. In querying this relationship to knowledge
it hopes to explore terms on which development professionals can more successfully
establish bridge identities (Ferguson. 1998) and. moving from that individual basis,
explore terms on which the conditions necessary for the formation of those identities
can be institutionalized.
The first step this dissertation takes is a close examination of those moments of
the postdevelopment critique that produce the charge that development necessarily
harms. This study locates that charge in a historical context and examines some
mainstream responses. It finds that this aspect of the postdevelopment critique has
been poorly understood, that it is easily rejected and that the way the argument has
been framed has limited its effectiveness. Looking to internal limitations, it examines
how knowledge, the subject and power are articulated within these moments of the
postdevelopment literature. This study finds that, even at their most disciplined,
postdevelopment authors have not full}' used the theoretical tools available within
the poststructural tradition that deeply influences their work and that this partial
use has constrained both their ability to describe development and the range of future
directions that they are able to endorse.
The gap between the use made and the potential of the theory that underwrites
the postdevelopment critique justified field based research. The purpose of this re-
search was to work with development professionals to explore their understandings
both of their relationship to knowledge and of their own formation. The hope was
that these interviews would provide material that would extend the work of post-
development scholars in two wavs: First, by exploring whether the relationships to
knowledge the}' presented differed in politically interesting ways from the their repre-
sentation as spoken within the postdevelopment literature, and second, to map their
understanding of their own production and reproduction as a possible terrain whose
engagement could result in the credentialling of development professionals who are
more susceptible to productive engagement as allies.
A fundamental difficulty faced in this research was that it is an attempt to map hy-
pothesized fractures within a presumed hegemonic discourse based on interviews with
individuals who are the most likely to be its spoken moment. In order to strengthen
the probability of identifying viable subordinated knowledges, this research engaged
its subjects as collaborators in a series of three interviews. A detailed review of the
transcripts of the initial interview were to have searched for momentary hesitations,
slips and silences that suggested fractures in the dominant or the presence of subordi-
nate discourses. If these subordinated discourses were found, we were collaboratively
to have elaborated on their nature, viability and effects through a sequence of dis-
cussions. These interviews found that the anticipated hegemonic narrative was far
more fragmentary than originally anticipated, that the accounts offered were inade-
quate and that the anticipated dominant narrative arcs were frequently interrupted
by narratives which emerged from subordinated discourses. Significantly, however,
some of the interrupting narratives could not be captured on the terms of either the
Enlightenment or the poststruetural frameworks within which this investigation was
initially undertaken. These excesses were later found to be well served by the work
of critical theorists who draw on Lacanian psychoanalysis.
A detailed review of the interview transcripts found that it was possible to iden-
tify at least sixteen different understandings of the role that knowledge plays in their
practice. These ranged from the anticipated claim that development knowledge is
approaching truth through a process of successive approximation and that this knowl-
edge legitimately guides their practice to the the less expected position that devel-
opment knowledge is impossible and believing otherwise is harmful. Further, the
professionals interviewed could be understood to shift rapidly between their perspec-
tives in a manner that contradicted the expectation that they would have a relatively
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stable understanding of their knowledge. The range and dynamism of the relation-
ships that the development professionals interviewed evinced is not anticipated either
in the mainstream or the post-development, literature and suggests a rather different
terrain on which development professionals may be engaged in potential alliances.
The narratives offered by these professionals were also read for their discussion
of the processes by which they were produced and sustained. This portion of the
research anticipated that the dominant narrative would be one within which indi-
viduals come gradually to master a variety of bodies of knowledge and. by virtue of
that demonstrated mastery, are gradually recognized and appointed to positions of
increasing importance within development. In addition to finding this reading to well
describe their formation, the development professionals interviewed were also quite
happy to recognize that their formation as disciplinary. That is. they also accepted
that the processes by which they gradually came to master bodies of knowledge con-
ditioned their wills such that, incrementally, their desires came more to correspond
with those of the discourse of development. These professionals, in summary, were
able to discuss their learning both as a process through which they mastered bodies
of knowledge and by which they were gradually disciplined. In addition to these two.
however, these professionals also repeatedly mentioned that their formation and prac-
tice continually shifted the relationship that they have with their knowledge. That
is. they identified positions such as naive, instrumentalism and cynicism as being of
fundamental importance though entirely missing both from the discourse of develop-
ment and any education that they received. These shifts and their alleged significance
were not anticipated in either the Enlightenment or the post-structural frameworks
that initially framed this dissertation. The work of Lacan, as deployed by Marxist
social critics, was invoked in order to accommodate these observations. The readings
of professionals' formation that this dissertation explores point fairly clearly to a va-
riety of pedagogical concerns that ought to be considered when composing learning
/
programs for current and aspiring development professionals and for those who may
be attempting to engage them as allies.
As stated above, the following chapter examines those moments of the postdevel-
opment critique which produce the charge that development necessarily harms. It
locates that charge in a historical context and examines some mainstream responses.
It finds that this critique has been poorly understood, is easily rejected, has been
framed in a manner that limits its effectiveness.
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CHAPTER 1
POSTDEVELOPMENT
Postdevelopment i.s often identified as a Foucauldian critique of development. De-
velopment. following this critique, is a monolithic and hegemonic discourse which
unavoidably determines its agents to harm. Reducing postdevelopment to this single
characterization enables postdevelopment's detractors to avoid substantive engage-
ments with the diversity of interventions within this critique. These range from neo-
populist interventions with a penchant for rhetorical flare, which support a reactionary
politics, to the more carefully composed sceptical contributions, which support inter-
ventions far more akin to the radical democracy project (Laclau and Mouffe, 1984).
Postdevelopment's detractors tend to focus on the more rhetorically expansive mo-
ments of the populist threads within postdevelopment and. on that basis, dismiss the
entire field. Second, sceptical contributors to the postdevelopment literature make
partial use of the Foucauldian theory with which their work is associated. Confla-
tion first of populist and sceptical contributions to the postdevelopment literature,
and second, the postdevelopment critique with the work of Foucault, means that le-
gitimate attacks on populist authors carry over into an unjustified rejection both of
more sceptical contributions and of Foucault (Ziai. 2004). One effect of this confla-
tion is that it is very difficult to see the contributions that are available within and
the limitations of a broader reading of Foucault. This chapter explores the terrain
of sceptical contributions to the postdevelopment literature and then distinguishes
those contributions from the Foucauldian theory with which it has become identified.
The purpose of this chapter is to make it possible to see both contributions and lim-
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itations within the work of Foucault that are not today visible. In order to separate
the work of Foucault from its deploy by those critics I will locate their interventions
in the context of a history of development and examine and critique engagements
with this line of argument before I undertake a more careful study of contradictions
and limitations internal to the use made of Foucault by sceptical postdevelopment
authors.
1.1 A History of Development
Modern international development assistance is often dated to the inaugural ad-
dress given by U.S. President Harry Truman in 1949. In that speech he stated that
the United States:
. . . must embark on a bold new program for making the benefits of our
scientific advances and industrial progress available for the improvement
and growth of underdeveloped areas. More than half the people of the
world are living m conditions approaching miserv. Their food is inade-
quate. The}' are victims of disease. Their economic life is primitive and
stagnant. Their poverty is a handicap and a threat both to them and
to more prosperous areas. For the first time in history, humanity pos-
sesses the knowledge and skill to relieve suffering of these people. The
United States is pre-eminent among nations in the development of in-
dustrial and scientific techniques. The material resources which we can
afford to use for assistance of other peoples are limited. But our impon-
derable resources in technical knowledge are constantly growing and are
inexhaust ible. (Truman . 1949)
\\ hile this is most often cited in the development literature as constituting the birth
of the modern era of foreign development assistance, the content of this speech is
10
foreshadowed by Truman's argument for United States' assistance to the states of
Turkey and Greece in 1947 before a joint session of Congress. Truman made a number
of arguments in that address amongst which was the statement that:
... it is important to note that the Greek Government has asked for our
aid in utilizing effectively the financial and other assistance we may give
to Greece, an in improving its public administration. It is of the utmost
importance that we supervise the use of any funds made available to
Greece, in such a manner that each dollar spent will count toward making
Greece self-supporting. (Truman. 1947)
These speeches are significant for the manner in which they invoke and naturalize
the roles of development professionals and development knowledge. In these speeches
we are presented with a picture in which the United States is identified as the inex-
haustible source of the technical knowledge required to lift these countries from their
abject condition. American experts and the bureaucracies through which their knowl-
edge is given effect as capable of determining the best application of that knowledge,
and those countries are presented as inviting the application of that knowledge in
the service of their citizens. Stating this somewhat more formally. Truman's argu-
ment was that the application of western knowledge by western educated experts in
third world countries will produce predictable results. This formulation places Tru-
man's intervention firmly within the tradition informed by now dominant strains of
Enlightenment thought.
Tacit within research informed by the mainstream Enlightenment tradition are
specific assumptions regarding both the nature of the subject and of knowledge.
Starting with the subject, human action is thought to result from the conscious and
independent choice of an actor. This subject is found in core texts on political lib-
eralism (Rawls. 1971) and it underwrites mainstream economic theory by providing
11
the framework necessary for the emergence of the independent, rational and self in-
terested maximizer. In the field of development this actor, when properly educated,
is recognized as able to understand and. therefore, control nature. This presumed
ability derives from the work of early empiricists who assumed that the application
of scientific methods to the study of nature would produce an accurate and objective
knowledge and that acting on this knowledge would produce effects that could, in
theory at least, be predicted. Within development these notions of the subject and
knowledge were institutionalized through the emergence of management by measure-
ment. Management by measurement requires that development professionals state
their ambitions for an intervention, that they rationally assess the options available,
that they choose defensible between those options and that they objectively measure
subsequent performance of the program against pre-determined metrics (Noordegraaf
and Abma. 2003). In the field of international social and economic development man-
agement by measurement approaches emerged in the 1960s within the the United
States Agency for International Development as their Logical Framework planning
model. Today the core features of this model can be found in the planning and
management practices of all major donor institutions (Bell. 2000).
Following on the model of having well educated professionals acting on the best
knowledge available, the early days of international development saw developed coun-
try educated professionals producing and acting on a knowledge that told them how
development happens (Baber. 2001). The successive failures of this expert led model
of development produced an ongoing critique. In the 1980s official development doc-
uments began to acknowledge the need to involve those served in decisions that con-
cerned their lives through participatory approaches (Gianotten. 1986) and to value
the knowledge of those served (Chambers. 1983). Contributors to this now enormous
literature focus their attention on whose knowledge counts, on the mechanisms by
which this knowledge is produced, and on who is appropriately qualified to determine
the course of future action. Bringing forward the structure of the development they
critique, however, such interventions continue to accept that subjects can meaning-
fully be understood to decide, that these decision are guided by their invocation of
knowledge, that this knowledge approaches the status of objectivity and that it will
enable them accurately to predict the effects of their actions. Over the last twenty
years these assumptions have been the object of sustained assault that can be gath-
ered loosely under the banner of postdevelopment.
1.2 A History of Postdevelopment
In large part the postdevelopment critique can be traced to an article written by
Arturo Escobar in which he applied the work of Foucault to the field of development
(Escobar. 1984) E Contrary to most studies of western bureaucracies (Heyman. 2004).
Escobar recognized development experts and their bureaucracies as instruments of
domination. They were, in his words, means for the "extension to the Third World of
Western disciplinary and normalizing mechanisms and the production of discourses by
Western countries about the Third World" (Escobar. 1984). This was said to extend
Western domination through three strategies: by progressively increasing the number
of problems within its domain by creating abnormalities such as the malnourished and
the illiterate for which it has the solution: by professionalizing development such that
experts "remove from the political realm problems which would otherwise be political
and recast them into the apparently more neutral realm of science" (Escobar. 1984.
p. 387): and by undermining local centres of power and knowledge by centralizing
1 The power of Foucault's work is most keenly felt when it is applied to the study of those systems
of knowledge and attendant institutions in which the conduct of a group of humans (who are marked
by some lack or deficit) becomes the object of knowledge of and legitimate terrain of intervention
for another group of humans (marked as 'normal’). The field of development is an almost perfect
fit for the theoretical apparatus Foucault developed for his studies of topics such as penality and
sexuality. The insights made possible by application of his theory have produced an explosion of
scholarship and research.
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responsibility for and the knowledge of a ruinous development in large institutions
such as the World Bank (Gilbert. 2002: Gosovic. 2000: Kothari. 2005: Mehta. 2001:
Weber, 2004).
Escobar's analysis is deeply indebted to Foucault's study of penalty. In Disci-
pline and Punish (1979) Foucault documents the increasing number of behaviours
subject to correction, the increasing specificity of knowledge of those behaviours, and
the status gained by penal knowledge though its scientific basis. This is linked to
the metaphor of a panopticon: a wheel-shaped prison wherein the dark central hub
is occupied by guards whose penetrating gaze enables them to know absolutely the
prisoners who are located in well lit cells arranged around the rim. This knowledge en-
ables these guards appropriately to discipline their wards who. unable to see into the
central tower, gradually come to govern their own behaviour. Moving this metaphor
to the field of development, this first postdevelopment intervention reads develop-
ment professionals as the guards within the tower, expert knowledge as produced by
their gaze and the disciplining actions of the guards as the naturalized practices of
development professionals.
In order to counter the extension of western domination Escobar looks beyond the
gaze enabled by the discourse of development for political inspiration. Ele suggests
that resistance to development is to be found in the rise of popular counter-power for
social transformation (Escobar. 1984. p. 391). This brings forward the notions of re-
jected knowledges and of radical pluralism that we can find in Foucault. Importantly,
in making this move he does not presume that all groups external to development
share a common discourse. He recognizes that each of these groups may have radi-
cally different knowledges and lie argues for the formation of alliances between these
communities.
In this initial foray we have, on the one hand, development professionals who
are integral to and indistinguishable from the apparatus of development that they
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collectively constitute, and. on the other, we have the subjects of social movements,
who are located outside of the sway of the disciplinary and normalizing processes
effected through development. Contrary to much of the proceeding literature, which
represented development professionals as powerful agents of change (for better or
for worse) and people in the Third World as powerless victims of circumstance who
respond predictably to developmental stimuli. Escobar gives us development profes-
sionals who are bound by circumstance to harm the beneficiaries of development and
Third World subjects who are agents of progressive political change.
A few years later James Ferguson (1990) examined the activities of the Canadian
International Development Agency (C'lDA) in Lesotho. The project that concerned
Ferguson was an attempt to improve livelihoods for individuals who lived in high-
land areas. Ferguson’s text is a detailed exploration of the limits that the discourse
of development places on knowledge production and what he calls the 'instrument
effects' of development. He found that development professionals consistently made
errors in their characterization of the field of action, misunderstood those with whom
they were working, were blind to a range of effects of their intervention and failed
to realize their stated objectives. For example "project documents nearly always
exaggerated the importance of agriculture and understated or ignored the role of mi-
grant labour" which was "of course the most important way by far that ‘farmers’ in
Lesotho obtained cash’’ (Ferguson. 1990. p. 82). In these representations Ferguson,
like Escobar, is giving us development professionals who are determined by an inade-
quate discourse to produce knowledge which, when acted on. inevitably brings harm
to those it purports to serve.
Watt's contribution to Power of Development (Crush. 1995) and Escobar’s En-
countering Development (1995) add a more detailed consideration of professionals’
roles in the discourse of development. Watts describes development professionals as
follows:
While a great deal is already understood about the political economy of such
[development! organizations, much less is known about how they [development
experts] function as organs within a political economy of truth (Pottier 1992:
Hobard 1993). Development experts inhabit these institutional environments
as cosmopolitan intellectuals, members of a 'new tribe' (Hannerz 1990: Klit-
gard 1990). The} are the scribes who oversee the production and reproduction
of knowledge and practices which purport to measure well-being and poverty,
national growth and standards of living, who negotiate the re-entry of national
economies into the world market through the science of adjustment, who at-
tempt to 'mobilize' and 'animate' peasants in the name of basic needs (Watts.
1995. p. 55).
Complementing the earl}- work of Escobar and Ferguson. Watts' portrayal of a cos-
mopolitan tribe supports the argument that expert knowledge is produced by. in and
for a community that is far removed from the local conditions in which development
activities are necessarily conceived and executed. Insofar as these professionals can
be said to oversee, to measure, to negotiate, to mobilize and to animate in accor-
dance with their foreign science, they are constrained in their ability to recognize
and use local knowledge. If we take the metaphor of the scribe literally, profession-
als are to be understood to re/produce in written form the law of the discourse of
development. That is. the texts they produce are spoken through them by their dis-
course. Finally, their knowledge is seen as analogous to that of the penetrating gaze
of the prison guard within Foucault's panopticon insofar as that knowledge is read as
objective and as constituting its human objects as legitimate and pliable objects of
professionals' remedial intervention.
In Encountering Development (1995) Escobar reproduces in greater detail his ear-
lier argument and extends his discussion of the conditions of formation and operation
of Watts' cosmopolitan tribe. This tribe is said to operate in the context of the
discourse of development which is:
...the system of relations [that] establishes a discursive practice that sets the
rules of the game: who can speak, from what points of view, with what au-
thority. and according to what criteria of expertise: it sets the rules that must
be followed for this or that problem, theory or object to emerge and be named,
analysed and eventually transformed into a policy or plan. (1995. p. 41)
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As in the case of the previous examples, professionals appear to be located as the
gaze in relation to which the field is constituted and within which their exercises of
power are naturalized. These individuals are authorized as professionals and differ-
entiated from the actors who are the objects of their gaze by the recognition of their
prior possession of a knowledge and competence by authoritative institutions such
as the United Nations, the IMF and the World Bank and. as the following quote
demonstrates, their location within these organizations:
... [economists, demographers, educators, and experts in agriculture, public
liealth. and nutrition elaborated their theories, [makejtheir assessments and
observations, and [design] their programs from these institutional sites, (ibid.)
This intervention continues to speak in terms of subjects who, once finding their home
within the discourse of development, are bound to see. think and take action solely
on the terms of that discourse.
Following the publication of Encountering Development in 1995 the focus of post-
development critiques shifted more to the topic of neoliberal globalization and. in
that context, drew heavily on Foucault's notion of governmentalitv. Within this liter-
ature relationships between the subjects and objects of development are understood
to be governmentalized when the human objects of development come willingly to
conform to the expectations of development. For example, a women's microcredit
project may be thought to produce subjects who see themselves as rational maxi-
mizers and as heads of households who accept full responsibility as clients for their
success within the project, who recognize as natural their location at the periphery of
a global neoliberal order and as subjects who desire those things which development
has identified as properly theirs (Sato. 2004). This pattern of critique goes on to
explore how producing these rational economic subjects is functional to the extension
and naturalization of this often monolithic-ally represented neoliberal globalization.
There is relatively little mention of professionals and their expertise in this glob-
alization literature. In the globalization literature the role of development is very
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specific. Development is to shape marginal populations so that they want to become
peripheral and exploited citizens within global capitalism. In this literature devel-
opment professionals are instruments functional to the extension of capitalism and
produce only a small portion of its horrors. Despite this marginalization, the basic-
features of the postdevelopment argument remain: the knowledge of external objects
that is produced by expert subjects continues to authorize actions whose consequence
is the harmful extension of western hegemony.
Thus far in this discussion of postdevelopment critiques I have spoken of develop-
ment on the terms supplied by Truman: as "a bold new program for making the ben-
efits of our scientific advances and industrial progress available for the improvement
and growth of underdeveloped areas" motivated by the recognition that " m] ore than
half the people of the world are living in conditions approaching misery" (1949). This
excerpt suppresses the political context in which the program was framed. In that
same inaugural address Truman argued that the United States, the global champion
of freedom, was now locked in struggle with a regime that was governed by the false
philosophy of Communism, that the nation that championed this false philosophy
posed a direct threat to the freedom cherished and championed by the United States,
that the work of the Marshall plan for the reconstruction of Europe had been success-
ful in thwarting the growth of Communism on that continent and that this proven
approach now needed to lie used to save those countries of the developing world that
were at risk of losing their freedom. Foreign direct assistance to developing countries,
thus, was central to America’s strategy in the Cold War. This provides the a solid
foundation for postdevelopment authors' charge that the extension of hegemony is
fundamental to development.
This reading of a founding and powerful ongoing theme within of the held of in-
ternational social and economic development has produced its own line of critique.
The held of international development is seen to have been complied in an American
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foreign policy that has and continues to involve genocide, ecological devastation, eco-
nomic exploitation, the fomenting of inter-ethnic violence, political corruption, the
deposition of democratically elected governments in favour of brutal dictatorships
and the creation of ideological and economic dependency. These last two. this line
of critique argues, were and remain the brief of the United States Agency for Inter-
national Development, the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund: those
organizations that were charged by the US government with the task of inoculating
the Third World against the scourge of Communism through interventions that, with
calculated hypocrisy, could be represented to the American public as proof of their na-
tion's beneficence. It is this neo-imperialism that has attracted the postdevelopment
critique I explore in this dissertation.
In his first intervention Escobar argued that development was a mechanism for the
"extension to the Third World of Western disciplinary and normalizing mechanisms
in a variety of fields: and the production of discourses by Western countries about the
Third World as a means of effecting domination over it” (1984). Escobar goes on to
note that if development "has failed to solve the problems of underdevelopment, it can
also be said, perhaps with greater pertinence, that it has succeeded well in creating a
type of underdevelopment which has been until now. for the most part, politically and
economically manageable" (ibid., p. 388). For Escobar development is a mechanism
which both brings countries that are susceptible to the influence of the USSR into the
sphere of influence of the United States and it produces a form of underdevelopment
that the United States is able to manage. Moving forward to look at the work done by
Ferguson (1990). in addition to arguing that the vision of development professionals
was constrained by the discourse of development, he noted that the tools used in
pursuit of this development project, such as setting up local offices, building access
roads and getting a better understanding of the local population, well served the
Government of Lesotho which had "intended that the project would eventually lead
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to the creation of a long-planned tenth administrative district" (ibid., p. 195) within
an area that previously lay largely outside of government control. In this text, which
is focused more on the structure of development than on its agents, development
professionals are constrained by its discourse such that they are unable to see things
that are relevant to their work and the actions they take in the name of development
are found to expose the underdeveloped to ever more invasive forms of government.
Watts (1995). for his part, was cited above as stating that development professionals
bring knowledge and practices to their work “which purport to measure well-being
and poverty, national growth and standards of living, who negotiate the re-entry of
national economies into the world market through the science of adjustment. . .
"
(ibid.,
p. 55). The world market of which Watts is speaking was. precisely a feature of the
global economic order championed by the United States. The alternative feared was
that these nations, absent the ideological and material support required to re-enter
that market, would become part of the economic order in which the USSR played a
central role.
In summary, postdevelopment critiques most often mix two components: first,
the contention that development is a mechanism by which the West covertly extends
its hegemony (Goodman, 2005: Ziai. 2004) and the second is their sometimes un-
even exploration of how that extension is effected. The role of development within
American Cold War foreign policy has. from its inception, been a matter of public-
record. These sorts of arguments are made today with, to offer just one example,
reference to the US interest in HIV/AIDS serving as cover for the need to secure ac-
cess to energy resources in Africa (Smith. 2004: Booker and Colgan. 2004; Klare and
Yolman. 2004; Prins. 2004). As these interventions demonstrate, there is no need to
invoke the apparatus provided by post-structural theory to argue that development is
a foreign policy instrument. In calling attention to the how of development, however,
postdevelopment critics are making an argument that they do not take up adequately
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ill their own work. These authors lay the foundations of an argument that inevitably
produces the conclusion that the structure of knowledge which we inherited from the
Enlightenment is such that its production and its invocation as justification for action
necessarily extends the influence of the community within which that knowledge is
produced. That is. all alliances between groups of unequal power which rely in the
last instance 2 on the knowledge of the dominant inevitably further subject the subor-
dinate. This second critique cuts right to the heart of the Enlightenment imaginary,
serves as the focus of this dissertation.
1.3 Reactions to Postdevelopment
Like all texts, postdevelopment critiques are written with intent. In this case the
intent is minimally to gain an audience and. taking the next step, to produce change.
In addition to the social movements that are so often discussed in their work, postde-
velopment interventions that appear in refereed journal and in edited volumes will Ire
read by current and future development professionals. Among those practitioners who
read and contribute to such journals, the interventions of postclevelopment authors
have prompted decidedly mixed reactions. Apologists for development 3 frequently
argue that postdevelopment is impractical, that that the age of development has
passed and our concern today is with globalization, that the development discourse
is not internally monolithic, and that the suggestions of postdevelopment authors are
susceptible to their own critique. With these in hand it is possible to argue that
2While the dominant may claim to be privileging the knowledge of the historically oppressed, the
actions taken by the dominant must, in the last instance, be justified on terms that are acceptable
to the dominant. The knowledge of the historically subordinate, therefore, is allowed only when it
has equivalents within the knowledge of the dominant and the recognition of this knowledge given
by the dominant is necessarily structured on its own terms and, therefore, unavoidably partial.
:} This dissertation does not take up the interventions or concerns of critics of development who
are less than enamoured by interventions that draw on poststructural thinkers (c.f. Storey (2000);
Pieterse (2000): Pickles (2001): Lehmann (1997): Kiely (1999): Hart (2001); Corbridge (1998))
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"we may have entered what might be thought of as the 'post-discourse' era where the
political disengagement and theoretical reductionism of deconstruction is increasingly
problematized and new agendas put forward" (Gardner and Lewis, 2000. p. 16). The
following sections summarizes, lays out the weaknesses of and responds to each of
these responses.
1.3.1 Be practical
Postdevelopment authors are often asked and judged unable to provide an ade-
quate answer to the question of how their "approaches might be fed into a practical
agenda" (Eyben. 2000. p. 7). This question mirrors those of authors concerned that
poststructural theory out of which postdevelopment emerges is at best politically
vacuous (Diawara. 2000) or. worse, actually stabilizes inequity by removing the abil-
ity to make powerful claims at precisely that time when the oppressed have gained
that ability (Fraser. 1989). These responses are rhetorically compelling for precisely
the reason they are irrelevant. In asking post- critiques to demonstrate their prac-
tical value these authors reserve for themselves the right to judge the practicality
of those post- interventions. In this case postdevelopment authors are being asked
to what extent their interventions support the work of development professionals -
where the developers asking the question understand their work to be a good way
to help the poor. Postdevelopment critiques, however, are challenging the discourses
within which these notions of practicality are formed. This demand for practicality,
then, is composed within a discourse whose foundations are the object of assault.
Stated metaphorically, apologists' requirement of practicality assumes the rug that
has just been ripped out from under their feet. Escobar's discourse, for example, rec-
ognizes development as a means by which the West effects domination over the Third
World (Escobar, 1984. p. 377). For him interventions are practical to the extent that
they make developers' jobs impossible. Thus, while demanding that postdevelopment
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authors be practical may comfort those internal to the discourse attacked by natu-
ralizing their rejection, it fails substantially to respond to this form of critique. From
the perspective of a postdevelopment author, developers are only able to accept their
work to the extent that those contributions support the extension of western hege-
mony. And from the perspective of developers, the postdevelopment critique removes
the only tools they have to improve the lot of those who live in the Third World.
Both critics' and practitioners’ conversations made good use of the term practi-
cality and. for the purposes of this chapter. I will assume that they do so in relation
to a common concern for the material conditions of the people both identify as poor.
This term, however, is articulated within mutually discontinuous discourses. In order
for Escobar's detractors to make this misrecognition they must presume it legitimate
to extend the sphere of application of their discourse of development such that oth-
ers' interventions are judged on their terms. This act signals that such authors are
blind both to their formation within discourse and specificity of that discourse to
a particular history... in this case that of the powerful. When taken to the level of
the field this makes it difficult for developers to recognize interventions as legitimate
unless they respond to the terms of their discourse. This limitation may undermine
the possibility of sort of authentic alliance that figures so prominently in the rhetoric
of development and which motivates this dissertation.
1.3.2 Its globalization now
Both in discussion and in the literature 1 have encountered arguments well exem-
plified by the statement that "Development as discourse has been replaced by glob-
alization" (Eyben, 2000. p. 12). Such assertions imply that with this displacement
postdevelopment critiques are rendered irrelevant. Many postdevelopment critiques
are composed in a manner that exposes them to this response. Those critics who
follow the example of the middle Foucault's Discipline and Punish proceed by illumi-
nating those practices that are naturalized within the discourse of development but
whose effects are abhorrent on its terms. Ferguson, for example, shows how develop-
ment inevitably subjugates those served (1990)... an outcome that is unacceptable
within a discourse committed to empowerment of the oppressed. In order to make
such arguments convincing these authors have used discourses that readers accept.
At the time Ferguson was writing that was the discourse of development. Today the
discourse may be globalization. With this shift Ferguson’s framing of his critique
has been antiquated. This, however, does not mean that the phenomena that at-
tracted his interest and in response to which his critique was framed have in any way
changed. The argument that the ascent of globalization renders postdevelopment
critiques irrelevant perhaps too conveniently mistakes the substance of the postde-
velopment critique for the means of its expression. Practices whose effects attract
critique in development (e.g. practices that produce and maintain extremes of wealth
and poverty) may be re-naturalized within an infinite series of new discourses. This
can be found in the sequence colonialism=ydevelopment=>giobalisation.
1.3.3 Development discourse is not monolithic
An easy grievance to raise with postdevelopment authors is that they inaccurately
assert that there is a single discourse of development. A good example of this charge
is the assertion that “deconstruction can only become politically engaged show the
possibility of change when it is used to demonstrate the fluidity and heterogeneity of
discourses within development" (Gardner and Lewis. 2000. p. 16). Such assertions,
however, are often followed by arguments that demonstrate a lack of understanding
of discourse. For example, the quotation just given is followed by the assertion that
the 1997 British foreign aid agency's high level policy document (the White Paper)
represented a fundamental shift in the development discourse in Britain. This claim
was supported with the argument that the elimination of the buy British policy indi-
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cated a substantial change in development discourse. ..a suggestion that was followed
two sentences later with the observation that this change followed the realization that
"greater benefits would accrue to the UK economy from untying aid" (Gardner and
Lewis. 2000). 4 While this may be a shift in policy, it is consistent with the long
standing commitment to ensuring that the donor's economy realizes the maximum
possible benefit from the funds disbursed (Lenin. 1939).
In pointing out that differences may obtain within a single discourse I am not
suggesting that there is only one discourse in development. There may be multiple
discourses in development, but discursive heterogeneity is not found by tracing con-
flicting opinions. Rather, these differences are found through a multiplicity of studies
that each examine the rules of formation of statements from the perspective (s) of
their authors. These studies may reveal that identical statements derive from dis-
continuous discourses (e.g. 'social capital' as formed within Christian and secular
discourses) while apparent differences (e.g. microcredit vs. large infrastructure) may
exist within a common discourse (e.g. neoliberalism).
Recognizing difference of opinion as variation in discourse is domesticating. This
error substitutes the manageable challenge of resolving differences for the much more
unsettling challenges of working in the context of divergent and unpredictably mu-
tually discontinuous discourses. If development professionals recognized knowledge
claims as formed in divergent discourses they would have to accept the potential par-
ity of those discourses with that of development. This would force them to abandon
the pretensions of universality that are foundational to the self proclaimed neutrality
that characterizes the discourse of development . Removing this illusion would make
it far more difficult to justify the imposition of the goods and practices prescribed
4 Why untying aid renders greater benefit to the T'K economy is not explained in the article. My
presumption is that a financial analysis determined that a greater fraction of the resources disbursed
as foreign direct assistance would return ultimately to the UK economy if initial disbursal was untied.
I have been unable to find the study which the author must have been referencing.
by the discourse of development on its 'beneficiaries’ and it would be much harder to
claim that the mechanisms by which development knowledge are produced can fairly
arbitrate between competing claims.
In this section I have recounted the arguments that postdevelopment critiques
are impractical, that they are made irrelevant by rise of globalisation and that they
inaccurately represent the discourse of development as monolithic. In response I
have suggested that apologists are blind to the locality of their own formation, over-
look the instrumental link between language and practice and misunderstand dis-
course. Whether or not the objections of these apologists are well founded, their
effect remains: development professionals may legitimately reject the interventions of
postdevelopment authors. This rejection arrests further exploration both of the con-
tributions of the postdevelopment critique and those within the poststructural theory
from which which it has emerged.
The arguments authored by critics of postdevelopment are weak. This, however,
does not mean that the work done by postclevelopment authors is well formed. The
following section asks whether the arguments of postdevelopment authors are inter-
nally coherent through a sustained examination of the articulation of knowledge, of
power and of the subject within their interventions.
1.4 Knowledge, Power and the Subject in Postdevelopment
Postdevelopment authors are in an uncomfortable position. They are concerned
that development is an instrument by which the West extends its hegemony. They
have taken that concern into the discursive framework provided by poststructural-
ism. Within that framework they found analytical tools that well equipped them to
explain how it is that development serves as a mechanism for the extension of hege-
mony. The problem with which they are faced is how to give voice to those highly
critical analyses on terms that are recognizable as legitimate by those who are formed
within and conditioned by the very discourse of which postdevelopment authors are
critical. Postdevelopment authors take up those aspects of the discourse they are cri-
tiquing that are necessary to secure the credibility of their contributions. Specifically,
postdevelopment authors have instrument ally adopted notions of knowledge, of power
and of the subject that are recognizable by those who are working in development.
In addition, perhaps, to making their interventions more credible to their intended
audience, these appropriations have both introduced contradictions into their argu-
ment and obscured understandings that may support the emergence of alliances that
benefit the social movements championed by postdevelopment authors.
1.4.1 Knowledge
Postdevelopment authors use knowledge in two ways. First the knowledge cre-
ated and used by development professionals figures prominently in their work as an
object of critique. This is postdevelopment authors describing development knowl-
edge. Second, in order to challenge the knowledge of development, postdevelopment
authors make competing knowledge claims. This is postdevelopment authors rhetori-
cally invoking their own knowledge. While the first of these provides postdevelopment
authors with a new and productive object of critique and the second secures for them
a legitimate voice, both uses produce effects that contradict their intent.
1.4. 1.1 Knowledge as critiqued
Knowledge can be read as having two distinct moments. The first, and more
familiar, presents knowledge as accurate statements about the real world. Within
development the epistemological conditions required for this reading are met through
an appeal to scientific or quasi-sc-ientific methods. For example, the poverty assess-
ment strategies used by the World Bank are recognized as producing valid knowledge.
The second, and more Foucauldian, moment presents knowledge as statements that
make it legitimate, if not necessary, for an appropriately qualified subject who occu-
pies an equally legitimate position of authority to exercise her power in a narrowly
specified manner. For example, if the country analyst for Cambodia is presented
with appropriately prepared documents that indicate that a CIDA funded project in
Cambodia is not meeting expectations, she is understood as having the right, ability
and obligation to require mid-term revisions.
The mechanisms by which knowledge has been produced in development are unsta-
ble. equivocal and limited. Since the field was founded the rules about who can make
knowledge claims, from what sorts of locations these claims can emerge what proce-
dures are to be followed in their production have and continue to change. This can
be traced in the rapid succession of and current debates over the merits of the meth-
ods by which development professionals are required to produce knowledge. Turning
to equivocation, when producing the documents that guide practice, those who are
responsible for preparing key documents are required to review the sometimes in-
consistent conclusions of other agencies working in an area, they must consult with
stakeholders who often have competing interests, the variety of research techniques
they deploy may produce varied results, and they have to screen what they learn
through possibly mutually incompatible considerations (such as those of gender, en-
vironment and democratization). In these situations it is the person 'holding the pen'
who is asked to exercise their best judgement in producing a document that will sup-
port the ability of the donor responsibly to disburse resources in a recipient nation.
\\ liile this author may be comfortable with their decisions, those who surround them
are just as likely to regard the choices they made as shaped by bias. Third, in inter-
views with development professionals about current practice I found that they, when
asked under amiable conditions, are happy to talk about the limitations of knowledge
within development. For example they cited the impossibility of accurately predict-
ing the outcomes of what they plan and the equal difficulties involved in tracing the
effects of development interventions as they ripple into the communities in which de-
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velopment activities are located. Further, these professionals tell stories about times
when it became clear that the data presented to them was prepared in anticipation of
their biases, affirm that time limitations on their work makes certainty impossible and
recognize that the variations from one context to another makes it largely impossible
meaningfully to aggregate data.
Unlike the ideal situation, where the gradual deposition of facts gradually builds
an unequivocal structure of knowledge, the levels of uncertainty, the mutual contra-
diction of the factors involved, and the instability of accepted procedures can. taken
together, be recognized as over-determining the content of the knowledge claims made
by professionals. Despite these recognized limitations, official development texts are
often represented both in functional and critical discussions as containing an ideally
unequivocal knowledge.
Mirroring the process of knowledge production, the content of the documents that
authorize the movement of resources can be understood to under-determine the range
of practice that they support. When translating from the text to the field it is possible
to justify a wide range of activities only some of which were anticipated by those who
prepared the authorizing documents. For example, one long running project that
gives women wheat in exchange for their work repairing roads in a rural area has
been justified variously on the terms of food assistance, infrastructure improvement,
agriculture, economic development and women in development. With this notion
of under-determination it is possible to recognize the effect of development planning
documents as more bounding the justifiable than specifying the actual: a shift that has
significant implications for understanding the function of the discourse of development
in shaping conduct, for the role of the development professional in the delivery of
aid and for the manner in which development professionals may be approached and
engaged as allies.
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In summary, the path followed in producing knowledge can be read as over-
determining its content, and that same knowledge can be seen to nncler-determine
the activities that can be justified through its invocation. Insofar as these slippages
within the discourse of development are seen as subsequent to the recognition of devel-
opment as a mechanism by which the West extends its hegemony, it is not surprising
that they have been overlooked by postdevelopment authors. This habit of mind has
denied those same critics the ability to recognize that these very slippages are both
a condition required for development to be bent to external purposes, such as mar-
ket creation for donor country capitalist firms, and an opportunity through which a
competing program, if properly conceived, could be introduced.
1.4. 1.2 Knowledge as rhetorically deployed
To date postdevelopment authors have challenged development by producing com-
peting knowledge claims. These competing claims are assembled in a way that they
hope will be convincing to an audience that accepts the law of the discourse of de-
velopment. For example. Ferguson (1990) Escobar (1984: 1995) and Mitchell (1995:
2002) all strengthen their claims by offering representations of the field that draw
on facts that did not find their way into official texts. This is well exemplified by
Mitchell's tracing the effects of accepting representations of Egypt's development
problem as being defined by the natural collision of a burgeoning population limited
to the Nile valley (ibid.). In order to destabilize this foundational trope. Mitchell in-
troduces a range of facts excluded from the representation found within development
texts and from this re-constituted basis he produces an alternative knowledge which,
if accepted, would justify the pursuit of different interventions. Careful presentation
of such alternative claims makes it possible for development professionals to ques-
tion whether or not their knowledge is accurate. In critiquing this justification, these
strategies overlook the possibility raised in the previous section: that the content of
the knowledge claims made by professionals are over-determined by their processes
of formation and that their invocation under-determines the range of actions which
may retrospectively justified by their invocation. While this strategy may strengthen
the rhetorical force of postdevelopment authors' arguments, it comes at the expense
of reinforcing precisely those notions of knowledge inherited from the Enlightenment
that initially attracted the critique of poststructural authors.
A brief discussion of the role of right in Foucault's work makes it possible to see
one of the costs that is being paid by postdevelopment authors for their rhetorical
deploy of knowledge. Foucault’s work traces the history of regimes of power. In
this study he dwells on what he identifies as the transition from earlier relations
of sovereignty to the domination that characterizes modern relations of discipline.
In this second arrangement one party defines the actions and. later, the desires of
another through ever more psychologically invasive methods. These invasive practices,
importantly, are justified by reference to knowledge possessed by the dominant party.
This can be found in the case of the previously mentioned example of women’s micro-
credit activities. Developers, in this case, deploy a knowledge they are convinced is
helpful. Postdevelopment authors, for their part, understand this as having the effect
of producing women who aspire to be neo-classical rational economic maximizers
pursuing the fantasies of petty capitalists in a peripheral location within a global
order whose history and current inequities they are taught to accept as natural (Sato.
2004 ).
One of Foucault's arguments is that of late relations of domination, such as those
which empower these women to take up their peripheral location, have come increas-
ingly to displace relations of sovereignty and that the conflict that this should have
produced has been suppressed through the invocation of the apparent neutrality of
science. That is. the apparent objectivity of science naturalizes and thereby obscures
the domination intrinsic to the disciplinary relationship justified by the invocation of
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its findings. In this context Foucault states that it is "against this ascent of a power
that is tied to scientific knowledge, we find that there is no solid recourse available
to us today" (1980. p. 107). So. while postdevelopment authors' invocation of a
scientific knowledge might secure for them an initial audience, it limits their political
horizon0 to that which can be justified by the very scientific approaches that are being
used to naturalize our transformation into a societv of control (Deleuze. 1992) and it
fails to provide the ground required for the emergence of a new form of justification or
right, "one which must indeed be anti-disciplinarian, but at the same time liberated
from the principle of sovereignty" (Foucault. 1980. p. 208).
1.4.2 Power
As stated previously, postdevelopment authors largely describe development as a
mechanism by which the West extends its hegemony over the Third World. This is
generally seen a three-step process. First, the developed world is thought to accept an
idealized vision of itself as the model to which the underdeveloped is to aspire. Sec-
ond. development professionals are understood to produce knowledge that describes
the condition of the underdeveloped in a manner that both identifies gaps between
their condition and the first-world norm and presents that gap in a manner that
is amenable to solution through the forms of intervention available to development.
Finally, bringing together the norm and the prescriptive accounts of deviation from
that norm confers on professionals the right they require to initiate the development
interventions whose effect is to extend western hegemony.
Since the inception of the field of development the exercise of this right has taken
a number of forms. At the outset development interventions tended to follow the
Marshall plan for the reconstruction of Europe insofar as they focused on the estab-
’The notion of horizon, as deployed here, is borrowed from Gadamer’s Truth and Method where
he suggests that every standpoint necessarily has a horizon that delimits the knowable (1975. p.
269).
lishment physical and political infrastructure and assumed that people from develop-
ing countries would take up the roles anticipated by that structure. The failure of
these subjects to take up the roles anticipated by development precipitated a gradual
move from a focus on producing appropriate infrastructure to producing appropriate
subjects. Throughout this history the exercise of power through these interventions
has been recognized by postdevelopment authors as the process, whether intentional
or not. by which by one group (i.e.. the West) dominates another (i.e.. the Third
World) and its evolution is seen as the move from providing external conditions for
modernization to disciplining the minds and hearts of its beneficiaries such that they
become ‘modern’ subjects.
A somewhat different reading of Foucault, mentioned briefly in the section on
knowledge above, yields an understanding of power that is less initially compelling
but more politically fertile. Within a moment of Foucault’s thought that seems to
be particularly influential within postdevelopment authors work (1980. p. 206-208)
power is discussed in two rather distinct ways. In the first power is seen as the play
of force on a battlefield and second as domination. The power that is produced on
the battlefield assumes the sovereignty of the agents and can be understood as that
which arises from the mutual impingement of individuals’ expression of their ability
(their power) to act. In the second power is understood as the ability to control
another’s action. This shift is well exemplified by the changing nature of conflict
that arises when a developing country ’modernizes' its agricultural sector. Mitchell’s
(2002) discussion of the history of agriculture in Egypt notes that the annual flood of
the Nile displaces many survey markers and changes the lay of he land. In the early
stages of colonization the allocation of land following the flood was determined by
negotiations between land-holders mediated by locally empowered individuals. The
agreements reached between these individuals were recorded both with field markers
and with tallies kept by the local mediator in a local shed. This serves as an example
of an early stage of relations of sovereignty that were negotiated locally and not
subject to the gaze of a central authority. Over time colonial administrators who
came to take an active role in this process and the right of these ancient or feudal
land-holders to take part in these negotiations was displaced by the authority of
the colonial office. The lot of farmers, literally speaking, came to be determined
by colonial officers in Cairo who justified their decisions by reference to the sciences
of cartography, of agriculture and of economics. In this second case the lots were
determined and the tallies kept in a central office that was not open to the gaze of
the local. The insurrection of these sciences has naturalized a ’modernization’ of
agriculture in Egypt which has displaced the relations of sovereignty through which
farmers would determine both their lot and the use tliev made of it.
In summary, postdevelopment authors use of power as domination makes it pos-
sible for them to point out those moments where, rather than encouraging the emer-
gence of relations of sovereignty, development creates conditions within which its
objects come to recognize taking up subordinate positions within a disciplinary order
that is not of their making and not constituted with their benefit in mind as the path
to their liberation. While this critique does make it possible to see the undesirability
of a range of effects of development, it comes at the expense of making it impossi-
ble to recognize power as an expression of ability. This forces them to look beyond
the terrain within which development is dominant and to overlook the possibility of
supporting the emergence of relations of sovereignty within the held illuminated by
development.
1.4.3 The subject
There are two distinct kinds of subjects within postdevelopment texts. The first
is that of development professionals and others who are within the discourse of de-
velopment and the second is the subject that postdevelopment authors reserve for
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themselves and ascribe to those who serve as their political vanguard. These, and
their instrument effects, will be discussed in turn.
1.4. 3.1 The expert subject
Development professionals are represented in the work of postdevelopment authors
as spoken by the discourse of development and as unable to escape the consequences
of that formation. Fixing the expert subject as the moment of articulation of the
discourse of development enables postdevelopment authors powerfully to question
the notion that development professionals, despite their failures to date, are able to
learn and to act and that their actions will eventually produce a successful (western)
development. Postdevelopment's representation of these professionals as spoken di-
minishes their stature which, critics might hope, increases the rhetorical purchase of
political visions that are not founded within the narrative of western development.
One complication produced by this approach becomes visible when we recognize
that a good number of the people who will read these postdevelopment authors are.
or will be. development professionals. If these professionals are spoken, they will
not have the agency required either to recognize as legitimate or to take the actions
recommended by postdevelopment authors. If. on the other hand, these profession-
als are not spoken, they will reject their characterization within postdevelopment
critiques and. as such, they are likely to be very suspicious of the remainder of post-
development authors' interventions. Either wav. one effect of the representation of
development professionals as spoken by their discourse is that it becomes very difficult
for them to be moved by postdevelopment critiques. The representation offered of
development professionals by postdevelopment authors, therefore, does not provide
conditions that support the sort of conversations that may lead to change, which once
again, compels postdevelopment authors to limit their politics to the endorsement of
social movements that are found outside of the shadow cast by development.
1.4. 3. 2 The critical subject
The characteristics that postdevelopment authors reserve for themselves and those
who compose their vanguard differ markedly from those attributed by these critics
to development professionals. While development professionals are spoken by their
discourse and determined to do harm, postdevelopment academics and those who
compose new social movements are able to exercise the kind of choice needed mean-
ingfully to oppose the creeping hegemony that is articulated through those profession-
als. Curiously, there are strong parallels between the subject that postdevelopment
authors tacitly retain for themselves and the subject that operational development
texts ascribe to development professionals.
Every field and sub-field within development has its own associated collection of
texts that variously specifies wliat information these professionals must command,
what skills they must be able to deploy and what dispositions will increase the prob-
ability of their success. Quite a number of these texts then go on to explain in some
detail the processes by which these three are to be combined in order to produce
either the knowledge that is necessary for the practice of development or the prac-
tices that are necessary for tire success of development. Of the texts that take up the
question of the expert and his or her expertise I have chosen to work with Fry and
Thurber's The International Education of the Development Consultant (1989). This
text, which is very widely cited, does not operate at the level of a specific field within
development, and is substantially more reflective than most. As the title suggests.
The International Education of the Development Consultant is focused entirely on the
questions of professionals and their expertise and its purpose is to improve practice
in the field of development. This text suggests that good professionals have:
• technical expertise
• communicative competence
• ethnic humility
• success in building local capacity
• ability to foster local participation
• sense of diplomacy and politics
• degree of commitment and willingness to serve
• sense of history
• degree of selflessness
• ability to be a team player and work in groups (p. 84-89)
For their part, postdevelopment authors need the technical expertise required to
produce texts that are recognized as knowledge, they need to be able to communicate
both with members of social movements and with their audiences, they need to be
aide to listen and learn while in the field, they need to work in a way that recognizes
and supports these movements, they need to be tactful both in their practice and in
their writing, they need to be committed to their work, they need to understand the
current context in light of its complex histories of formation, they can not place their
own concerns first and they must be able to work as a member of a larger alliance.
The subject that we find in Foucault is in many ways much closer to that ascribed
by postdevelopment authors to development professionals than it is that attributed by
either group to themselves. During the period of his writing that seems to be particu-
larly influential in these conversations Foucault stated that "[w]e are constructs—that
is. our experience of our very subjectivity is a construct mediated by and/or grounded
on a social discourse that is way beyond individual control” (1984. p. 83) to which
he adds that "the body is the inscribed surface of events (traced by language and
dissolved by ideas)" (ibicl. p. 148). that we are constrained to discover the truth in
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accordance with the dictates of these discourses and that "[t]he individual is an effect
of power, and at the same time, or precisely to the extent to which we are that effect,
we are the element of its articulation" (1980. p. 98). Once framed in this manner
it is possible to see how these postdevelopment authors can be read as retaining for
themselves and their chosen political agents both a subject and agency that their
Foucauldian foundation does not permit and which they deny to development profes-
sionals.
In the previous section I found that postdevelopment critiques are poorly under-
stood and easily dismissed by development professionals. In this section I found that
the strategies that postdevelopment authors have used in giving voice to their critique
produce at least three effects that constrain the political field in which they then sub-
sequently work. First, their use of competing knowledge claims may secure for them
a receptive audience but it locates their interventions within the very Enlightenment
tradition that is identified as fundamental to the emergence of a society of control.
Second, in working with power as domination it is possible to see those moments
where development requires that its subjects take up subordinate positions within a
disciplinary order that is certainly not of their making, but this comes at the expense
of requiring that postdevelopment authors place their political hope in actors who
are not yet contaminated by the discipline of development. Third, postdevelopment
authors' tendency to describe development professionals as spoken lay their discourse
while reserving for themselves and their chosen vanguard substantial political agency
provides their detractors with the grounds necessary to suggest that their use of post-
structural analytics is purely instrumental and. as such, their interventions can easily
be dismissed as so much window dressing. These combine to create a situation where
development professionals and postdevelopment authors are stripped of the political
inclination to explore the possibility of their collaboration, of a terrain within which
they could explore the productivity of that collaboration and of the theoretical tools
with which they may undertake that exercise. The following section asks whether or
not this outcome is inevitable given the nature of the poststructural theory on which
postdevelopment authors draw.
1.5 The limit of postdevelopment
As I have mentioned above, postdevelopment theory draws on a particular period
in the development of Foucault's thought. This period, which dates to the 1970s.
is one of the most constraining moments in the evolution of his thought. In this
section I will start from the least accommodating texts from that period and. on the
terms he offers therein, ask whether or not it is possible to find room for maneuver
that has been overlooked by postdevelopment authors6 . In this section I will look
specifically at the questions of the subject and agency, of knowledge and hegemony,
and of discourse and change within this highly determinist Foucault.
1.5.1 The subject and agency
Up to this point I have largely retained a familiar subject. For example, in ad-
dressing the charge of internal inconsistency I used the notion of horizon in a way
that implied that the subject found at the centre of that horizon exists independent
of that location. This subject, however, does not appear in the the work of Foucault
that lias so influenced the postdevelopment critique. In his middle years Foucault was
more likely to ask how it was that certain subjects were spoken by discourse than he
was to ask how a subject speaks. Alcoff states that according to Foucault ”[w]e are
constructs-that is. our experience of our very subjectivity is a construct mediated by
and/or grounded on a social discourse that is way beyond individual control" (Alcoff.
(>My strategy of faulting students invocation of Foucault's work is by no means unique. See
further Hook (2001 ) for an example external to development and Ziai (2004) for an intervention
that complements that presented in this dissertation.
1995, p. 440). Foucault goes further and undermines the atomistic self that is the
agent of free will. He states that “the body is the inscribed surface of events (traced
by language and dissolved by ideas), the locus of a disassociated Self (adopting the
illusion of a substantial unity)" and that his task is to “expose a body totally im-
printed by history" (Foucault. 1984. p. 148). Further complicating things, he goes on
to assert that we are constrained to discover the truth in accordance with the dictates
of these discourses and that “The individual is an effect of power, and at the same
time, or precisely to the extent to which we are that effect, we are the element of its
articulation" (Foucault. 1980. pp. 93. 98). This Foucault is read to state that we
are determined, that there is no common-sense subject and that this fragmented and
misnamed individual is an effect of power. This all leaves the question of how we are
to regard the claims of agency both required by poststructuralist critics themselves
and that imputed by them for those who appear as agents in their work.
Though problematic in its own right, one approach that largely remains within
the framework of Foucault's middle years is his statement that: "I am a pluralist:
the problem which I have set myself is that of the individualization of discourses"
(Foucault. 1991. p. 54). If there are many discourses, then we may participate
concurrently in more than one. For example, locals are employed as cultural brokers
precisely for their ability' to act through multiple discourses. On this model, when rip-
body is 'inscribed upon by history', that inscription can be read as mediated through
multiple discourses. To the extent that those discourses are mutually discontinuous,
the inscriptions of history on my bod}' can be thought of as equivocal.
While introducing the notion of concurrent formation through mutually discon-
tinuous discourses may deal with the charge of determination, it does not necessarily
retrieve the coherent agency normally thought necessary to capitalize on those free-
doms. Specifically, this approach does not allow for a standpoint outside of discourse
from which the subject can choose between the ends presented through his or her
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multiple constitutive discourses nor is there an touchstone that can Ire used to main-
tain the purity of conviction once action has been undertaken. Within this line of
poststructuralist thinking we are always uncertain authors both of ourselves and of
our ends. Granting this uncertainty need not produce the paralysing fatalism post-
structuralists are accused of purveying.
1.5.2 Knowledge and hegemony
Positing a diversity of active discourses in the field of development changes how
we understand the charge of hegemony levelled by postdevelopment authors. In the
case of a monolithic discourse, knowledge would be understood as produced within
a single discourse from conception to implementation. In the case of a plurality
of discourses, however, the dominance of a single discourse could be understood as
a self-perpetuating consequence of individually rational but collectively sub-optimal
choices. That is. the apparent hegemony of a single discourse could be the collective
product of individuals' decisions, once having coined an intervention in a subordinate
discourse, to cash it out in terms of the discourse which, by their action, they have
confirmed as dominant. An example of this can be found in religiously inspired or-
ganizations who may compose interventions within discourses of salvation but who
recast them in order to secure secular funding.' This possibility offers a much more
complex picture than that of the simple dominance that can be found in several post-
structural critiques of development. In observing that there may be discontinuities
that shape translation in development I am not making the romantic and impossible
suggestion there are discourses that are both subordinate and somehow authentically
‘other’ whose knowledges ought to be privileged, nor am I arguing that nothing good
can come of development. This would lead us potentially into a very dangerous lo-
calism (Mohan and Stokke. 2000). Rather, the suggestion here is that representing
See further (Nichols, 1988).
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a discourse as both monolithic and superordinate allows its subjects to remain igno-
rant of its own specificity. This, in turn suppresses our ability set aside our romantic-
delusions of alterity and recognize the multiplicity of local knowledges and practices
as the diverse products of collisions between a knowledge that arrogates to itself the
status of universality and those identified from that tenuous vantage as local (Curry.
2003; Diawara, 2000. p. 368). The tendency in these postdevelopment texts to reify
both the local and the dominant has. ultimately, the perverse effect of limiting post-
development authors' ability to recognize precisely that complexity in the field of
development which is required by the radical pluralism championed by Foucault
.
1.5.3 Discourse and change
Poststructuralist analysis, as I have presented it. holds that subjects and their
discourses are mutually constitutive. As such, those who walk the halls of power in
others' service would be understood necessarily to be transformed by that experience
(e.g. they may be co-opted or sell out) while those from those halls would similarly
be transformed by time in the field (e.g. they may go native or lose perspective).
Though the nature and extent of such transformation is contingent on a variety of
conditions, not the least of which is historical relations of domination. I have found no
support for exempting those who identify themselves as having progressive agendas
from this rule. Within this line of post structuralist thought, those who intervene in
pursuit of change can never know the extent to which they are the authors of their
own convictions or that those convictions will remain.
The elimination of the spatial and temporal locations from which it is possible
to assign value to the consequences of the concurrent production of the subject and
their discourses yields the very nihilistic relativism of which this poststructuralism
is accused. Rather than respond directly to this charge, this line of thought shifts
the moment of judgement. That is. rather than presuming an impossible location
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from which we judge ends and the extent to which they are realized, this approach
asks after the relations of power that delimit the production both of the discourses
and of the subjectivities in whose interplay ends and the means for their pursuit are
articulated.
1.6 Conclusion
Postdevelopment authors have successfully deployed the work of philosophers such
as Foucault in the composition of a novel and telling critique of development. Their
efforts go bevond historical and current efforts which identify development as one
mechanism through which donor nations and powerful lobbies within those nations
pursue their own interests. Within the operation of development they identify the
mechanisms by which knowledge is produced and the manner in which actions are
justified through invocation of that knowledge as necessarily resulting in the extension
of the hegemony of the cultures out of which the international development effort has
emerged. The powerful observation that development professionals are constrained
to subject those they seek to serve to an expanding hegemony, however, suffers the
handicaps of being articulated within an intervention that is poorly understood and
easily rejected by development professionals. There are. as this chapter has demon-
strated. other directions in which it is possible to take even the most constraining
moments of the poststructural theory on which postdevelopment critiques are based.
The remainder of this dissertation builds on the recognition that postdevelopment
authors have only brought forward into their work a small portion of the insights
afforded by the poststructural theory on which they draw.
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CHAPTER 2
RESEARCH APPROACH
In the previous chapter development was discussed as an instrument of US foreign
policy. In that presentation development was seen in two distinct lights. First, it was
a means by which the US deployed its self professed inexhaustible knowledge in the
service of the improvement of the lot of the citizens of the Third World, and second,
it was the means by which the US thwarted the ambitions of its Cold War adversary
and in that process produced manageable forms of underdevelopment. These two.
as discussed, are inextricably mixed in the work of postdevelopment authors with
their claim that the structure of development inevitably extends western hegemony.
The relevance of this mixture to this dissertation is that these authors' analytical
approach to the study of development draws heavily on the work of Michel Foucault.
Foucault's fate, in the held of development studies at least, is linked to that of the
postdevelopment critique. The postdevelopment critique, however, has made partial
use of the theoretical tools he developed (Ziai. 2004). With the study of the deploy,
the responses to. and the tensions within, this approach I hope to have distinguished
sufficiently between the work of Foucault and his appropriation by postdevelopment
authors to allow me to invoke aspects of his work that are not currently used in the
study of development. This, in the language of the previous chapter, hopefully offers
a palate of theoretical tools broader than those used by postdevelopment authors with
which I may describe the how of development.
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2.1 Methodology
This dissertation, like any other research effort, necessarily involves building knowl-
edge. Knowledge, in this case, is born from the narratives offered in interviews.
Research subjects are not understood transparently to recount the raw events that
surround the phenomena of interest to a researcher. They are understood to be active
in producing (Scott. 1991: Stone-Mediatore. 1998). constantly re-constituting (John-
ston and Usher. 1997) and active in recounting (Sandelowski. 2002) their experience.
Recognizing that research subjects' accounts are not transparent has spawned an ex-
plosion in attempts to patch for that uncertainty. This can be found in discussions of
validity. Central to most attempts to improve validity is the assumption that the goal
of a research activity is to seek to understand an object that is external to the inves-
tigating subject. This can be found in the heavy emphasis on confirmatory strategies
such as triangulation (Damodaran and Roe. 1998) and the recent re-emergence of sci-
entism within qualitative research approaches (Maxwell. 2004). A common effect of
these confirmatory strategies is to reduce the variety of posted explanatory narratives
to those which can survive their examination. In this respect the narratives which
survive confirmation are effects of the theory invoked in that examination. Recogniz-
ing the bias that this may introduce, confirmatory exercises may require examination
guided by very diverse theoretical approaches (op. cit
.
) . The material that remains,
often a very small subset of the narrative content with which the confirmatory process
began, is then accepted as knowledge.
The research undertaken in this dissertation is not concerned with confirming a
knowledge. Its focus is the effects of the processes by which raw events are trans-
lated into experiences and those experiences are then woven into narratives. Over
the last twenty years a number of authors have contended that one effect of these
processes is the identity of the research subject (Mishler. 1986). According to this
line of argument, which has been identified with the social constructionist school, a
subject's identity is formed in part through the narratives they tell (Hermans, 2000:
Maclure. 1993: Presser. 2004: Schiffrin. 1996). These identities are not created out
of nothing. The individuals offering these narratives draw on the modes of thinking
(Ashworth. 1993) or narrative repertoire (Gudmunclsdottir. 1996) available to them.
In successfully invoking the discourses that are available to them (Anderson, 2004)
that individual is produced as a legitimate subject (Cheshire. 2000).
The narratives that these individuals voice produce more than themselves as legit-
imate subjects. In addition to creating and assigning characteristics to their audience
(Hermans. 2000) they also map and locate themselves within a terrain. The terrain
described, like the identity of the speaker itself, is also formed from narrative re-
sources readily available to the speaker. Both the subject and her held. then, are
artifacts of the intersection of modes of thinking that are readily available to the re-
search subject. When asked questions in areas that these subjects have not previously
considered. they may hesitate and be uncertain in composing these productive nar-
ratives. These initial constructions, however, quickly take on the value of pragmatic
truth (Anderson, 2004. p. 223).
Within this approach, then, individuals produce both themselves and the con-
texts in which they act through the selective invocation of narrative fragments that
are available to them m their immediate environment. It is possible to accept these
initial articulations and grant, for example, that assertions of a core essential self
constitute proof of the inaccuracy of poststructural notions of a dec-entered subject
(Fenwick. 1998). Emancipatory research must, however, recognize these pragmatic-
truths as the product of the combination of resources whose availability is shaped
both by the laws of the discourse from which the research subject is speaking and the
interview context itself (Talburt. 2004). Within this dissertation, then, the narratives
of research subjects are understood more to be transcriptions from their constitutive
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discourses (Foucault. 1977) than they are the purposive acts of autonomous individ-
uals.
The first step this dissertation takes in attempting to escape the constraints im-
posed by the hegemony of the discourse of development in its work with development
professionals is to assume that the dominance of a single discourse is never total.
Foucault was. by his own account, a pluralist (Foucault. 1991. p. 54). It. thus, reads
interview transcripts as the conglomerate artifact of a plurality of discourses. This
shifts the emphasis of analysis from tracing the contours of and condemning a dis-
course for the actions to which it determines its subjects to. first, individualizing the
discourses that are mixed in narrative and. second, exploring the nature of and the
exercises of power available to the subjects associated with each of those discourses.
These disparate themes, when elaborated, will suggest both different subjects (Ar-
chakis and Tzanne. 2005) and different terrains (Gibson-Graham. 1996). 1
This dissertation turns on the claim that subordinated discourses may produce
subjects who can contemplate actions that are unthinkable on terms that have, though
the sedimentation of the initially convenient but now inescapable, become impossi-
ble. The hope that underwrites this effort is that possibly, just possibly, the actions
suggested by the recognition of the plurality of these narratives may allow for the
emergence of alliances between the agents and beneficiaries of development that are
at least aware of the relationship discussed in previous chapters between the invoca-
tion of a knowledge with the extension of western hegemony. The closest analogue I
have found in the development literature is the notion of room for maneuver discussed
by Hilhorst in her study of NGOs in the Philippines (2001: 2003). She finds that ac-
tors find room within which they maneuver and that the compound effect of each
actor's room for maneuver within the operational hierarch}' linking a donor agency to
1 See further page 4 for a discussion of Gibson-Graham.
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recipients of aid utterly undermines the imaginary of rational planning as capable of
producing a predicable sequence of effects within an intended beneficiary population.
My use of the notion of room for maneuver differs from Hilhorst’s in two ways.
First, her deploy held constant the notion of an Enlightenment subject. Her subjects
were understood to be pursuing their own projects within the room for maneuver
that they in part created. This dissertation brings forward Hillrorst's use of the
notion of room for maneuver as being produced in part by an actor, but adds to her
analysis the possibility that this actor, itself, may be understood alternatively to be
drawing on and to be a channel through which these narratives flow (Anderson. 2004).
Second. Hilhorst’s work focused on staff in local and national NGOs. This intervention
builds on others' observation that focusing on the actions of the dominant (whether
critical or celebratory) has the effect of reducing analysts' ability to recognize the
importance of the subversive actions taken by the ‘beneficiaries' of a development
intervention (Diawara. 2000). This dissertation brings a measured scepticism for
ascribed homogeneity to its study of the practices and understandings of development
professionals in donor institutions.
2.2 Site selection
The next step that I must take prior to moving into a discussion of the methods
that I used for research is convincingly to argue that the development that I am
studying is not inextricably the development that is a mechanism for the extension
of western hegemony. There are two paths that can be followed to realize this end.
In the first I would argue that the critiques of postdevelopment apply less to periph-
eral donors than they do in the core donors. This would allow me to conclude that
the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) is to some extent distinct
from the United States' Agency for International Development (USAID). In order to
distinguish between peripheral and core donors in a manner that offers ground for
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the suggestion that there may be more room for maneuver afforded professionals in
donors such as CIDA I would have to establish that there are relevant differences.
In the second case I would accept that the characterizations of postdevelopment au-
thors illuminate one powerful thread of practice and effect that can be identified as
the instrumental deploy of development in the service of a national interest or, as
termed here, instrumental development. The illumination of instrumental develop-
ment. however, comes at the expense of the visibility of subordinated streams within
these very organizations. These may be built around concerns that might range from
enlightened self-interest born of the intrinsic stability of a more equitable global, a
secular (or not so secular) messianism or the recognition of the need for some sort of
reparations for the harms of colonialism whose illumination and championing might
serve effectively to destabilize the structures that justifiably attracted postdevelop-
ment critique. Of these two. options I have chosen to try and distinguish my research
site from the object of postdevelopment authors' critique.
Canada was first formally involved in foreign aid following a conference held in
Colombo in 1950 to discuss a joint request from Australia and Ceylon for the transfer
of capital and technical assistance from the white members of the Commonwealth
to newly independent nations in South East Asia. 2 Canada’s participation at this
event was suggested by the relative success of its involvement in the reconstruction
of Europe. Canada's role in securing a place in the Commonwealth for the newly
independent India and the concern that it would be politically unwise to allow the
nations of South East Asia to think that Canada was indifferent to their concerns.
At that meeting foreign aid was discussed on terms that mirrored closely those just
put forward by President Truman. The development proposed by Truman was both a
means by which it was possible to lift the masses from their poverty and to thwart the
-The history, though not the interpretation, provided in this section was drawn largely from
Morrison’s Aid and Ebb Tide (Morrison. 1998).
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danger posed by Communism. Initial responses to this framing of the importance of
development in Ottawa were decidedly mixed. For example, one block was convinced
that the problems of India's poverty would be better solved by the sale of the pooled
jewellery of the Maharajahs. Concerned that this venture not Ire overly expensive.
Canada took the positions of arguing in favour of respecting the complexity of social
conditions, of being concerned that foreign assistance only be provided when self-help
and mutual aid had been thoroughly explored, of ensuring that the funds allocated
would be spent effectively and of supporting small and local rather than large infras-
tructure investments. 3 This initial move into bilateral (government to government)
support was preceded slightly by Canada's early contributions to the emerging organs
of the United Nations that concerned themselves with questions of development. In
this period some politicians in Canada came both to realize that that participation
in foreign aid was one mechanism by which they could effectively improve Canada’s
stature in the international arena, that foreign aid could be an effective means of
dealing with Canada's surplus grain production and that there may be ways use aid
to increase market opportunities for Canadian firms.
In the early 1960s Canada's economy was not doing particularly well and the then
conservative government was at odds with the US government over defence policy. 4
That government reacted to US admonitions to increase foreign aid spending as yet
another example of the US meddling in Canadian affairs. They reduced funding for
foreign aid. With a change in government, and the innovation of soft loans pro-
grams in the mid 1960s. Canada’s aid contributions began to increase rapidly. In
the mid 1960s there was an active and successful separatist movement growing in
"These initial positions were quickly overtaken by almost exclusive support for the infrastructure
led approaches championed in early modernization theory.
4Much like today, the United States was concerned that Canada was not spending its fair share
on defence and the United States had made it very clear that development assistance was integral
to the cold war.
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Quebec, the Premiere of Quebec was in direct contact with the heads of state of
French speaking nations, the focus of Canada's aid in the Commonwealth was begin-
ning to attract very critical international coverage, and former French and Belgian
colonies in Africa were gaining independence. While these newly independent nations
were not particularly welcoming, Canada actively developed aid programs in several
of these nations and coupled that activity with a very public international touting
of Canada's bilingual status. This same time period coincided with the formation
of the Canadian International Development Agency under the guidance of a young
and phenomenally successful businessman and the declaration of the Federal Public-
Service as bilingual...which prompted aggressive recruitment from Quebec for those
agencies of the Federal Government, like the newly formed Canadian International
Development Agency, that were experiencing rapid growth.
This, as seen largely by one well studied and fairly uncontroversial author, brings
us to approximately 1969 (Morrison. 1998). A few paragraphs ago I proposed that
there were two paths I could follow in distinguishing between Canadian and American
foreign aid programs. The first was to argue that Canadian aid was not a cold war
strategy and the second was to argue that this thread was but one of many conver-
sations that shaped the practices of aid. The narrative just offered does not provide
a simple history. From this we cannot deduce that Canadian foreign assistance was
guided by Canada's desire to ride on the coat-tails of their US neighbours nor can
we conclude that this assistance was grounded fundamentally in the humanitarian
concern of the Canadian people. Rather, what we have is a picture of aid as a highly
contested terrain. Development professionals of that day and. as I will later argue,
today were acting in a context where they were buffeted continuously by mutually
contradictory imperatives. While it may have been politically useful at an organi-
zational level and at times psychologically necessary for individuals to reduce the
resulting dissonance, the contradictions intrinsic to the different forces contesting the
terrain of development assistance can be understood as providing for Canadian devel-
opment professionals a very different context than that which one would expect of a
more 'rationally' constituted bureaucracy. The very fractious and contested nature of
development in Canada, precisely its failure to respond coherently to a single imper-
ative. can be understood to provide a terrain within which development professionals
can find room for maneuver.
2.3 Subject Selection
The professionals with whom I was able to work were referred to me by a contact
that I have had within CIDA for many years. I discussed with him my interest in
having conversations in and around the topic of expertise in development and my
desire to work with people from a variety of backgrounds. This lead him to refer me
to individuals who worked in the same corner of CIDA and who stood in a variety
of positions in relation to the held of development but who had in common a desire
to reflect on their practice. This final criteria is significant insofar as he refrained
from referring me to people, and 1 will return to discuss this exclusion later, who
were entirely cynical about the careers that they have followed or who were so junior
that the were naively enamoured of the field. Isolated by their head office desk jobs
both from the discordant realities of the field and the political storms that frequently
move across the top of their organizations, the development professionals I interviewed
would be seen by postdevelopment authors as sustaining members of the cosmopolitan
tribe of developmenticans (Escobar, 1995: Watts, 1995). They, following the logic of
the postdevelopment critique, are the most abject of the subjects of development.
They would be the last group a postdevelopment author would approach in the hopes
of finding an ally in their quest to destroy the field of development, and would be
expected, when queried, unwittingly to speak the discourses that they collectively
produce. It is precisely because of their abject position that I chose these professionals
as my subjects.
2.4 Methods
Field research for this study was conducted through a series of three one to two
hour guided discussions with what was eventually became five mid and senior level
development professionals. My initial conversations were structured around an explo-
ration of their experiences in the field as triggered by a set of written questions about
expertise, learning and themselves. These interviews took place at these professionals'
convenience, tended to be held in their offices, and were at times interrupted by their
work. All interviews were recorded, transcribed fully and annotated for hesitations,
laughter, discomfort and silences.
The focus of the analysis of the first set of interviews was to have been on identify-
ing representational and perforative discontinuities and interruptions. These possible
discontinuities and interruptions were to have been found in the noted silences and
affective shifts captured in the transcription (and repeated reviews) of the interviews
themselves. These breaks served as the starting point for the second set of inter-
views. During the second interviews we were collaboratively to have extended the
discontinuities or interruptions into alternative narratives of tire represented events
and looked at the interactions between these different narratives as they played out in
terms of learning, expertise and subjects. Analysis of the transcriptions of the second
round of interviews followed the pattern set in the first and was to have focused on
exploring the possible operational effects of the narratives offered. The third set of
interviews was scheduled to identify substantially divergent representations of com-
mon sequences of events in order to explore their interaction and fields of possibility
associated with each.
2.5 Research Ethics
The structure of the research done for this dissertation required consideration both
of exploitation and exposure. For those who research 'down' there is rightfully a good
deal of concern around the question of the extent to which research is exploitative of
its subjects. While this was reduced to some extent by my decision to research up, I
was concerned that their granting my time was secured only by the strength of their
relationship with my initial contact. As a result, the first encounter 1 had with the
research subjects opened with a meandering conversation in which I attempted to
find some way to link my understanding of my research interests with a vision that
somehow connected with and appealed to my research subjects. They each reported
enjoying our conversations and each, on at least one occasions, rescheduled interviews
in a manner that indicated that these discussions were certainly not intruding overly
into their lives. Their apparent enjoyment of our exchanges and their willingness to
reschedule our interviews on very short notice dealt effectively with my concerns over
exploitation.
The second question that this research raised was that of exposure. Research was
conducted with a small number of well known and relatively senior officials within
a large bureaucracy. The purpose of my research required that I be able to solicit
narratives that diverged from that which was acceptable on my understanding of the
official terms of the discourse of development. In order to accommodate both the need
that this research be able to engage the content of illegitimate discourses and that the
final product respect the confidentiality, this dissertation does not quote directly from
the interview transcripts. Rather, as the following section discusses and justifies, the
extended quotations found in this dissertation are the product of synthetic narratives.
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2.6 Representation
To start our discussions I shared with my subjects an abbreviated version of my
dissertation proposal that included the list of questions that I hoped to explore with
them. I then asked how the}' understood my project and what, if anything, in my
project the}' found interesting. Contrary to what I would have expected based on the
postdevelopment critique, each had a very different understanding. B saw my inquiry
as asking the question of whether or not it is possible to transmit the knowledge
gained in the field back to head office while F asked whether 1 was interested in the
legitimacy of professionals with or without inverted commas (i.e. real or 'official’ le-
gitimacy) and M thought that 1 was asking how it is possible for all parties involved in
development to recognize that meaningful progress is being made without necessarily
having identical understandings of that progress. While each of the interviewees were
quite interested what I was doing, their responses suggest distinct understandings
of my project none of which corresponded to the Foucauldian framework that 1 was
bringing to these interviews.
When I started my interviews I had reduced my area of inquiry to what 1 thought
at that time was a rather clear set of questions and 1 was working with the Foucauldian
postdevelopment literature. This literature suggested that development professionals
were both produced within and confined by the discourse of development and within
this line of argument the discourse of development was represented as fairly mono-
lithic. Starting from that basis. 1 wanted to know whether or not it was possible for
me collaboratively to explore narratives of professionals' experience other than those
synthetic to the discourse of development. To that end 1 wanted to get their stories,
to find moments of interruption in those stories that indicated fractures or fissures
within the discourse of development, and then to collaborate with them in teasing out
narratives that began with those fractures to compose alternative discursive fields.
When I asked my interviewees about my project, the answers I heard were certainly
not structured on the terms of the theoretical debates I was using to frame my inquiry.
A moment of the abbreviated proposal that I gave to my respondents mentioned
that one of the consequences of my work might be to provide a new lens through which
we could examine the perennial debates between program and project based funding.
For many years within CIDA there has been a tension between those who feel that
funding decisions should be made close to the field and should be responsive almost
entirely to the conditions in the field and those who feel that final funding decisions
should also respond to considerations that cannot be felt by field officers and. as such,
are properly made in the corner offices of CIDA headquarters. My thought was that
in disrupting the notion of knowledge as the gaze it might be possible to re-articulate
this debate in a manner that better supported the interests of local movements. Of
the variety of aspects in my summarized proposal. B identified with this tension and
our subsequent conversations circumambulated the question of the appropriate level
and mechanisms for making funding decisions within CIDA. With this response B
occupies a location that would likely be recognized by postdevelopment authors as
the spoken moment of the discourse of development.
Rather than respond to the tension between program and project funding. F.
instead, immediately inquired after the sort of expert legitimacy in which I was inter-
ested. He framed this interest in terms of real legitimacy (i.e. sel ves beneficiaries) or
legitimacy in inverted commas (i.e. looks good on paper). The conversational terrain
produced by this initial turn was markedly different than the field in which I engaged
with B. Instead of locating himself within and being concerned with the operation of
a singular field of development, his response created a context in which there were
multiple discourses that rhetorically concerned themselves with the welfare of people
in developing nations and wherein discourses external to official discourses of devel-
opment were thought to respond better to the realities of the poor. While F most
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certainly is a development expert, the position that he took in our conversation, that
of an external observer looking down on and meddling in the field, was much closer
to that of a postdevelopment author than that of the spoken moment attributed by
these critics to professionals such as himself.
The positions that B and F take make it possible for them to engage in particular
forms of debate. For example, while they come to the question from very different
perspectives, both would find it reasonable to debate the question of whether or not
it is possible within development to produce the sorts of knowledge and practices that
will result in the improvement of the lives of those the field was ostensibly founded to
serve. By way of contrast. M's initial understanding of my project was that it is an
attempt to explore how it might be possible to support the emergence of meaningful,
sensible and realistic dialogue given all of the different discourses and translations
that have to occur. For M development can be other than the discourse within which
truth is produced and decisions made. Rather, development can be recognized in part
on the model of a Rosetta stone, an artifact of an often unfortunate history through
which translation is effected. Distinguishing her position from that of F. she then
immediately added to this understanding of my project the observation that we (i.e.
those who work in development) are neither purely spoken by nor standing external
to the field, but rather, that we are as shaped by the discourses of development and
the other discourses within which we think as we shape them.
Each of these positions, and others I later encountered, bring with them their
own presumptions about the subject, about knowledge and about expertise which,
taken together, shaped the discursive field within which our subsequent conversations
took place. My interest was not in the content of the descriptions I recorded from
these interviews but. rather, in exploring what effects on the prospects for productive
alliances between the agents and recipients of development resources might be found in
exploring these positions. This made it possible to affirm that each of my participants'
very different understandings of my project was exactly what I meant.
While the positions that I initially encountered were voiced by individual subjects,
over the course of the four to six hours of recorded and longer informal conversations
with each, my subjects' voice shifted repeated through a variety of positions in rela-
tionship to development. The failure of my subjects to speak consistently from one
of these positions presented coupled with the Foucauldian frame within which this
research was composed suggested a solution to the structural problem of maintaining
anonymity when working intensively with a very limited and rather well known pool
of informants. Foucault is often cited as suggesting that subjects are more effects
than authors of discourse. Within that context my research would be understood to
be an inquiry after the variety subjects that can be found in and around the discourse
of development. In this approach there is no necessary connection between subjects
and individuals. There are no ground in this approach to suggest that one individual
can not occupy multiple subject positions nor is there reason to deny that the same
subject position can be found in a variety of individuals. This makes it possible to rec-
ognize interview transcripts as the representations of subjects. To find these subjects
I coded my transcripts both by topic and voice and, from that resource, synthesized
the voices of a number of subjects. For each of these synthetic transcripts I have
chosen to locate the synthetic narrator as working as a seasoned analyst on a ClDA
country desk and rhetorically to excuse myself, the researcher, from these narratives.
1 have chosen to draw heavily on them in the body of this dissertation. The
people who read this dissertation will either rarely have the opportunity to engage
development professionals on the terms available to me or will be development pro-
fessionals themselves. In the first case these external readers will have an opportunity
to appreciate the texture of the discourse within which our conversations took place
and. in the latter, professionals may recognize aspects of their own experience and
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from that familiarity be inclined to follow me into the more theoretical reflections
that follow. These synthetic narratives are written in the first person, all of the key
ideas that they contain can be traced to interview transcripts and they are presented
in a form that my expert informants easily recognize. Finally. 1 do not pretend that
the narratives that I offer here exhaust those that may be found to be productive
readings of conversations that take place within the held of international social and
economic development
.
2.7 The Place of the Researcher
The purpose of this research is to generate knowledge that may increase the abil-
ity both of development institutions and postdevelopment detractors to recognize the
profit that might be found in exploring terms for alliance that are not today visible.
In this research l found that my subjects spoke in a fragmentary nature from a variety
of mutually inconsistent positions as we together engaged the questions that I brought
to (and they interpreted for) our conversations. Scattered through our conversations
I found a number of moments that I could plausibly stitch into narrative arcs that
I have produced. While presenting these arcs I have resisted the ever-present temp-
tation latent in my own will-to-knowledge to suppress their inconsistencies in the
interest of producing from their proliferation a coherent representation that would
point clearly and unequivocally to a singular notion of the expert subject of devel-
opment. monolithic understandings of their learning and knowledge or a specific set
of actions. The narratives that I offer in this dissertation are stitched together from
conversations that 1 had with my research subjects. These narratives, like the dis-
cussions from which they derived, sometimes start or end abruptly, at times wander,
occasionally make reference to points that are not taken up in analysis, often provide
sufficient material for alternative readings and. as a result of these defects, retain some
of the texture of the interviews from which they emerged. In addition to hating been
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present in the interviews, in the sorting of the resulting transcripts into voices and
in the selection of material from those voices for inclusion, throughout this chapter I
am also present in those moments where I reflect overtly on and link these narratives
both to operational issues and to theoretical engagements with the field.
The following two chapters, which consider the question of knowledge and of
learning, are drawn from these synthetic narratives.
60
CHAPTER 3
CONTESTING DEVELOPMENT KNOWLEDGE
As discussed in Chapter 1. postdevelopment authors use Foucault to argue that
the relationship between development knowledge and how it is used to justify action
necessarily extends western hegemony. The use that these critics make of Foucault,
however, is partial. This chapter uses a poststructural theoretical framework to ex-
plore the productivity of asking whether development professionals can be understood
to stand in a number of relationships to their knowledge and how. if at all. those rela-
tionships bear on what may come of the alliances that may form between these agents
of development and their intended beneficiaries.
3.1 Introduction
Development, as discussed by Parpart (1995) and acknowledged by authors debat-
ing postdevelopment (Brigg. 2001: Chakrabarty. 2000: Escobar. 1984. 1995: Ferguson.
1990: Mitchell. 1995) is very much a child of the Enlightenment. The Enlightenment
scholars whose work has become commonsense and which underwrites the field is
founded on a number of assumptions. First, it assumes that it is possible to build
accurate mental representations of an external world that is thought to have inde-
pendent existence. Second, that this external world is of a level of complexity that
admits of human understanding. Third, that this understanding allows appropriately
qualified individuals to recommend courses of actions which will produce predictable
effects. Fourth, that this knowledge will improve through processes of successive ap-
proximation. Fifth, that the truths thus produced are far more shaped by the world
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investigated than the history or interests of those doing the investigating. And sixth,
that those doing the investigating and deciding are able more or less freely to exercise
their judgement. Finally, this knowledge, as it must, aspires to the status of objective
truth. As put so eloquently by Michael Welmond of the World Bank at a plenary
panel discussing the state of the field at the 2005 Comparative and International
Education Society annual meeting. "Bureaucracies need truths in order to justify the
movement of resources" (2005). The World Bank, serving as an exemplar within the
held, produces and aspires to be the global repository for such knowledge (Mehta.
2001 ).
Critics of development draw on the French philosopher Foucault challenge the
knowledge that underwrites the held of development. These critics often make use
of Foucault’s study of the relationships between power and knowledge most famously
articulated in his study of penality Discipline and Punish (1979). In this work, and
in others that date from the same period. Foucault often spoke in terms of truth and
power : "There can be no possible exercise of power without a certain economy of dis-
courses of truth. .
.
[and]. . .we cannot exercise power except through the production
of truth" (1980). While Welmond might agree that legitimate action is contingent
on possession of truth, he would balk at the entailments of the attendant notion of
discourse. For Foucault, and those who draw on his work, truths are differentiated
from other assertions not primarily by their correspondence to an external world, but
by their formation in accordance with specific procedural rules. These rules, writ
large, are the laws of a discourse. These laws both enable the production of truths
and constrain their subjects to recognize only those assertions as legitimate. These
discourses, and this is where Welmond might have difficulty, are recognized as arti-
facts of specific histories and. as such, their truths can not legitimately be proposed as
somehow approaching the status of an objective knowledge. Truths, for Foucault and
those who follow, are subsequent to discourse and discourse, inevitably, is subsequent
to history. Within this perspective, attempts by subjects of a historically dominant
group to elevate the claims made from within their discourse to a universal status are
immediately recognizable as having the effects both of naturalizing the subordination
of other knowledges and extending their own hegemony. Development professionals,
despite their subjective perceptions to the contrary, are understood to Ire most ef-
fective instruments by which the global North naturalizes and extends its hegemony
over the global South. Within this critique there is nothing that can be done, either
by or with these individuals, that will avoid these two effects.
The Enlightenment and Foucauldian visions of knowledge found in debates about
development agree on two points. First, they accept both that knowledge is a
condition of existence of development professionals and. second, that development
professionals have a specific subjective understanding of the relationship that binds
them to their knowledge. The Enlightenment and Foucauldian perspectives discussed
here concur that development professionals would understand themselves to be au-
tonomous agents who are able to exercise independent judgement both when they
produce and when they draw upon the knowledge that is a condition of their exis-
tence. While these professionals may recognize that the knowledge with which they
are working is flawed, the}' would be expected to hold that through a long term pro-
cess of gradual elaboration that it will be possible to generate knowledge equal to the
challenges of development. The Enlightenment and Foucauldian readings mentioned
differ in their understanding of this perspective. Where Enlightenment texts would,
in man\' important respects, concur with the beliefs of development professionals,
critics who draw on Foucault would argue that these perceptions are an effect of dis-
course and that they have the pernicious effect of naturalizing exercises of power that
will inevitably extend the hegemony of the global North. This Foucauldian criticism
carries over into a totalizing critique of a number of key development institutions and
the rejection of an}' possible alliance with development professionals.
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Postdevelopment critics influenced by Foucault accept that institutions such as
the World Bank play a pivotal role in the imposition of a global neoliberal regime
that exacerbates global inequity while securing for the elite of donor nations the
rhetorical position of beneficence. These critics argue that the knowledge created by
professionals within institutions such as the World Bank, the International Monetary
Fund and USAID is fundamental to those institutions' selection, justification and
naturalization of the ruinous neoliberal program they impose (Kothari. 2005: Mehta.
2001: Torres. 2001; Ziai. 2004). While identified as ultimately culpable, critics recog-
nize that these institutions often impose their policies through governments (Sharma.
2006) and components of civil society (Ferguson and Gupta. 2002). The relationships
that link the NGOs and local governments which execute ’development' and organi-
zations such as the Bank provide an entry point through which critics can use the
language of governmentality (Foucault. 1991) to explore how their work is instrumen-
tal in extending a global neoliberal hegemony (Brigg. 2001: Bryant. 2002: Elvachar.
2002: Ferguson and Gupta. 2002: Rankin. 2001: Watts. 1995). They find that the de-
velopment done by NGOs and local governments, despite it rhetoric of empowerment
(Mckinnon. 2006). often disciplines its beneficiaries (Agrawal. 2005: Ferguson. 1990:
Green. 2000: Herbert-Cheshire. 2000: Herbert-Cheshire and Higgins, 2004: Nightin-
gale. 2005: Rankin. 2001: Triant afillou and Risbjerg Nielsen. 2001). The use made of
governmentality in these analyses does not allow much room for the exploration of
the agency of those who are so disciplined.
The argument that development fully disciplines its beneficiaries has been rejected.
These critiques are found to suffer from a tendency to see the less powerful from
the perspective of the more powerful. This ’domino-centrism' is characteristic of
official development knowledge and characterizes a good portion of the work done
by development critics. This perspective blinds authors to the complex manners
in which locals play with (Diawara. 2000). resist the constraints of (Everett. 1997)
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and/or pursue paths (Sato. 2004) other than those mandated by development. These
suggest that the purported domination of the discourse of development is far from
complete.
Taking a step up the chain, authors who understand the force of this Foucauldian
critique and are sympathetic to its intent argue that while some NGOs do comply
with the expectations of donors, there are other NGOs which are very deliberate in
their efforts to secure the resources of those donors while not complying entirely with
their expectations (Townsend et ah. 2004; Townsend and Townsend. 2004). For ex-
ample. religiously inspired NGOs have a long tradition of finding ways to mix their
salvific missions with the ostensibly secular work of development (Nichols. 1988).
Such NGOs and their staff are found to create room for maneuver sufficient to un-
dermine the credibility of the suggestion that those identified as the authors of global
neoliberalism have any real control over either activities on the ground or their effects
(Hilhorst. 2001. 2003). The ends to which this room for maneuver are put may be
justifiable, as in the case where employees of NGOs and donor institutions advocated
for the mainstreaming of gender (Hendriks. 2005). uncertain, as we find in the mix-
ture of religion and development (Canadian International Development Agency. 1995:
Nichols. 1988; Selinger, 2004). or inexcusable, as can be found in cases where indi-
viduals' exploitation of the same ambiguities enables corruption (Abramson. 1999).
This same argument, that the agents of development are not determined entirely by
that discourse, has been made of those who work in donor institutions (Crewe and
Harrison. 1998: Harrison. 2002).
Research which accepts the substance of the Foucauldian analysis and attempts
to counter the determination proposed by its students must ask how individuals
find space within the ostensibly hegemonic discourse of development to pursue ends
that are formed on the terms of a subordinated know’ledge. For example, advocates
for the mainstreaming of gender within donor organizations justified their efforts
by reference to a knowledge that was not at that time integral to the discourse of
development (Alexander. 1995: Angeles. 2004: Hendriks. 2005: Moser. 1993: True and
Mintrom. 2001). This same pattern can be found in the integration of sustainability,
environment, girls' education and now capacity development into the mainstream of
development thinking: Individuals both within and outside of mainline development
institutions knew they were important and championed their integration. These all
hold constant a particular relationship of the subject to their knowledge. Independent
of whether the individuals or the institutions are 'compliant.' they are autonomous
agents capable of generating an adequate knowledge which they can then legitimately
use when making their independent judgements. These individuals, like the much
maligned bureaucrats in the World Bank, are understood to have a simple relationship
to their knowledge in which they produce truths that guide and justify their actions.
This chapter explores the productivity of asking whether development professionals
can be understood to stand in a number of relationships to their knowledge and how.
if at all. if those relationships bear on what may come of the alliances in which they
ma}' participate.
Research for this chapter involved interviews with a number of development pro-
fessionals who work in the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA).
These professionals were chosen both because prior contact would shorten the period
required to establish trust and because of their location, dead middle in the chain
that links the treasurer's office and field activity, would incline a postdevelopment
author to suggest that the}' would be both most constrained by and blind to the con-
straints of the discourse of development. This research began with the assumption
that there was a hegemonic discourse of development and that this discourse would
almost entirely structure contact 1 had with these professionals. In order to escape
the dictates of this initial context, research was conducted through a sequence of
interviews. Following each interview its transcript was analysed for hesitations, slips
and moments through which subordinated discourses momentarily erupted. These
fissures then became the core around which subsequent conversations were held. The
transcripts of these interviews were then coded for the understandings of the relation-
ship to knowledge that they evinced. This coding demonstrated that development
professionals stand in quite a variety of relationships to their knowledge and. as will
be discussed in the conclusion, that these understandings are both dynamic and may
be of operational moment.
Rather than describe the variety of positions that these professionals demon-
strated. the coded fragments were assembled into synthetic narratives each of which is
generally indicative of a particular understanding of their relationship to knowledge.
These narratives are presented in full below. Much as the interviews from which they
emerged, they wander, start abruptly, shift in the middle, are susceptible to multiple
interpretations, and often end prior to any satisfying conclusion. Each is followed by
a commentary that summarizes those aspects 1 was able to identify as relevant to my
inquiry, locates those ideas in the context of broader conversations, and bridges to
the content of the next narrative. For clarity the narratives are presented as extended
quotations. The first of these narratives opens by dropping the reader into the middle
of a synthetic exposition where the speaker understands that knowledge describes the
world and secures the right to act.
3.2 Narratives of Knowledge
3.2.1 Our knowledge describes the world in a way that enables action
In C’lDA decisions are knowledge driven. Once we know, then we have
the right to act. That much is easy. Things get a bit more complicated
when we talk more specifically about knowledge. In addition to reflecting
the real world, in our organization knowledge has to meet three important
criteria: its content must be acceptable, it has to be presented in a form
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that we can handle and it lias to describe the world in a particular way.
I'll discuss each of these in turn.
First, making how we talk about what we do acceptable is a very impor-
tant skill. While CIDA is an independent ministry within the Government
of Canada, it is a junior portfolio. This means that we are usually given a
rookie minister who needs to demonstrate that they are effective. To that
end these ministers will often come in with pretty clear priorities and they
will move money around accordinglv. These ministers are often with us
for a relatively short period of time and they are generally replaced with
another young minister who must, similarly, make their mark. In order to
deal both with their priorities and their short tenure we have become vert'
good at making what we are doing acceptable. For example, we have a
project in Northern Laos that has been going for some 20 years. Women
are given the task of fixing roads for which they are given wheat. This
same activity has convincingly been funded as relief work, infrastructure
development, agricultural enhancement, market based development and
gender development. It is the exact same activity: women spending a few
years fixing roads and getting wheat in return. We talk about this activity
in very different ways and if we didn't change how we talked about it. it
would no longer be supported.
Second, in addition to being acceptable, the knowledge we work with has
to Ire presented in a way that we can handle. We re often critiqued for
shipping Canadian professionals into the field to do research when there
are local consultants who know the area better. The problem that we
have with local consultants is that they don’t know how to write the
kinds of documents that we need. There is a particular kind of rhythm to
our documents and how they get put together. If they don't meet those
expectations and if they don't have all the right bits in them, they are
either very hard to work with or. worse, they get rejected.
The third thing that the knowledge that we work with has to do is describe
the field in which we are working in a way that allows us to be able to
identify points where we can intervene and offers perspectives from which
we will be able to keep track of the effects of our interventions. What this
means is that our descriptions of the world are not disinterested. We are
required to move money and our interest in learning about these parts of
the world is to find wavs in which we can move that money. This mandate,
necessarily, shapes what we describe and how we describe it.
What unites all three of these aspects of knowledge is that the}- all make
it possible for us first to disburse the money given to CIDA by Parliament,
and second, to account for that money in a way that ensures that we will
continue to be funded in the future. Our primary job is not to know, our
job is to act.
The knowledge that the people interviewed both produced and worked with was
gathered by the best means at their disposal. Often they would consult documents
prepared by other agencies, talk to people who were working in the field and would en-
gage in rather extensive public consultation efforts. Once gathered this information,
importantly, had to be packaged in ways that responded to conditions that they find
in head office. The need to respond to these conditions forces development profes-
sionals to select from a rather broader range of statements that legitimately could be
said those which would be found acceptable in head office. This continuous process,
however, is not said substantially to disrupt the notion that the knowledge internal to
development reflects the context in which they are working. The modifications that
are made take place at the level of 'framing' information so that it responds to the
minister’s interests or ‘packaging’ a proposal in a way that responds better to CIDA
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guidelines. Neither of these substantively to alter the content of the message. This
narrative of knowledge in development raised two immediate questions. The first
asks after the possible effects of the bias in favour of those understandings that find
needs in the field that are amenable to the sorts of solutions that C'lDA can provide
(actionable knowledge), and the second looks at the degrees of certainty associated
with the knowledge claims generated.
The question of a Idas in favour of actionable knowledge is most simply grasped
through the following cliche: 'when the only tool you have is a hammer, the world
is full of nails.’ CIDA has a relatively small budget, these funds are spread literally
all over the globe and actions are taken on the terms of a limited number of lines.
This means that there are main' issues and opportunities that CIDA can not even
dream of productively engaging. When a CIDA officer or their representatives are
sent out on mission their task is to determine what CIDA can do. Of the incredibly
complex range of opportunities that may confront them, the CIDA officer is asked to
pick those which are meaningful, manageable and consistent with CIDA's declared
interests. This constrains the content of the knowledge that is returned to head
office to those topics that the person on mission believes are within CIDA's ability
productively to engage. While this bias is not seen to distort the content of the
knowledge generated, it may substantially delimit its content. Moving beyond those
considerations that shape the framing, the packaging and the phenomena included
within development knowledge. I found narrative arcs in a number of interviews which
support the notion that there are constraints internal to the field of development that
result in substantial uncertainties being attached to the knowledge with which they
are asked to work.
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3.2.2 Our knowledge sort of describes the world
In order to justify our actions we have to be able to say that we know.
This brings us immediately to a fundamental problem: the combination
of the incredible complexity of the field in which we work, the equally
broad diversity of activities we undertake and the limited resources given
to generating knowledge means that we are not able fully either to know
the field or predict the results of our actions. The Auditor General's office
knows that we work under these circumstances and they are not concerned
by these limitations. They recognize that ours is a high-risk operation.
What they require is that we track and manage that risk as responsibly
as can be expected given the resources we are allocated.
Yes. we work with knowledge, but perhaps more importantly, we work
with risk. What I mean by that is when a project document gets written
the authors are making a bunch of assumptions about things over which
they do not have control. If you approach this from the assumptions that
you are making and risks that they entail, then you have already opened
up because here we are not saying that there is an absolute truth. We can
not go in and say with absolute certainty that we need to build this bridge
here at this point in time because it may be more relevant to allow them
to continue to use boats to ferry people across rather than build a bridge
and if floods come all the time then the river can actually shift in some
countries so why would you build a bridge there. You see. . .there are no
truths within this. What we are requiring that people do now. and I think
that this will get spread agency wide, is to have people who put project
proposals together do a complete risk assessment. These assessments go
right into the Logical Framework tables. For every step that a project will
take we want to see the assumptions that it rests on. For each of those
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assumptions we need a detailed discussion that considers its associated
risks. Will the host-government sponsor he transferred and what will you
do if her replacement doesn't champion the project? There may be some
that are entirely beyond our ability to control. . . like another flood, but
there may be others that we can either mitigate in the design or insert
contingency clauses in the design of the program. In proposing that we
do this I’m not saying anything new. Old hands have done this forever.
All I'm really doing is acknowledging that can't really know how things
will turn out. but that we can and should make well educated assessments
of those factors over which we have limited control that may shape the
effects of our intervention.
The point of departure of this narrative is management by measurement (Noorde-
graaf and Abma. 2003) or. in the official language of CIDA, results based management
(Human Resources Continuous Learning Section. 1999). On this model development
ideally is to be directed by the appropriate invocation of carefully generated knowl-
edge whose application produces a range of results the effects of which can both be
related back to the intervention and discussed meaningfully in terms of their benefit
to the community. While this may be the ideal type, the development professionals
interviewed were very clear that the levels of knowledge, the predictability of future
circumstances in the intervention theatre, the clarity of attribution of effects and the
visibility of long term impacts assumed within this model are impossible. Recogniz-
ing this limitation, these officers are invited to patch over uncertainties with carefully
prepared assessments of risk. This addition has the effects of lowering the threshold
required for justifiable action and of maintaining the integrity of the idea that knowl-
edge. recognized as understanding of an object of study, is an appropriate basis for
the exercise of power. That is. assessments of risk make it possible legitimately to
exercise power in the absence of sufficient knowledge.
Iii addition to being produced In' approved mechanisms, the knowledge of devel-
opment must also be created by legitimate subjects. Over the last three decades the
understanding of who is a legitimate knowledge producing subject has shifted. Where
originally northern educated professionals were the only subjects considered able to
determine what ought to be done with development resources, since the mid 1980s
both critical and some strands of the operational literature have to varying degrees
celebrated local voice (Chambers. 1983: Gianotten. 1986). The desire to include this
local voice, as the following narratives illustrate, intersects with the need of develop-
ment to produce knowledge that supports the movement of resources and reduce the
risk that those resources will be ill spent. The first context in which I will take up this
limit is in a study of shifts in the legitimacy of CIDA officers as knowledge producing
subjects. I will follow this by looking directly at the question of local voice.
3.2.3 My knowledge can diverge from our knowledge
Within CIDA. as with many other donor organizations, head office staff are posted
to recipient countries for a period of three to five years before they are most often
cycled back to head office for a similar period of time. Among the variety of reasons
for this there is something called localitis whose operational effects were quite clearly
identified in my interviews.
During the first six months on post 1 staffers tend to feel that the}' are
able to understand, that the}' are able to figure out what they should be
doing, and that doing these things will produce the sorts of results that
the\' are looking for. This initial sense of mastery, which characterizes
short term consultants, is only apparent. From the perspective of head
office the entire first year on post is a very steep learning curve and. by
1-On post’ refers to the assignment of a Canadian employee to a CIDA office or project in a
recipient country.
the end of the first year, these staffers will start to question a good deal
of the assumptions that shaped their actions during the first six months.
During your second year these staffers will have an open mind and dur-
ing this period they are really beginning to learn about the local context.
During the third year these mission staff really begin to produce. They
have a nice integration of the thinking they brought with them and they
have learned a good deal about their local environment. If they stay much
longer, however, and this changes from person to person, they begin to
substitute the local biases for the ones that they brought with them from
head office to such an extent that they really begin to lose perspective
and their effectiveness begins to drop off pretty dramatically. These peo-
ple. effectively, have substituted one set of prejudices for another, ft is
difficult to tell whether the external prejudices with which you arrived
or the new set of prejudices that are based on a newly found perspective
that is created from deep within the country is better suited to the local
conditions because, and lets not forget this, you are trying to marry off
what is needed back here in head office with what makes sense in that
country.
In making this shift it is very important to remember the distinction
between understanding and accepting. I'll give you a story. A number
of years ago I was sitting at a brunch with men who were wearing suits
but who happened to be from an area where there is no effective central
government. They were very cogently explaining why, in their context,
sons are so much more important than daughters. Basically, because there
is no effective central government peace is only secured through strength.
If a man is killed, his murderer knows that the male relatives of that man
will soon pay him a visit. In this context if there are no men left, there
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is no possibility of retaliation and, therefore, there is no security for that
family. As I was sitting there that began to make sense to me. I got so far
into that explanation that I began to see how all the relationships made
sense in their own way and where they came from and I began to lose
my ability to step back and hold onto the commitment that the gender
discrimination that this situation that is natural and sensible on their
terms has to change. I lost the ability to see that the relevant question
was not how does this make sense but. rather, how can we change the
structures within which this set-up exists such that more equitable gender
relations make sense. 1 had begun to be so caught up in the local that 1
could not step back and be objective.
Recognizing the changes that an officer experiences when posted to the field (lo-
calitis) on the model of a curable infection, as was initially proposed, makes it possible
for those who work in head office selectively to discount their contributions. That is.
while the knowledge they produce may be assembled in accordance with the proce-
dures that are recognized as appropriate, the legitimacy of their claims is also shaped
by characteristics of the speaking subject. In this case the subject is identified as
having lost perspective" or 'lost objectivity' and. as such, their knowledge claims
become suspect. Sitting in behind this reading, which holds head office to be the
guardian of 'our" knowledge, is the side comment that when officers move into local
they have effectively substituted one set of biases for another. While this shift does
not hold the standards of head office constant (e.g. consistent with priorities and
minimizes risk), it concludes with the suggestion that the purpose of being in the
field is not necessarily to know in some sort of absolute sense but rather to be able to
marry off. or to be able to facilitate a connection between these local contexts and the
requirements of head office such that it becomes possible to move resources. Moving
from recognizing localitis as falling prey to a local and curable ailment to the process
of swapping one set of biases for another calls into radical question the link between
the knowledge claims found in development and the assertions of objectivity that
development invokes in order to establish the legitimacy of those knowledge claims.
That said, the loss of the epistemic- foundation which justifies the rejection of these
knowledges exposes the secondary and pragmatic argument: That those who work in
the field must speak a language that is recognized as legitimate in head office if they
are successfully to be able to facilitate and account for the movement of resources.
Independent of whether the knowledge of infected held officers is rejected on epis-
temic or pragmatic grounds, recognizing individuals as having fallen prey to a local
condition both sets up an opposition (global vs. local) and provides a mechanism by
which it becomes possible and natural to exclude from the pool of legitimate knowl-
edges those that are likely to be more disruptive. As demonstrated in the following
dialogue, the same discourse that naturalizes docalitis' also conditions the selection
of individuals who are engaged to help generate the knowledge on which CIDA bases
its decisions and the extent to which the identity of the person asking the question
shapes the answers they get.
3.2.4 Our knowledge requires exclusion so it is partial
We spend a lot of our time asking questions. One problem that we hat e is
that we have no idea why people choose to tell tts what they do. Responses
might be motivated by everything from selfless interest in helping out their
community through selfish interest in filling their back pockets to the
desire to get rid of us as quickly and painlessly as possible so that they
can get on with their lives. For this, and a variety of other reasons, when
we have questions that require that we go out and do our own research,
or when we want to check what other donors are saying about something,
we generally use an approach that is called triangulation. That is. we try
to make sure that when we go after a question we approach it using three
different methodologies and that, to the extent possible, we work with
different groups of people.
When it comes time for us to go and do this triangulation in the field we
face two serious risks. If we only talk to people who think like us it is
very easy to quickly and inexpensively come to consensus. If you think
about it. however, there is no point in paying for this sort of research at
all. I can write the proposal, or evaluation, or whatever, faster better
and cheaper myself. . .but this may not be at all helpful in the long run.
A good example of this sort of danger can be found in the question of
fundamentalism in Georgia. For quite a number of years the entire donor
community was pretty much convinced that Georgia was a good example
of secular Baptist state. To confirm this donors would consult the think
tanks that we. in part, created. Over the years we have been asking
them what we should be worried about and where we should put our
energies in Georgia. While there was. of course, a variety of opinions,
we didn’t hear things that encouraged us to get really worried about
fundamentalism until quite recently. You see. the people who work in
these think tanks tend to be western educated and they also most often
have secular inclinations. They are the people who are interested in and
willing to work with us. So. we were going out and getting the local
perspective. We were doing the dutiful and making sure that we were not
only proceeding on the basis of our own biases. The problem is that the
people with whom we were consulting were too much like us. This sort
of problem would seem to suggest that we go out and try and find the
broadest diversity of local perspectives possible, but this does not work
either.
It is very easy for us to find very divergent or even opposing views. The
problem with these is that if we accept them and if they are direct ly
contradictory. we’re stuck. We can’t move money until those contradictory
positions are resolved and there are a number of pressures from the field
and in head office to keep the money moving. Triangulation is good,
we have to do it in order to produce good knowledge, but we have to
triangulate within a range. The people we talk with can’t just see in
black and white. . . we need to listen to people who are sufficiently similar
to each other that they are able to communicate but sufficiently different
to ensure that they will have resolvably different opinions. We deal with
the risks of group-think and paralysis in few ways: we are careful who we
send over on our missions, we are careful who we talk with when we are
there and we spend a lot of time talking.
Within CIDA there is an ongoing debate over how we should compose our
mission teams. If we send a bunch of economists over they will have no
problems talking to each other and they will all talk easily with the same
sorts of people over there. The problem is that all of their thinking will
be happening in a pretty small box. At the other end of the spectrum we
can put teams together that have such divergent perspective that they,
and those they would consult, can’t agree on anything at all. What we
are tending to do now is to send over a few content specialists who might
not normally be able to talk with each other on missions headed by ex-
perienced generalists who can sort of be the glue that holds the group
together and makes sure that people talk to each other and that there is
some balance in their contributions.
At the other end we try to make sure that we don’t only talk to the
regular suspects. We push our teams to stretch a bit to try and get a
range of perspectives that they might not normally hear. In addition to
this we often give one person responsibility for writing a document. That
person, both literally and metaphorically, is holding the pen. It is their
job. to the best of their understanding and based on their consultation,
to sort through all of the divergent opinions and to prepare a document
that makes sense.
The third way we handle the problem of paralysis involves a pretty long
process of building common understanding. There is a good example of
this in the concept of exploitation. A year ago or so I was working with
a group in a highland agricultural area and the question we were looking
at is market access. The farmers would sell their goods to a guy who had
a cart who would in turn sell their goods in the market. When I looked
at this I saw that the guys with carts had the area carved up so that each
farmer only had the option of selling their goods to a single guy with a
cart. This was a perfect monopsony. 2 I thought these were ripe conditions
for exploitation and the way to fix it would be to have the guys with carts
compete for farmers' goods. The people 1 was working with looked at
this and saw it as an efficient way to overcome the distance problem.
From their perspective it didn't make much sense to have guys with carts
retracing each others' footprints. For them competition was inefficient.
So every night we'd sit down and talk about what we’d seen and come up
with questions for the next day like 'is it the same person who comes back
again and again?' in which case they may have a long term relationship
they are trying to protect, or. 'are there multiple people coming up so
you have a choice of saying no to one of them?' or 'have you gone to
’The opposite condition of monopoly. Where there are multiple vendors bound to a single buyer
who has. by virtue of their position of exclusive purchaser, the absolute ability to set prices.
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market yourself and tested whether or not you are getting a fair price?'
We had to go through many cycles of questions like this because even
after going through this process and using the same words and agreeing
on using those words we would find that we were totally disagreeing on the
concept that was behind those words. At the end of this time consuming
and exhilarating process we finally got to a point where I think that we
were agreeing on enough that we could work together, but there are other
cases where, for example, we have to deal with the echo effect that are
much more difficult.
A few minutes ago I talked about the "group think' that happens when
there is not enough diversity. There is a second way that we can get
into the same sort of problem that has to do more with strategy than
similarity. When we send somebody out into the field, it is not like that
person is invisible. There is the old story about when a white jeep with
a water project sticker on the side shows up in the village how. all of
a sudden, the community needs water. That's a tired story and I've
already sort of talked about that with 1113- mention of how we can never
know why people are telling 11s what they choose to tell us. More of a
problem these days is working with consultants and working with partner
organizations. For example. I may give a consultant an assignment. That
person, being smart, will ask around and figure out what I want to hear
and the categories in which I want to find it. So. a few thousand dollars
later. I will get a report that tells me exact ly what I wanted to know in
the first place. Not because we think similarly, and not because she or
he is bending the facts. Rather, she or he is just being smart. You see.
there is never a simple coherent story out there. It is generally possible
to connect the dots that we see in a variety of ways and the tendency
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of consultants, who we pay, is to connect those clots in the way they
think we want to see them connected. A second layer of problem we get
comes from the speed with which development fashions change. When we
take this into the field we wind up dealing with people who have been
around for a long time. They will come to the table and basically ask
you what is the development flavour of the day. These folks get pretty
jaded. They've been in the business for a long time, they've seen many
people come and go, and they've danced to so mam- different tunes that it
often becomes pretty mechanical for them. When we ask these people for
information what we get back is their fashionably presented anticipation
of our expectations. While it is easy to turn these sorts of contributions
into fundable planning documents, this, again can be dangerous.
Contrary to the unconditioned celebration of local voice that figures promi-
nently both in the operational and critical literature, the professionals with whom 1
talked were clear that they see very real operational limitations to whom productively
can be invited to contribute to the creation of knowledge in the field of development.
In producing knowledge, development engages the maximum diversity of perspectives
that successfully can be wrestled into the sort of coherent narrative required by their
organization in order to condition the disbursal of resources within considerable fiscal
and temporal constraints. Further. J find that a good portion of the decisions around
whose voices are marked either for inclusion or exclusion have become naturalized.
In addition to the predictable observations that the intentions of those consulted are
obscure. I also found an entirely naturalized system by which development profes-
sionals are able to mark and discount the contributions of their own peers (localitis)
and. looking back on themselves some years later, may be able to understand and
find quaint, perhaps, the more youthful variations in their own perspective. The dis-
cussion of local voice brings powerfully to my study of knowledge its fundamentally
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pragmatic articulation. The knowledge that is generated within development must be
useful3 to the donor agency and this imperative shapes fundamentally the processes
by which it is produced and delimits who can legitimately take part in the production
of development knowledge.
Practical knowledge, on the terms that I have just discussed, responds to the
requirements of head office. While certainly a powerful theme in my interviews, I
also found a somewhat contradictory argument that drew heavily on the oft-stated
concern that development knowledge to be relevant it must emerge from those who
have a stake in the lives of its beneficiaries.
3.2.5 My knowledge requires investment
It is not possible for CIDA officers to make good decisions about what to
do unless they have a stake in the country to which they are posted. The
way that CIDA works, however, makes it very hard for the people who are
preparing the documents that will guide development efforts to make good
decisions. For example. CIDA has an odd way of learning about countries.
\Y hat often happens is that CIDA will hire a Canadian expert and pay
that person very well to go on a short mission. That person will be taken
around by the most senior local to meetings that this local officer has
set tip with individuals that this local office] has known for a long time.
Following this short trip the Canadian will return to Canada where they
will write a nice report that CIDA will then use and the next time CIDA
wants to learn something they will go back to this consultant, whom they
will have now to pay more, and they will go back to the country and have
another round of interviews and on and on.
3Among other things it must condition the movement of resources, manage risk and respond to
the interests of internal and external stakeholders.
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This way of doing things makes sense for CIDA because the Canadian
consultant can generate the kinds of documents that CIDA needs, but it
doesn’t makes sense for the country that CIDA is supposed to be help-
ing. Before a CIDA officer can do much useful for the country they are
supposed to be helping they need really to understand at a pretty deep
level many of the social practices, they have to understand the history
and. perhaps more important, they have to be part of a web of long term
relationships in that country. This all takes time. Officers who have been
there for a long time have gained a contextual knowledge and trust that
goes along with their academic or theoretical knowledge and because they
are there, because they have made this part of their life, the people they
work with accept them as somebody who has a stake in their lives too. It
is only this way that you can get the kind of perspective that you need
and the relationships and the commitment that is required in order to be
able to do projects that will actually benefit somebody.
While speaking to the question of local voice and apparently contradicting
the argument made in the section on localitis. this arc is founded on very similar
assumptions. Specifically. I find this arc to argue that development professionals
speak from a location, that they are changed by the nature of that location and.
extending the analysis slightly, decisions are more likely to be recognized as good if
the person who is judging is located fairly close to the person who is making the
decision. Professionals close to the field are likely to make decisions that look good
to those who work in the field while those who are close to head office are more likely
to produce knowledge that is acceptable to head office. This parallels the section
on localitis which tacitly accepts that CIDA officers are not particularly useful unless
they are somehow fairly close to head office. Both of these work with some variation of
the idea that contextualization or immersion in a context is a necessary condition for
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the production of appropriate knowledge. Contrary to the presumption of an ideal
objective perspective found within within the Enlightenment tradition and which
authorizes the field of development, this practice identifies knowledge as inescapably
local . 4
While those who argue for centralization or devolution may differ as to which
location is likely to produce the best knowledge for financial decisions to be exercised,
all parties agree that knowledge is an adequate basis for the exercise of that authority.
Complicating this picture in which knowledge is recognized as local, as discussed in
the next section, each of the development professionals involved in the production of
an official document brings with his or her own bias . 5
3.2.6 My knowledge is shaped by my history
People who work in development and who are somehow committed to
improving the lives of the people we serve all tend to think that their
knowledge is what should happen. As you move up and down and around
in this organization you will hear a range of opinions as to how a recipient
country wound up in its current condition, what the key variables are in
holding that country there, and what we ought to do about it. Everybody
treats what they see as knowledge and most everybody tends to identify
4 This plays into perennial debates within CIDA over the location at which oversight ought to be
exercised (Ottawa vs. field office) and the level at which that oversight ought to be exercised (line
staff vs. senior managers). One camp holds that decisions ought to be taken at high levels in head
office and that accountability practices should examine the details of what has taken place while
another camp suggests that decisions ought to be moved as close to the field as possible and that
overall accountability ought to be taken at the level of principle. Tins debate has gone on for as
long as any of the people interviewed can remember.
0Seeds for this debate were sown at the inception of the field. In the inaugural address during
which Truman laid the rhetorical grounds that enabled the US congress to appropriate funds for the
creation of USAID he justified that allocation both on humanitarian grounds and as an appropriate
tactic within a larger cold war strategy (Truman. 1947). The purpose of this work is not to contradict
or undermine their contributions but. rather, to call attention to aspects of the object of critique
which appear to have escaped their attention.
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opinions that are different from their own as the product of external influ-
ences or bias. In fact, it is helpful to think about the relationship between
knowledge and bias as a circle. You get your knowledge from your bias
as well as your bias from your knowledge. Many things contribute to
the formation of a person's bias: their family situation, their experiences,
their basic attitude. As a person grows older or takes on a discipline they
will have experiences that also condition that bias. So. then you are en-
tering the world of knowledge before you start your formal training and
you enter with a particular condition of mind or. stated more simply, you
start out with a bias. With that bias you tend to gravitate towards those
sources of knowledge (seminars, articles, conversations and people) that
match your bias. So. I've come already to a learning situation with a bias
and I gained knowledge at that event that will build on top of that bias
so that bias has led me to a knowledge that has strengthened my bias.
So. in this way. over time the knowledge that I have will be common with
the community in which I have chosen to live.
A good example of the relationship between bias and knowledge is the
local vs. head office tension. There is a history of tension between the
kinds of things that wind up in the documents that professionals hired
by head office write and the opinions of those who work in our country
offices. It is pretty common to find a situation where local staffers will
have pretty set opinions about what we should be doing in their country.
From their perspective, when they look around they see the reality on the
ground and when they look up the tree they see the confusion produced
by the collision of a whole bunch of biases. From head office, when we
look down we see something quite different. Rather than seeing a more
true perspective, we might very well see that the person who we have hired
does not have the perspective required or is not sufficiently objective to Ire
able to make good decisions. This whole notion of bias goes a long way to
explaining how a well-educated bunch of equally well-intentioned people
can produce lousy projects. The people on the ground do what makes
sense there, the people one let-el up do what makes sense to them and up
the tree it goes. By the time the project gets approved and handed back
down to the field it has been so muddied by all the often incompatible
biases it is no wonder that the projects don't work.
I read this arc as arguing that development professionals may recognize that
what counts as knowledge is. in part, the product of the incremental sedimentation
of individuals' biases: 6 an observation that can Ire applied both at the individual and
collective levels. This recognition contradicts both the imaginary of objective knowl-
edge attributed to development try postdevelopment authors and the rhetoric that
characterizes development planning documents. Despite the operational recognition
that knowledge is subsequent both to location and now to history, the Enlightenment
ideal of knowledge, as will Ire discussed next, remains necessary.
3.2.7 Our knowledge is both necessary and impossible
Knowledge is the currency of the mind. If we didn't have knowledge our
work would be impossible. If. however, you push me and ask what, exactly,
is knowledge then our conversation will become a lot more complicated.
For example, the World Bank is in the habit of banking knowledge. That
is the height of absurdity. How is it possible to bank knowledge? Informa-
tion. maybe. . . I can see the notion of banking information, but knowledge
()Rather than speak in terms of the sedimentation of bias, post-structural theory provides the
language of discourse. Rather than bias, this theory would suggest that the individual incrementally
becomes more fully the subject of a particular discourse.
86
onlv happens when the information you have is in context and by context
I mean in the right place at the right time. If it isn't in place and time, it
is only information or. worse, it is just data. You can stuff either of these
into a cubby-hole for later retrieval but knowledge, no. A basic problem
that we have is that the things we want to know about don't come in
nicely wrapped packages.
Our work is messy. Everything is connected to everything else in ways
that, even if we had the time, we likely will never be able to understand.
It is not possible for us to know if by that you mean something that
somebody doing a good experiment and terrified by the spectre of 18 f/7
century scientism would recognize. The best that we can do is pick out
a few points that we will use as proxies that connect, we hope, in some
operationally relevant way to the contexts in which we are working. Now
that we have these proxies we can go out and we can measure, we can
produce numbers, we can work with these numbers, and we can move,
account and justify the use of resources. For example. I can tell you the
number of women who are in credit groups and 1 can tell you how much
money has been moved, and I can tell you a story that links these two
things with something called gender and development, but 1 can not know
what the full effect of these women's participation is. Every once and a
while we will get slapped. For example, we have one microcredit project
that we were running. Everything seemed to be going along fine until
we found out that the money that women were saving was being taken
by their husbands. Our program was actually disempowering women. We
don't know if or how many similar stories the work that we do has created
and. quite frankly, we can't know.
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This arc moves away from the Enlightenment ideal wherein the accumulation of
knowledge gradually produces an unequivocal description on whose basis appropri-
ately qualified rational subjects legitimately act. Instead we have a world in which
knowledge emerges from the examination of visible indicators of uncertain connection
to the field and which may miss entire regions of possible significance. Recognizing
these limitations, the development professionals with whom I worked acknowledged
that there is a second layer of considerations that they invoke when making decisions.
These are concerned much more with harm than they are with direction and control.
3.2.8 Our knowledge mostly tells us what to avoid
We re in a business that is impossibly complicated and. realistically, most
of the development projects we fund will have mixed, if not negative,
consequences for the people we say we were trying to help. It is not really
possible for me to be sure that the decisions that I make will lead to some
immediate benefit. If I really think about it. 1 can't know whether or not
I’m doing a good jolt. . . but there are a few things that I can use that help
me be content when 1 leave my office at the end of the day. First of all.
we are all always asked to do an impossible amount of work. This means
that we don’t get to spend as much time as we would like on anything so
I can’t spend the time I would like learning before I’m forced to make a
decision. One of the ways in which I know that I’m doing OK is when I
look at all of the decisions that 1 have made I can comfortably say that
if 1 made errors or if there are omissions that no serious harm will come
of them. It may not be possible to say that the decisions I’ve made will
benefit people, but it is possible for me to say that 1 have done everything
that I can to make sure that I have minimized the harms that might result.
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Iii the first narrative arc the appropriate application of knowledge produced results
results that could both be predicted and connected to larger societal benefits. The
professionals I interviewed, however, were aware of the rather dismal record of the long
history of these carefully thought development interventions. Rather than accept the
position of mastery that is latent within the rational planning models that justified
these interventions, this arc shifts their hopes to supporting interventions that do
no harm. Moving to an understanding of knowledge as necessarily inadequate. 1
was able to read a number of arcs as suggesting very different notion of knowledge.
That is. as the next excerpt indicates, rather than being frustrated by the failure
of knowledge to enable mastery, knowledge is seen as something that is useful when
picking a direction.
3.2.9 Our knowledge just suggests the next step
The work that we do is a lot less about knowing in any sort of grand sense
and a lot more about figuring what step to take next. In some ways we
are in the same sort of position as lG f/i century mariners and how they
found their way around offers a useful metaphor. At that tune there was
a trade in maps of the New World. These maps were all wrong. The
people who made them knew that they were wrong, the people that sold
them knew they were wrong and the people who bought them knew they
were wrong. Those maps were the best information that they had at the
time, so people bought them, climbed into impossibly small boats, and
sailed off into the ocean entrusting their lives to maps that they knew were
wrong. Now. how are we to understand this? Were these people crazy?
No. These maps were made for a purpose. They were made to help other
people find and then explore the New World. They were perfectly useless
for any other purpose, they did not claim to accurately represent the New
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World, blit they certainly did help people who read them to find their way.
These wrong maps were central in the colonization of the Americas. They
were wrong, but they were helpful to one group of people. So. in a sense,
these maps were perfectly accurate. Rather than talk about whether or
not the knowledge we have is true in some sort of abstract way. it makes
a lot more sense to think about our knowledge the same way that these
16 ,/ ' century explorers thought about their maps. The question is a lot
more about where this knowledge, if we call it that, helps us to get to.
Let’s think about these maps a bit more. Lets say the Captain gets into
his ship and sets off across the ocean and. after a few weeks, looks at the
map. and thinks that he should Ire. lets say. in New York harbour, but.
when he looks around, he sees an island with palm trees. Does he name
this place New York in the same way that Columbus named the people
who lived here Indians? No. he recognizes from the start that his map is
deeply flawed. We have to have the same idea about the knowledge that
we work with. Now. if there was some objective truth with a hierarchy
of knowledges things would be easy. We’d use the best knowledge and
measure what we all sav against that truth and we’d Ire done. Our work
isn’t that simple. We have to recognize that the knowledge that we have,
like those maps, is both intentional and flawed. If we thought that way
then when we sat down together around a table to figure out what we
should be doing with Canadian money we would not be all concerned
about whose knowledge is more accurate. We. rather, would be comparing
maps and seeing how they work together. Let’s not forget something here.
These maps were not some sort of imperfect approximation of objectivity.
They were made with purposes in mind. . .if the Aztecs could have made
a map of the Americas for the Spaniards you can Ire sure that it would
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have looked a little different. So when we sit down and think about the
maps we are working with what we can claim to know is pretty limited
and we have to negotiate both at the level of knowledge and intent.
This knowledge does not offer an accurate description of an external real. Rather,
it is both necessarily incomplete and as equally necessarily composed in the service
of a specific and questionable end. In a word, knowledge is partial. Knowledge is no
longer connected to some grand narrative of truth. It is recognized as an imperfect
aid in the complex and often overwhelming process of figuring out what direction we
ought to take and what step to take next. These decisions, as discussed next, are
often not entirely based on material that can be found in the official texts.
3.2.10 Our knowledge is in part how I make my knowledge
In our case I guess you could say that at a certain point I become comfort-
aide with a decision. So. I've now introduced a second way to think about
how I make decisions. If I'm asked how I know a decision was a good one
to make 1 am always able to point to the documents that contain mounds
of information and I can say how that information produced the decision
I reached. This, however, is not the same as being comfortable. When
I point to the documents that we produce and the mission trips and all
that I can say that the decision was justified: however, there can be a big
difference between being comfortable with, and being able to justify, a
decision.
The formal discourses of development may only partially capture the paths
that development professionals walk when arriving at their decisions. At this point
in the conversations that I had with my research subjects they were not suggesting
that development knowledge was in any way incidental or trivial. They, rather,
seemed much more to be suggesting that the knowledge that was visible, the formal
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language of development, was incomplete and that, while the formal knowledge was
very important, it was possible to distinguish between the paths they walked when
reaching a decision and the rationales invoked in its justification.
Both of these observations suggest that studies of development that rely on of-
ficial records are radically deficient. In addition to examining the mechanisms and
limitations of the formal mechanisms by which knowledge is produced, studies of
development must also look beyond these formal representations and engage their
authors in collaborative explorations of the means by which they become comfortable
with the decisions that they make. This study might, for example, start from the
position that the combination of mutual contradictions and unknown gaps in the data
that can legitimately be referenced in the composition of development knowledge is
such that the author of a planning document could legitimately reach quite range of
conclusions. Given the range of possible conclusions, then, it is possible for the author
of such documents to work from a range of discourses in selecting and assembling that
knowledge and. at the end of that exercise, produce statements that are justifiable
as legitimate development knowledge. Moving forward from description to action,
development texts can never contain fully either the full range of activities that will
take place pursuant to that text or the ever shifting complexities of the context within
which those texts will be enacted. Mirroring the room for maneuver (Hilhorst. 2001)
in the production of formal texts, between the moment of knowledge and action it is
possible for implementing professionals to be swayed by suggestions formed within a
variety of discourses and. at the end of the day. be able fully to justify their actions
on the formal terms of development.
Talking about this room for maneuver in more theoretical terms, the content of de-
velopment knowledge can be seen as over-determined by the surplus of contradicting
phenomena that legitimately can be referenced in its composition. Now looking the
other way. the details of the actions authorized by the invocation development knowl-
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edge are under-determined by the unavoidable combination of its relative sparsity and
the complexity of the contexts within which the actions it justifies are undertaken.
The space found in both of these moments can be seen to allow for the successful
influence of a variety of considerations that have their foundation external to the
formal discourse of development.
While the content of official texts may be recognized as the interference pattern
produced by the interaction between discourses which are contesting over the field
of development practice, and while these official texts may not fully predict prac-
tice. the laws of the discourse of development set important limits. An example of
this may be found in the suggestion that commercial interests may intervene in the
knowledge produced within and the actions taken pursuant to development. Though
this external influence may produce a variety of transformations that are justifiable
on the terms of the discourse of development, it may also produce effects that cannot
be justified on those terms.
Rather than seeing such effects as evidence of the ultimate failure of development,
it is possible to recognize the success of such external interventions as an invitation.
Returning to the poststructural critique, development professionals are seen as the
spoken moment of development. Following the narratives that I have just offered,
however, these same professionals can be seen as acting under contradictory influences
and incomplete direction. The space afforded by both of these moments may be
sufficient so as to allow development professionals to take part in alliances in which
they facilitate the movement of resources that support activities which make sense
on local term but are barely justifiable on the terms of the discourse of development.
With this we have moved from recognizing the knowledge of development as the
omniscient and domesticating gaze of the developed to a somewhat flexible frame-
work within which it is possible to justify supporting a range of activities that are
formed pursuant to influences that may emerge from outside of the formal discourse
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of development. While this is a somewhat more hopeful vision of development and
its expert subjects, this development, as presented in the next section, still serves as
a limit.
3.2.11 Our knowledge lets us focus resources
One of the key documents that we work with something called a country
development framework. This document specifies what CIDA is going to
do in a country over a given period of time. It provides the guidelines and
the benchmarks for the whole team when we are planning, implementing
and assessing the results of the programs that we fund. Another thing
that these documents do. and I don’t mean to sound too negative here,
is that they give us the guidelines we need in order to be able to say no
to organizations who come to us and say that they want to do such and
such in this country. We can say that 'these are the things that CIDA is
emphasizing, and yes. your proposal fits. or. no. your proposal doesn’t so
you better go someplace else for funding because that is not in line with
our objectives.' I'm not just being mean with this one. After all. when
we receive a proposal ultimately the minister has to approve it and all he
or she has to go on is the short summary of what we said we were going
to do in the country development framework. He or she will look at the
proposal, look at the country development framework and. if it doesn’t
fit. it will just get rejected. At another level, we are a small player, there
are far more good ideas that we can ever hope to fund and if we just do
things willy-nilly we will never be able to have any impact. So. using
the country development framework to structure our programs and to
determine whether or not we fund proposals keeps us on the straight and
narrow.
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Organizations such as CIDA must demonstrate to their respective funding sources
that the resources they disburse produce immediate effects and that those effects can
be logically linked to some larger narrative that can Ire understood as development.
All such funding organizations must confront, at one time or another, questions of
coherence and dilution. One of the ways that these organizations deal with these
questions is through the production of forward looking planning documents. Sum-
maries of these documents are prepared by mid level officers and forwarded to senior
management. These summaries become the knowledge on which those senior man-
agers draw when making decisions to fund projects that are proposed. . .often by the
same officers who contributed to the planning documents. So. while it may be more
than a little circular, the knowledge of development lends both coherence and focus to
development activities. An immediate question that this the strength of this internal
reference raises is how development is able to respond to external proposals.
3.2.12 Our knowledge is inadequate
A ell. the basic problem that we are facing is that we are playing in the
wrong game. W hat J mean by that is pretty basic. You have people
walking these halls who are all concerned that we be working with the
right kinds of knowledge and consulting with the right people to put the
right interventions together that will produce the right kind of results.
We've been doing this for about 40 years now and we can't escape it. We
really need to change, and change fundamentally, what we talk about in
this field. What we are about is not the right kind of microcredit activities
or the right kind of literacy training or the right kind of anything. That all
happens at the level of technology. That part is simple. If the technology
was the problem we wouldn't be having this conversation. What we are
doing, and what we refuse to talk about, is our task is to change hearts and
minds both at an individual and a collective level. All of these different
priorities and perspectives and approaches and procedures and whatnot
are just wrapping. I don't mean this in some sort of naive missionary
sense of going out and saving souls. No. not at all. We have to change as
well in ways that are going to hurt us. But no amount of work in project
design or accounting or anything else will do unless we can have the more
fundamental conversation. . . and. today, in meaningful ways, we can't do
that.
The funny thing is that we are knee deep in this stuff, it is the ocean
we swim in. Come on. most of the folks who work in CIDA are not in
it for the money. In my generation we were mostly ex-priests and 60's
do-gooders who figured that development was a way that they would
continue on their mission. That is what brought us to the table, and once
we are here magically all that disappears and we talk in language that
any construction contractor would recognize. It’s really quite amazing
how we drop, how we entirely drop, the very thing that brought us here.
Of course, we don't all agree on what we should be. or even if we should
be. working in these registers. It was your story I think from a few years
back. You said that a woman from Thailand stood up at a conference on
participatory approaches to development and accused the gathered sages
of blind theological imperialism. Dead silence. . . right? On the other hand
there was this innovative, and I mean innovative, project that was run out
of the International Development Research Centre that looked at the role
of religion in shaping people's contributions to development. After he left
the replacement for this project's sponsor was at meeting in which religion
was brought up. She went into an absolute rage. The register kicks, and
it kicks powerfully, but we can’t talk about it.
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I know that I just talked in terms of religion. I don't mean to say. like
the environment, gender and literacy before, that all we need to do is
talk about religion and. viola, development will happen. Religion is one
aspect of terrain that development either systematically ignores or. when
it is recognized, sees values, beliefs and culture as obstacles. The whole
assumption that a technical solution will do. that this solution is just
around the corner, and this solution will not involve changing who we are
has been with us since we started and this is now exhausted. The reason
I raise religion is that it allows us to see into categories that we today just
are not willing or able to engage.
The previous narrative argued that the limits imposed on practice by the dis-
course of development were useful insofar as they enabled organizations such as CIDA
to focus their resources such that they are able to produce the immediate results and
to link those results to some notion of development. The subsequent arc has added
the possibility that the limits imposed by the discourse of development constrain
CIDA to the trivial. That is. the coherence produced by the limits imposed by the
discourse of development may be realized at the expense of effectiveness and the same
limit which produces this failure makes its recognition impossible. This brings us to
the question of whether knowledge is always a good thing.
3.2.13 Our knowledge sometimes gets in the way
The following arcs present three manners in which development professionals ar-
gued that their knowledge should be limited.
3.2.13.1 Knowledge is not always desirable
Like other donors, over the last few years CIDA has been supporting a
good deal of work in the area of micro-enterprises and micro-finance. An
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early issue we ran into with these approaches is that when the men in the
family discover that their women can make money, they exploit them even
more. Now this was not the purpose of our program. One of the ways
that a NGO we fund found to get around this, and about which they told
us considerably later, is to allow women to keep double books. That is.
we fund an organization to keep a set of books for our women beneficiaries
in the community center and these women have another, a different, set
of books that they take home and show their husbands. Now. initially I
had some pretty serious issues with this practice, but in the context of the
exploitation within the family that microcredit is proven to support it was
critical that we make this happen. Here we were in a situation where what
we had to do to help women get out of an exploitative situation directly
contradicted our equal commitment to mutual transparency. The thing is.
this practice has been going on for a while and unless we were willing to
accept this practice, our intervention would have made our beneficiaries'
lives worse. I thought about this one for a while, and you know. I now
just wish that they had never told me.
3.2.13.2 We can and should only know a few things
Right now we have a situation with one of our major NGO partners. They
have set up a cow bank which helps poor women to get cattle that will
in turn produce milk. Now. the milk that these cows make is sold by
the women back to the NGO that gave them a cow to start with. The
question we have here is what is the nature of the interest of the NGO in
this exchange. Are they doing this to help the women and giving them
a good price on their milk or are they setting up a situation where they
can force the women to sell them milk at a very low price. If we are going
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to help these kinds of programs we need to know about how they are
thinking about these relationships.
3.2.13.3 If we trust, we don't need to know as much
Canada has a range of different kinds of relationships with NGOs. At one
end we have small grants that we let for very specific activities and at the
other we actually give some large and well-established NGOs core funding.
In some of the countries where we work it is these NGOs who are actually
delivering most of the social and human services. Now. we know that
there may be some problems with accountability in these organizations
to which we give core funding, we know that there are NGO moguls and
we can’t Ire totally sure of where our money is going, but on the whole
these organizations are the most effective way we have at our disposal
to encourage social change so for some of them there are times we don’t
audit them too closely.
In these narratives detailed knowledge and mutual trust play complementary roles
in producing the conditions in which development professionals are comfortable dis-
bursing resources. That is. picking up on the theme of comfort once again, it seems
that the development professionals with whom I was talking can be comfortable sup-
porting relationships with organizations whose conduct may not be entirely visible to
or acceptable on the terms of the official standards of development. When I suggested
this conclusion to two of my informants, however, our ensuing conversation suggested
a rather different possibility.
Internal to the postdevelopment critique is the notion that the work of devel-
opment. like that of the Enlightenment, requires that its subjects believe that it is
both possible and desirable to understand in detail the field that concerns them.
When presented with this assumption my informants were quite clear that this sort
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of pseudo-omniscient knowledge is neither possible nor necessary. Rather, they sug-
gested that their work requires that they be able to produce knowledge about two
specific things. First, they need to be able to represent a portion of the held on terms
acceptable within the discourse of development with resolution sufficient to be able to
justify the movement of resources. Second, thev need to Ire able to watch for effects
that run counter to their intentions. For example, in this section I have mentioned
three examples used by my informants. The first involved how farmers get their goods
to market, the second had to do with the relationship between an NGO that both
provided beneficiaries with cows and bought their milk and the third had to do with
an organization that were funded to keep double books. In all three of these cases
my informants were concerned that their work not increase the level of exploitation
of their beneficiaries. This required that they work with their counterparts in each
of those contexts to collaboratively identify what exploitation looked like. and. again
together, work out methods that allowed them to keep an eye out for exploitation.
This discussion is concerned with the resolution and the reach of the gaze of the
dominant. That is. it asks after the extent to which the discourse of development
requires that its subjects work from a position wherein the)' assume that they are
theoretically capable of reducing the entire field to terms that are both legitimate
and sensible within the discourse of development. Most discussion of the gaze writ
within the Foucauldian tradition attribute to the dominant the assumptions both that
the purpose of the dominant is to subject the entire field to his or her disciplinary
gaze, and second, that the entire field is reducible to terms that t hey' find intelligible. I
find my informants to be suggesting that they are interested in extending that gaze to
only a very few areas and that, while perhaps curious, are operationally disinterested
in those areas of the field or the effects of their interventions that fall outside of
their operational concern. Further, the)' certainly don't think, even given enough
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time, that they could understand everything. This brings us to the question of how
development professionals may engage at the frontier of their discourse.
3.2.14 I can use our knowledge to justify my knowledge
A number of years ago 1 went on a site visit to Northern Sudan where we
were funding an INGO to do a variety of health and literacy activities.
Now. the INGO sent somebody from England along as a minder to make
sure that I saw all the right things and that the people I got to talk to
didn't say anything wrong. At one point I was sitting in a room with a
group of community health care workers and they were carefully reciting
what their jobs were in the project. It was deathly boring and my minder
slipped off for a few minutes to do something else. The minute my minder
was out of the room I turned to the people there and observed that they
had been living in this area for about 2 000 years and that, somehow, they
had survived all that time without development workers. There was this
still moment in the room and the people I was with began to look a little
nervous. I then asked whether or not there was anybody around who was
doing the sort of medicine that was around before the colonizers came
along. When I said that I saw terror in their eyes. I was asking them
to give up their identity, their modernity, their jobs. At that point the
minder came back in the room and the tension just dissipated. I made sure
to beat up on the minder a few times that afternoon so that the people
in the room knew who was boss. That was the afternoon. At about 9:00
that night I got a knock on my door. It was three of the people who had
been in the room when I'd asked the question. We sat down and had a
very long conversation. At one point in that conversation they stated that
it was all very well and good for me to come along and ask questions like
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that but. if they stood forward, who was going to protect them when I
was gone.
The project that the CIDA officer was visiting was a fairly typical community
health activity that draws exclusively on the western medical tradition as adapted
for local conditions. In this project traditional approaches to medicine were identified
as backwards, as an obstacle, as incompatible with development and as inconsistent
with modernity. In order for the people in that room to have secured their jobs within
the project they would have had to have demonstrated that they were appropriate
modern subjects which would, necessarily, involve at least professionally rejecting the
legitimacy of traditional approaches to healing. While it was deathly boring, the
people in the room knew the rules of the game and they were all carefully playing
out their roles. When the person responsible for funding the entire project, and by
extension had the ability immediately to terminate the project and with it their jobs,
asked after the historical effectiveness of traditional healers he. in a very fundamental
way. violated the law of the discourse, he did so from a position of considerable
power and he did so in the context of an event that was part of the donor’s mid-term
evaluation. With that action he identified and stretched the discourse of development
beyond its limit. There was no way for him. in that room, and particularly with his
minder present, to continue that conversation.
When those individuals, however, came to his hotel room later that evening they
were not engaging on the terms of the discourse of development nor was the CIDA
officer attempting to reduce their knowledge of traditional healing to some legiti-
mate subset of that discourse. The several hour long conversation that they had that
evening might best be understood as taking place in a borderland or at the frontier
of the discourse of development. It was possible for them, in that space, to have
conversations that were not possible on the terms of development. This development
professional, then, authored mid-term revisions to the project which created an offi-
daily justifiable shell that had the operational effect of creating a room for maneuver
within which the local staff he visited with could support a range of activities that
would not be justifiable if directly represented within official documents. This offi-
cer found terms for alliances that were relevant to local conditions, were presented
on terms palatable to head office but were unthinkable on the terms of the official
discourse of development.
3.3 Terrain for Alliance?
This chapter opened with a nod to the assertion that can be found in the work
of postdevelopment critics and the development texts that the}' critique: that bu-
reaucracies need truths in order to move resources. For both developers and their
postdevelopment critics, these truths are to be created by processes that can be traced
to the empiricism of the 18 //7 century and their production and invocation secures for
development professionals the right they require in order to act. This vision was
certainly present in the interviews I held, it was cited as what finds its way into offi-
cial records, but it was only one of several concurrent!}' active understandings of the
relationships that bound these professionals to their knowledge.
The first step away from this vision involved the role of knowledge in disbursing
resources. Knowledge, in this mode, has the double moment of both being an (ideally)
accurate description of an external world and of being articulated within processes
that justify and condition the movement of resources. The requirement that knowl-
edge condition the movement of resources resulted in its truths being couched in terms
that respond to the expectations of those who were to be its consumers: other and
often more senior bureaucrats. This ‘packaging’ or 'framing' was not reported sub-
stantially to compromise the truths conveyed. For these professionals the challenges
they faced had to do with gradual!}' improving the quality and efficiency of their data
gathering processes and making sure that they maintained their ability to frame their
findings in terms acceptable to their audiences.
Extending the exploration of the effects of the location of knowledge production
and consumption within a bureaucracy, my interviews consistently suggested that
they were constrained in the processes they use to generate knowledge. At the simplest
level, generating knowledge takes money and time, both of which are limited to the
point that it is not possible to produce knowledge at the levels of confidence ideally
required for professionals to make decisions on the disposition of resources. In order
to patch for this failure CIDA is now exploring a process by which risk or uncertainty
estimates are to be attached to the claims made within planing documents.
Loosening the connection between knowledge and the world it purports to de-
scribe. at some moments in our conversation it was clear that a good portion of
development knowledge was recognized as the best stories that could be told about
indicators that were hopefully associated with changes thought to Ire desirable in an
irreducibly complex environment. At these moments knowledge was understood far
more on the model of a partial guide that may be helpful in collaborative negotiation
than on the model of an increasingly objective representation of a controllable world.
Relaxing yet further the relationship between knowledge and control, a few of the
interviews gave up entirely on the role of knowledge as guiding action. They, rather,
were concerned minimally, and by their accounts realistically, that the actions that
they propose produce no immediate harms. In this context the role of knowledge
is reversed. Knowledge, traditionally, is invoked in order to increase the probability
that of the infinite range of the possible, that a few desirable impacts are realized. In
this case knowledge was being used to ensure that of the range of possible impacts, a
few undesirable outcomes are avoided.
Stepping entirely outside of the realm of development knowledge directing action,
each of the people I interviewed also at times displayed an entirely instrumental
104
relationship to development knowledge. In these moments interviewees talked about
a variety of manners in which they were able to arrive at decisions about what ought
they to do which were, then translated into the official language of development.
The most frequent examples of this involved discussion of religion, corruption and
cooptation.
In addition to being concerned with the production and use of knowledge, my
interviews also explored the identities of those who are invited to take part in the
production of knowledge. In initial conversations it seemed that the selection of
people to consult in the production of official development knowledge was entirely
unproblematic: it was pretty clear who it made sense to talk to. and they just went
and talked to them. When our conversations began to consider some of the more
challenging questions that surrounded the quality of the knowledge that they worked
with. I began to encounter a number of statements that bore on processes by which
both authors and sources are selected for the production of development documents.
It seemed, after some conversation, that the criteria used in the selection of appropri-
ate sources of information and the mechanisms used to naturalize the de-legitimation
of sources could significantly shape the information that was taken up in the process
by which knowledge is produced.
Turning from the legitimacy of the voices invited to contribute to the formation
of development knowledge. 1 also asked after the legitimacy of the development pro-
fessionals that I was interviewing themselves. Grasping for an external measure of
legitimacy, one of the early questions that 1 asked was the relationship between doing
what they think is necessary in order to support development and getting promoted.
I was consistently told that promotion system is a frustrating artifact of an old ap-
proach that never worked in the first place and that there was. if anything, a negative
relationship between those practices that get you promoted and those practices that
support development. Moving outside of the context of head office. 1 found a parallel
situation wherein officers may find themselves concurrently in communities outside
of their professional circle in which there is a substantial concern for development.
These officers, also, talked in terms of paper and real legitimacy. This makes it pos-
sible for there to be a range of variously bracketed 'legitimacies' to which a given
development professional may react in a wide variety of ways.
The stories of development knowledge and its subjects that I have presented here
could be read as suggesting a hierarchy of understandings of development comple-
mented by a stage theory that linked aspects of professionals’ character with com-
mon experiences in a manner that allowed us to understand how developers might
change over time. These would range from the naive notion held by a new recruit
that development could work if we'd only get the knowledge right to the more ma-
ture recognition that development knowledge is necessarily local and partial and.
quite frankly, is necessarily that way. This argument would, naturally, be coupled
with the suggestion that naive subjects of development are politically dead while the
relationship of more mature subjects to development affords a more fertile terrain
for the exploration of interesting collaborative efforts. Based on this sort of analysis,
then, it may be possible to think productively about the human resource develop-
ment practices in an organization like CIDA or the formal and informal curriculum
in development studies programs within Canadian universities. This, however, is not
consistent with what 1 found in my interviews.
In this chapter I have been examining development professionals' understandings
of the relationships that bind them to the official knowledge of development. In
that study I have found that these professionals are able to speak from a number of
sometimes mutually contradictory understandings of that relationship. While calling
attention to these varied understandings does add considerable nuance to our ability
to describe development professionals. I have not vet provided an argument that this
now far richer descriptive palate undermines in any respect postdevelopment authors'
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argument that development professionals are constrained by the official discourse of
development to those practices which extend western hegemony.
In my interviews I was presented with a number of different understandings of
the relationship that binds development professionals to their knowledge. These un-
derstandings were not each voiced by a specific individual. Aspects of each of the
understandings that I have shared could be found in each and every interview. These
individuals worked from and between a variety of positions and understandings and
they seemed not to be aware of their shifts. Rather than thinking of these profes-
sionals as having an essential character or as working from an essential position, it
may be more productive to understand these professionals as being called sequentially
into specific subject positions within those discourses whose combination and whose
mixture with social, political, economic and physical processes, is recognized — with
the assistance of distance and myopia - to constitute the field of international social
and economic development. In making visible the variety of these stories I hope it
becomes clear that the question of the relationship between development profession-
als and their knowledge can be understood to be far more complex than either the
functional literature or postdevelopment authors tend to find. The next question, of
course, is whether this rather more complex reading is of any practical moment.
The variety of the understandings that the development professionals interviewed
evinced suggests that it may be possible to them to enter into alliances on terms
other than those which constitute the official discourse of development. Individuals
and organizations who may wish to engage these professionals in order to realize some
of the resources they control could frame their engagements with in a manner that
encouraged those representatives to work from more hospitable understandings of the
relationship that binds them to knowledge. For example, those approaching develop-
ment professionals may work from the position that the knowledge of development is a
somewhat awkward and certainly historically contaminated framework within which
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they are required to recast activities whose merit has been decided elsewhere. This
initial stance may induce a development professional to take up a position in respect
to the official knowledge of development that allows for broader reaching discussions
than can be accommodated on the official terms of development. Independent of that
understanding, however, the development professionals interviewed were clear that
at the end of the day their representations and their actions must be justified on the
terms of official knowledge. Whether they decide what the} - wish to take next in the
office, at church or in a bar. at the end of the day what they want to do has to Ire
justifiable on the terms of the official discourse of development. If we accept the link
proposed by Foucauldian postdevelopment critics between knowledge and power, then
the act of invoking official knowledge to justify a course of action will strengthen that
discourse. All engagements of development professionals in alliances will, in the last
instance, reinforce the discourse of development. This conclusion, as the next chapter
will find, is a product of a limitation within Foucauldian poststructural theory.
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CHAPTER 4
WHERE DO DEVELOPMENT PROFESSIONALS COME
FROM (AND WHY SHOULD WE CARE)?
The relevance for postdevelopment authors of examining the formation of
development professionals
4.1 Introduction
In previous chapters I have argued that postdevelopment authors’ argument that
development professionals are constrained by the discourse of development to harm
those whom they purport to serve is theoretically and practically inadequate. This
understanding is born of a partial reading of Foucault (c.f. Chapter 1) and is unable
to engage productively with development professionals' malleable understandings of
their own knowledge (c.f. Chapter 3).
This chapter uses the question of the production and reproduction of development
professionals to map the contributions of and limits inherent in Enlightenment and
existing postdevelopment approaches to the study of the held. It finds that these
two approaches leave untouched a range of phenomena that development profession-
als whom I interviewed identified to be crucial. Transcripts of interviews done with
development professionals as part of a study on the role of knowledge in development
suggested three ways of asking after the questions of how they come to be and are
sustained as development professionals: first, asking how a learner acquires knowl-
edge. second, looking at how the processes of learning produce an expert, and third,
examining the significance of the changes in the relationships that bind development
professionals to their knowledge. In order to accommodate these excluded phenom-
ena this chapter then introduces and explores the possible contributions of Lacanian
psychoanalytic t heory.
Currently development professionals are trained both in university programs and
on the job. Training within development institutions, such as the Canadian Inter-
national Development Agency (CIDA), tend to focus almost exclusively on helping
emerging professionals to master bodies of knowledge and to grasp the logic of the
procedures which such organizations require for the operation of development . 1 These
formal training events range from being introduced to a room full of three inch thick
black binders to participating in workshops that are characterized by small group and
learner directed methodologies. Such formal training is complemented by more infor-
mal mentoring arrangements and peer counsel. The material learned through these
approaches includes topics such as the correct way to build a pit latrine, explorations
of the cultural and political contexts in a recipient nation, what the deputy minister
and minister expect in their briefing dockets and self management techniques for em-
ployees who are going on mission. Each of these practices introduces the learner to
material that he or she is expected to master in order better to be able to do her job.
Like the training provided to development professionals, university level educa-
tion in International Development Studies (IDS) programs introduce their students to
common bodies of knowledge which they are to master. In addition to being taught
about the history of development and the official knowledges of the held. IDS stu-
dents are also invited to ask the larger questions of why are we engaged in the practice
of development, what historically and currently is this development, ought we to be
engaging in these sorts of activities at all. and what might we better do with our in-
1 In Foucauldian terms, these subjects are mastering the laws of the discourse of development
where those laws are understood to Ire the grammar that regulates the production of valid statements
(truths).
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dividual energies and collective resources. Despite these differences, like development
professionals, students are expected to learn the material they are taught, they will
be rewarded or sanctioned based on their ability minimally to regurgitate what they
have learned, and they are introduced to the relationships of master and student that
they may replicate later in their careers.
The formal education received by development professionals and IDS students are
both firmly built on the model that learning is a process by which an individual mas-
ters those knowledges whose appropriate invocation legitimately guides practice. At
its inception in the early 1950s. international social and economic development was to
be a process by which the inexhaustible knowledge of the West was deployed in service
of ameliorating the deplorable conditions found in former colonies2 as a mechanism
that would aid the West in thwarting the ambitions of Communist countries. Despite
half a century of effort development continues regularly to fail. The failures of devel-
opment have prompted lively conversations that often revolve around inadequacies
in the knowledge on which it is founded. This focus has resulted in an extraordi-
nary emphasis within the held on improving the knowledge that guides development
efforts. Every generation of upcoming development professionals has identified phe-
nomena whose exclusion, they argue, has resulted in the failure of development to
realize its stated objectives. The privileging of these new knowledges has produced
a remarkable sequence of development ‘fads.’ 3 Over the last three decades this effort
has looked increasingly to those processes that support mutually productive engage-
ments between the knowledge brought by development professionals and that of the
people they are to serve. These efforts started with and continue to claim to privilege
the knowledge of the people who are supposed to be the beneficiaries of development.
JOne of the first multinational efforts in this direction was expressed in the 1950 Colombo plan
(1998).
3A partial list of the fads the field has suffered is offered by Sagasti and Alcalde (1999).
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IDS students do read literature written by critical theorists who are heavily in-
fluenced by Foucault. 4 From them they learn that development professionals are
determined by their discourse to the delusional conviction that they are being of
service and that the practices of these professionals will inevitably harm their bene-
ficiaries. These authors do not ask how development knowledge might Ire improved.
They argue that producing and acting on development knowledge, whether or not
it is correct, inescapably supports the extension of western hegemony. When knowl-
edge is named within this conversation it does not refer to a specific instance such as
the claims found in the oft-maligned official texts of the World Bank (Mehta. 2001).
These authors, despite their mutual differences, refer to the complete set of all the
divergent opinions that can be found both formally and informally within the field
of development. For them this entire complex is a single developmentalist discourse. 0
This discourse is presented as being governed by a set of laws that regulate the pro-
duction of the knowledge which guides the practice of development. These laws are
seen to reduce moral and political claims to technical questions (Diawara. 2000. p.
304) that are to Ire resolved on terms that development recognizes as legitimate.
Within this arrangement all alliances between donor agents and representatives of
their beneficiaries necessarily involve the subordination of the latter to the ever ex-
panding hegemony of western knowledge. For these authors the path forward is to
be found in the endorsement of alternatives to development. Social movements are
often cited as one such alternative/1
4 (Bebbington. 2000: Brigg. 2001. 2002: Briggs and Sharp. 2004; Cooke and Kothari. 2001: Crush.
1995: Escobar. 1984. 1995. 1997b. 1998. 2000. 2004. 1997a: Ferguson. 1990: Ferguson and Gupta.
2002: Grischow and Mcknight. 2003: Ki-Zerbo et al.. 1997: Matthews. 2004: Mitchell. 1995. 2002:
Sachs. 1992: Shultz. 1999: Torres. 2001: Watts. 2003)
'By developmentalist 1 intend the assumption that development progresses through a sequence
of predictable and manageable stages (Shultz. 1999: Watts. 1995).
(,The study of how the discourse of development disciplines its subjects is precisely that: a body
of knowledge that is to be mastered by the student. These students, like their professors, are gazing
on the field in whose study they are engaged. Very rarely are they and their professors, at the
The education received by development professionals and IDS students is similar
insofar as this education is silent both on the disciplinary effects of its own enactment
and the range of relationships that students may adopt in relation to that knowledge.
These silences are dangerous. Students in IDS programs that 1 have encountered, in
fact, reported that they are gripped by a crisis that normally attends the conclusion of
their exams at the end of second year for which nothing in their program has prepared
them and an extensive survey of IDS students in Canada conducted in 2004 found
that most graduating seniors are deeply cynical about international development.
This cynicism, in turn, was identified by the development professionals interviewed
m the course of research for this chapter both as prevalent and as dangerous.
The argument that development knowledge is inevitably functional to the ex-
tension of western hegemony can not be well received by those who work within
or advocate for development (Hart. 2001: Agrawal, 1996: Blaikie. 2000: Corbridge.
1998: Curry. 2003: Green. 2000: Kiely. 1999: Lehmann. 1997: Nanda. 1995: Peer and
Hart-wick. 1999: Pickles. 2001). Once the questions of political meddling and cor-
ruption have been dealt with, one of the very few ways forward that development
professionals and the academics who labour on their behalf are able to recognize as
legitimate is to improve their knowledge. For these individuals, the postdevelopment
proposal that development professionals are inescapably condemned to be unwitting
instruments of the extension of western hegemony must either be rejected or result
in abject cynicism. Conversely, participants in the postdevelopment conversation can
not respond well to calls to demonstrate how their contributions can improve develop-
ment. Bending their work to the task of improving knowledge would be recognized as
rendering their efforts complied in the extension of western hegemony (Tanias. 2004).
moment of formal instruction, recognizing themselves as concurrently implicated in a discourse that
can be understood using exactly the same critical tools that Foucauldian critics deploy in the study
of the field of development nor do they discuss the effects of the range of relationships that these
students may have in relationship to these knowledges.
While these two conversations differ fundamentally in the politics they support they
do agree on three key points. First, something must be done to redress inequity.
Second, primary agency is found in the people who live in the country that is the
object of development or analysis. Third, nothing the other conversation has to say
can possibly help them to understand better how to engage productively with those
who suffer the most violent harms of current global inequities.
This chapter takes both of these perspectives seriously. It accepts both that the
use of knowledge in development is functional to the extension of hegemony and that
knowledge is a necessary condition for action to redress inequity. The task of this
chapter is to find a path that resolves the contradictory starting positions of de-
velopment and postdevelopment authors. To date the postdevelopment critique has
focused on the nature of development professionals and the effects of their practices.
Avoiding the now polarized terrain that this focus has produced, this chapter looks in
the other direction. It explores how the mainstream and postclevelopment approaches
discussed in this dissertation understand the processes by which development profes-
sionals are produced and reproduced. The hope is that the understandings of learning
found in these conversations offer more material than is found in current discussions
of the nature of development professionals and that this overlooked surplus may pro-
vide grounds from which it may be possible operationally to resolve the contradictory
commitments with which this chapter has opened.
This chapter opens by introducing development and postdevelopment understand-
ings of the field, of development professionals and of their formation. It then draws
on the product of a series of interviews with development professionals to produce
learning narratives. These narratives were initially limited to the terms suggested
by mainstream understandings of learning and. second, more recent post-structural
approaches. Finding these readings inadequate, this chapter introduces a third per-
spective that can be traced to the work on psychoanalysis formulated by Lacan. This
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chapter concludes by arguing that in not helping students and professionals to rec-
ognize that mainstream understandings of the learning processes in which they are
immersed are partial they preserve the notion that their judgement is unconstrained
either by history or by discourse, and second, in not ensuring that students and pro-
fessionals are aware that they may move between a number of relationships to their
knowledge, they are not prepared for the personal crises and transformations that
many development professionals experience. The remedy that this chapter suggests
is to make explicit to students of development the three frameworks discussed in
this study, to present them as necessary though utterly incompatible, and to ensure
that they understand that they themselves, at the very moment of instruction, are
inescapably implicated in relations that can and should concurrently be understood
on the terms of those three perspectives. It is my hope that this intervention will be
of interest to those who are concerned with the education of students of development
studies, to those whose task is to train development professionals and theorists who
are looking for more productive ways in which we can approach the formation of the
alliances between development professionals and those who they are to serve.
4.2 Mainstream and Postdevelopment Perspectives
4.2.1 Mainstream Perspectives on Development
This section presents mainstream perspectives on the nature of development, the
relationship between development professionals and their knowledge, the processes by
which an individual becomes a development professional and the nature of alliance.
4. 2. 1.1 The Nature of Development
Modern international development assistance is often recognized to have been ini-
tiated in a set of speeches given by US President Truman in 1949 (Truman. 1947).
The response of the US Congress to those speeches secured the funding necessary
to initiate development programming within the United States. Development was
to be "a bold new program for making the benefits of our scientific advances and
industrial progress available for the improvement and growth of underdeveloped ar-
eas" motivated by the recognition that “ in] ore than half the people of the world are
living in conditions approaching misery" and made legitimate by the eager invita-
tion of the rulers of those downtrodden countries (Truman. 1947). Complicating this
beneficent vision, of course, was the backdrop of the legacy of colonialism and a Cold
War within which development was a strategy deployed in order to win the hearts,
the minds and the economic dependency of underdeveloped countries. With this,
development was born and the contours of debate internal to that field were set: the
legitimate ends of development, the conditions of the recipient government and the
quality of the knowledge deployed. Of these this study is concerned with the question
of knowledge.
4. 2. 1.2 The Professional and Her Knowledge
Tacit within Truman's speech are specific assumptions regarding the nature of
development professionals and their knowledge. In arguing that development is the
process by which a body of knowledge that was created by professionals of developed
countries is applied in the service of the needs of the underdeveloped, he attributed to
development professionals a set of characteristics. Most important for the successful
execution of his program is the humanist' assumption that human action result from
the conscious and independent choice of an actor. Without these assumptions, which
descend from the Enlightenment tradition within which development is conceived.
Truman can not argue that development professionals will be able appropriately to
invoke the knowledge of the West in the services they render.
Humanism is further discussed on page 118.
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The humanist subject silently invoked by Truman is part of modernity's inheri-
tance from the Enlightenment, it is found in core texts on political liberalism (Rawls.
1971) and it underwrites mainstream economic theory by providing the framework
necessary for the emergence of the independent, rational and self-interested maxi-
mizer (Bergeron. 2004). In the field of development this actor is recognized as able
to understand nature sufficiently to be able to predict the outcomes of planned in-
terventions. This presumed ability derives from the empiricism that underwrote the
colonial enterprise. Empiricism assumes that the application of scientific methods to
the study of nature can produce an accurate and objective knowledge and that acting
on this knowledge will produce effects that can be predicted.
Procedures that have been derived from epistemologies that have emerged from
the interaction of these empiricist assumptions and their colonial application can be
found populating the pages of any methodology handbook created for development
practitioners. They have been developed through many generations of inquiry in
which the product of contesting approaches to the generation of 'truths’ are tested
against a set of consensuallv developed criteria (e.g. predictive ability) (Bergeron.
2004). Within development these notions of the subject and of knowledge were insti-
tutionalized through the emergence of management by measurement. Management
by measurement requires that development professionals state their ambitions for
an intervention, that they rationally assess the options available, that they choose
defensible between those options and that these objectively measure subsequent per-
formance of the program against pre-detennined metrics (Noordegraaf and Abina.
2003). In the field of international development management by measurement ap-
proaches emerged in the 1960s within the United States Agency for International
Development (USAID) as their Logical Framework planning model. Today the core
features of this model can be found in the planning and management practices of all
major donor institutions (Bell. 2000).
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4. 2. 1.3 The Education of A Development Professional
Within this Enlightenment tradition the study of education is concerned with
questions of how ought we to understand the growth, development and learning of
these humanist subjects (Merriam and Caffarella. 1999. p. 340). For authors in
this conversation, answers to this question are to be found in the study of how we
learn from our experience. A core author in the exploration of experiential learning.
John Dewey, argued that that in order for learning to take place it must be possible
for a learner "to connect what they have learned from their current experience to
those in the past as well as to see possible future implications" (ibid., p. 223).
This dependence on reflection on experience has been formalized into a number of
different 'learning cycles.' At their most simple these depictions present a circuit
within which an individual has a concrete experience, they reflect on that experience,
from that reflection they abstract principles that both make sense of that experience
and can guide future practice, they then plan future actions on the basis of that newly
derived principle, and they then execute actions which become the foundation for a
new concrete experience.
Working from the premise that we learn from our experience, a number of au-
thors have elaborated theories of adult learning, one of the most familiar of these
approaches was introduced to North America by Malcom Knowles (1950; 1973) and
is concerned with personal development. He argued that adult learning is associ-
ated with a shift in self-concept from being dependent to self-directing, that learning
depends on reflection on experience, that adults willingness to learn is associated
with the roles they are is plating in society, that adults tend to want to apply what
thet' learn immediately and that adults are intrinsically motivated to learn. Knowles'
work, which has been vert' influential in the study of adult learning, is grounded in
a humanistic philosophy that can be traced to the work of Abraham Maslow and
Carl Rogers (Frick. 1971). Authors who work within the humanist tradition assume
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that learners are fundamentally good, that they are personally autonomous, that
they have sufficient free will so as to be understood to make individual choices, that
their behaviour is the product of that choice, that they have an unlimited potential
for growth, and finally, that perceptions are based in experience. This humanist ap-
proach. which has generated the most research, focuses on the individual learner and
her self-development and provides a powerful framework for the understanding of the
formation of development professionals.
A second strand of study of adult learning within the Enlightenment tradition is
concerned with promoting transformation. This perspective argues that adult learn-
ers require an understanding of the historical, cultural and biographical conditions
that may shape their interests. Learning, on this model, should involve "dramatic,
fundamental changes in the way we see ourselves and the world in which we live"
(Merriam and Caffarella. 1999. p. 318). The focus of this conversation, which is often
associated with the work of Jack Mezirow (1978: 1991) and Paulo Freire (1970: 1973:
1974). is on understanding and transforming the mental construction of experience.
This approach starts from the presumption that a basic human challenge is to make
sense of our experience. In these sense-making processes we form perspectives. When
well established perspectives are unable to account adequately for current experiences,
we are presented with an opportunity for a life-changing shift in perspective. It is
these shifts in perspective that are the object of transformational learning. While
not all learning is transformational, a goal of transformational educators is to en-
courage learners to recognize and critically to engage the premises on which their
meaning-making perspectives are based. Transformational learning, as presented by
Mezirow. involves critical reflection on the premises of one's perspective that is often
precipitated by a disorienting dilemma, a self-examination that is often attended by
feelings of guilt or shame, and finally, a critical assessment of assumptions that leads
to the recognition that others have gone through a similar process which then permits
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the learner to consider options for forming new roles and relationships in the context
of a plan for action that will be re-integrated into a now transformed perspective
(Merriam and Caffarella, 1999, p. 320-1).
Freire. the transformative pedagogue best known in the field of international de-
velopment. argued that the ideal condition is that of critical consciousness. For him
this condition provides an "in-depth understanding of the sources that shape one's
life space" and the impetus required to become "an active agent in constructing a
different, more just reality" (Merriam and Caffarella. 1999. p. 325). Freire argued
that most education is best understood on the model of banking. On this model
education is a process by which the knowledgeable deposit information in the igno-
rant. Contrary to this approach. Freire argued that true education proceeds through
the process of posing problems that the learner and educator collaboratively attempt
to resolve. It is in this collaborative process of engaging problems brought to the
classroom by the students that Freire found it possible to stimulate the emergence of
both a critical consciousness and to produce a vision of how to redress the inequities
that his students were suffering.
4. 2. 1.4 Understandings of Alliance
Reflecting their foundation within the Enlightenment tradition, both of these ap-
proaches involve individuals producing knowledge through reflecting on their expe-
rience and. later, acting on this knowledge. Despite this common foundation, they
point to very different bases for but an identical approach alliance. Within the first,
alliances between development professionals and their beneficiaries would be under-
stood properly to based on extending of the knowledge of development by deliberately
engaging the experiences of its beneficiaries. The framework invoked by Freire. by
wav of contrast, requires that the powerful privilege the knowledge of the oppressed.
These both, however, work from the assumption that all parties to an alliance share
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objectives and. perhaps over time, come to a common understanding of both that
objective and the paths appropriate for its realization.
4.2.2 Postdevelopment Perspectives
The previous section introduced the theoretical assumptions that underpin En-
lightenment approaches to the study of development and explored two understandings
of learning that have been formed within that tradition. It looked at the nature of
development, the professional and her knowledge and how the formation of develop-
ment professionals is understood and understandings of alliance. This section asks
the same questions within the postdevelopment tradition.
4. 2. 2.1 The Nature of Development
In large part the postdevelopment critique can be traced to Arturo Escobar's
ground breaking work (1984) in which he drew on the work of the French philosopher
Michel Foucault. Escobar recognized development as a mechanism for the "extension
to the Third World of Western disciplinary and normalizing mechanisms and the
production of discourses by Western countries about the Third World" (ibid.). This
development was said to extend its control through three strategies: by progressively
increasing the number of problems within its domain by creating abnormalities such as
the malnourished and the illiterate for which it has the solution: by professionalizing
development such that professionals "remove from the political realm problems which
would otherwise be political and recast them into the apparently more neutral realm
of science" (Escobar. 1984. p. 387): and by undermining local centres of power and
knowledge by centralizing responsibility for development in large institutions such as
the World Bank. With Escobar, postdevelopment authors accept that, independent of
the intent of its authors, development will inescapably extend hegemony. Mainstream
accounts of development are formed subsequent to the discourse that is the object
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of this critique and. as such, they are incapable of responding substantively to this
charge.
4. 2. 2. 2 Knowledge and its Professionals
Contributors to the mainstream conversation concern themselves with tire ques-
tion of how development professionals learn and then produce knowledge. Parties
to the debates that constitute postdevelopment reverse this question. These authors
draw heavily on the work done by Foucault within which he proposed that the sub-
ject is an effect of discourse (Foucault. 1077). As a result, postdevelopment authors
ask how it is that development knowledge produce subjects who. in turn, reproduce
the discourse of development. In the context of development, the question is how
the discourse of development produces development professionals. For example, in
1990 James Ferguson (Ferguson. 1990) examined the activities of the Canadian In-
ternational Development Agency (CIDA) in Lesotho. The project that concerned
Ferguson was an attempt to improve livelihoods for individuals who lived in highland
areas. Ferguson's text is a detailed exploration of the limits that the discourse of de-
velopment places on knowledge production. He found that development professionals
consistently made errors in their characterization of the field of action, misunderstood
those with whom they were working, were blind to a range of effects of their interven-
tion and failed to realize their stated objectives. For example, “project documents
nearly always exaggerated the importance of agriculture and understated or ignored
the role of migrant labour" which was “of course the most important way by far
that 'farmers' in Lesotho obtained cash" (Ferguson. 1990. p. 82). The development
professionals, in turn, were compelled by the laws of the discourse of development to
act in manners that harmed the people whom they served.
Watt's contribution to Power of Development (Crush. 1995) and Escobar's En-
countering Development (Escobar. 1995) add a more detailed consideration of pro-
fessionals' roles in the discourse of development. Watts describes development pro-
fessionals as “inhabiting institutional environments as cosmopolitan intellectuals, as
members of a mew tribe'. ..who oversee the production and reproduction of knowledge
and practices which purport to measure well-being and poverty, national growth and
standards of living, who negotiate the re-entry of national economies into the world
market through the science of adjustment, who attempt to 'mobilize' and 'animate'
peasants in the name of basic needs" (Watts. 1995. p. 55). With his invocation of
the metaphors of tribe and scribe. Watts is commenting directly on the nature of
development professionals and their degree of freedom. He suggests that they are
formed in relationship to a community that is radically separate from the people they
purport to serve and he argues that they are little more than the spoken moment, the
scribe, for that community. While Escobar does not pick up the metaphor of a tribe
in his discussion of development professionals, his argument is compatible. He asserts
that these professionals operate in the context of the discourse of development which
is:
...the system of relations [that] establishes a discursive practice that sets the
rules of the game: who can speak, from what points of view, with what au-
thority. and according to what criteria of expertise: it sets the rules that must
be followed for this or that problem, theory or object to emerge and be named,
analysed and eventually transformed into a policy or plan (Escobar. 1995. p.
11 ).
Contrary to much of the proceeding literature which represented development profes-
sionals as agents of change (for better or for worse) and people in the Third World
as victims of circumstance who ideally respond predictably to developmental stim-
uli. postdevelopment gives us professionals who are produced by their discourses and
determined by their circumstances to harm the beneficiaries of development.
4. 2. 2. 3 The Production of a Development Professional
Postdevelopment critiques often present the field of development on terms that
derive from the theory of the middle years of Michel Foucault (1977: 1978: 1979: 1980).
Like the mainstream approach that we have inherited from the Enlightenment, the
framework described in those works of Foucault bring with them resources that have
been elaborated into approaches to the study of learning. Rather than having an
autonomous learner, within post structural approaches the self is understood to be a
fragmentary and ever shifting product of discourse. These approaches have been well
presented in the work of Richard Edwards and Robin Usher (1998). Rennie Johnston
and Usher (1997). and are summarized in Sharan Merriam and Rosemary Cafarella
(1999). Edwards, Johnston and Usher differentiate between dominant approaches to
the stud)' of adult learning and their own by drawing careful attention to the role
of experience. They argue that in mainstream approaches experience is accepted as
the unproblematic reservoir on which a unified self draws for their learning. These
authors, by way of contrast, argue that this experience, itself, is dynamic. That
is, the experience on which mainstream approaches depend for their understandings
of learning and for the production of a coherent self is “constantly constructed and
re-constructed within history, context and discourse" (Johnston and Usher. 1997.
p. 141). The dynamic nature of this experience has a corresponding effect on the
understanding of the subject. Contrary to the Enlightenment tradition in which a
coherent subject is formed in relation to stable experience, subjectivity is recognized
as the fragmentary and shifting expression of a dynamic and negotiated experience.
These authors divide the field of adult learning into the domains of lifestyle, voca-
tional confessional and critical practices. Lifestyle practices are concerned primarily
with the production of autonomy through self-expression in terms of taste and style
that is often realized through consumption. Experience in this context is used to
define the aesthetics of a desirable lifestyle and instructors help their students open
up to new ways of thinking about their lifestyle. One example of this type of learning
can be found in the study of how we learn to produce identity through the public
display of purchased goods. Vocational practices are tied tightly to the market and
produce flexible competencies. Learners are motivated by socioeconomic needs and as
a result of this learning individuals become better able to respond to changes in their
vocational environment. These can be found in educational programs that respond
to the stated requirements of prospective employers. Postdevelopment authors' char-
acterizations of development professionals consistently represent them as produced
by the expectations of the discourse within which they are subjects. This focus on
the production of an effective professional is entirely consistent with the vocational
practices discussed within poststructural approaches to the understanding of learn-
ing. Confessional practices, a secularized form of Catholic ritual, are concerned with
self-improvement and self-regulation. Here experience is the reserve in which we are
able to find traces of our innermost self whose exploration produces empowered and
economically functional citizens. Critical practices work from the premise that ex-
perience is never simply present, that the specifics of its re-presentation are variable
and that the pattern of this representation is an ongoing site of political struggle.
Experience in this domain is not the given raw stuff of knowledge. Experience, it-
self. is a site of struggle. Poststructural critical practices can be differentiated from
those of Freire discussed on page 119 by their utter refusal to replace the hegemonic
narrative with the one championed by the critical pedagogue. The commitment here
is to an ongoing reflexive questioning of how experience is represented coupled with
the recognition both that the same experience can be bent both to oppressive and
emancipatory ends and a practice of listening for the subjugated representations of
others' experiences.
4. 2. 2.4 Understandings of Alliance
When local organizations or coalitions approach a donor for support they are not
thought by postdevelopment critics to be junior partners who will co-operate in the
production of a legitimate and contextualized knowledge that will then legitimately
guide future practice. They, instead, are seen to be assuming the subordinate posi-
tion in a disciplinary relationship that will necessarily transform the representatives
and their organizations such that they become functional to and regard as absolutely
natural the extension of western hegemony. Within the postdevelopment approach
discussed here there is no escaping this end and. as such, engagement with develop-
ment professionals should be avoided.
To this point this chapter has very roughly sketched a few of the positions that can
be found within two distinct approaches to the field of development. The first derives
from the Enlightenment and structures mainstream understandings in the field. In
this approach development is. ideally, thought of as well educated professionals gen-
erating and acting judiciously on the basis of an ever improving body of knowledge.
Within this approach alliances are understood to be effected when the knowledge
of development is able to draw on the experience of its beneficiaries. Contrary to
this position, the critical strand internal to the Enlightenment tradition argues that
alliance requires that the powerful privilege the knowledge of the subordinate. The
postdevelopment approach, which can be traced to the work of Foucault, has under-
written active critical debates and is is interested in how how development knowledge
itself has produced its professionals. Postdevelopment theorists hold all actions of
development professionals necessarily extend western hegemony and. as such, there
is no possible ground for mutually beneficial alliance. The poststructural theory on
which this intervention is based, however, suggests that recognition of the dynamic-
nature of experience should fracture sufficiently the hegemony of western knowledge
so as to permit its subjects to engage in processes of ongoing reflexive questioning.
The representations of the Enlightenment and postdevelopment conversations thus
far presented shaped the backdrop against which the research approach used for this
chapter was developed.
4.3 Research Approach
In one way or another, research done within the Enlightenment tradition discussed
above is most often concerned to describe a singular reality that is presumed to be
'out there.' Contrary to this Enlightenment stance, this chapter accepts the Fou-
cauldian suggestion that the things that we believe to be 'out there' (and even the
notion that there is an 'out there') are least in part though unpredictablv the product
of the discourse through which they are described. This recognition shifts the focus
of research from an effort to produce truth to the desire tentatively to explore the
effects of discourse. On these terms this chapter is motivated by the concern that
mainstream and postdevelopment discourses of development unacceptably constrain
the opportunities for alliance between agents of donor organizations and representa-
tives of local organizations or coalitions . Starting from this concern, this chapter is
an attempt to identify subordinated aspects of these discourses whose insurrection
will permit a wider range of collaborative engagements.
Field research for this study was conducted through a series of three one to two
hour interviews held with a number of professionals from the Canadian International
Development Agency (CIDA). Rather than accepting the transcripts of these reflective
interviews as exhaustive and stable, this study assumed that the accounts initially pro-
vided would be formed subsequent to a specific discourse, that they would be mutable
and that the)' would certainly not exhaust the range of all plausible representations.
With these in mind, knowledge generation for this study became a collaborative affair.
Approximately half way through the research process the interview transcripts were
analysed for their comments on the formation of development professionals. Despite
trying several times using different approaches designed to elicit commentary on their
formation, it was not possible to extract from the interview transcripts an account
of the formation of development professionals that could lie considered hegemonic.
When the comments these professionals had made on the topic of their formation that
127
were consistent with the Enlightenment approach discussed above were summarized
for their consideration, the development professionals interviewed affirmed that that
accounting was inadequate.
Failing to find the expected hegemonic understanding of learning, the transcripts
were analysed for those arcs that discussed the learning of development professionals.
These arcs were then sorted into two groups: those that were compatible with the
approach introduced by Knowles and discussed on page 118. those that responded
well to the vocational practices discussed above. After this initial grouping there
remained a number of arcs that concerned themselves with phenomena that could
not adequately be discussed in either the Enlightenment or poststructural discourses.
These surplus arcs largely took up the question of shifts in the relationships that
bound development professionals to their knowledge: a point that was identified
by the professionals interviewed as critical to their formation. These three were
assembled into learning narratives that were then discussed with the development
professionals engaged in research for this chapter. These three, and the product of
our subsequent conversations, were synthesized into the learning narratives that serve
as the focus for the remainder of this chapter.
4.4 Learning Narratives
This section presents brief discussions of humanist and poststructural approaches
to the learning of development professionals. These two are offered initially as learning
narratives that were composed by the author and shared with informants. These are
followed by discussions. After these two I present a rather more substantive discussion
of psychoanalytic approaches.
4.4.1 Learning as Mastery
There are a number of domains of knowledge that we must master in
order to be able to work effectively in development. These domains can
roughly be broken down into three areas: knowledges which look out on
the field, knowledges which look upward at the organizations we work for
and knowledge of ourselves. Those that look out might include some sort
of technical expertise (like how government audit systems work), familiar-
ity with the country in which you are working, comfort with local customs
and expectations and. at the most basic level, the ability to get around
and feed yourself without getting sick. Looking upwards professionals
have to know the formal and informal rules that govern the preparation
of key documents, they know their organizations customs, they can speak
in terms that are both recognizable and legitimate to those who employ
them. Looking inward, we need to learn about how we react to working
in culturally different and perhaps challenging circumstances.
Development professionals come by these different kinds of knowledge in
a number of distinct ways. First, we have some sort of formal training.
This formal training enables us to say credibly that we can help the orga-
nization respond to a need that it has identified. Once an individual has
been hired they are invited to attend a number of seminars, workshops
and conferences all of which combine to extend their formal qualification.
Parallel with this formal process junior staff are participants in two other
educational processes. The first of these is an unevenly formalized system
of mentoring. As new recruits have questions they are encouraged to seek
out more senior staff and ask their advice. This ongoing mentoring com-
plements and at time supersedes the guidelines held in procedures man-
uals. Second, these recruits are. over time, effectively socialized. CIDA.
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like any organization, lias its own culture. When people come in they
often find themselves a bit lost. They don't have the ability to anticipate
how things will work when they are confronted with a new problem. Over
time these recruits learn how things tend to be done around here and
they gradually develop the ability to anticipate how processes will work.
As mastery of these various domains of knowledge and the appropriate
means for their application increases, recruits will be granted increasingly
significant roles in the organization.
This narrative is well accommodated within the Enlightenment tradition. As is an-
ticipated in the work of Knowles and Dewey, in this story learning is a process by
which an autonomous subject gradually builds a mental representation of an exter-
nal world through often conscious reflection on experience, deliberately structured
or otherwise. This subject, as suggested by Mezirow and Rogers, exists independent
of the environment that is her object of study and ideally that act of observation
produces a mental representation that mirrors the object observed. It is possible for
her to move from an initial ignorance towards an objective and portable knowledge.
Once having acquired sufficient content knowledge, learned the rules by which the
knowledge appropriate for a given decision is identified, and mastered the collectively
agreed upon mechanisms by which others' perspectives are solicited and factored into
decisions, the learner is able to make decisions that will predictably produce desired
effects. They have developed expertise and. if a job opportunity arises, they may be
invited to take up positions of appropriate authority within an organization such as
CIDA.
Most of the discussion during the interviews was structured on terms compatible
with the vision of learning as mastery. As one put it. they are journeymen, masters
of their craft, able to draw on the bodies of knowledge that they have acquired over
the years to take actions that will respond to conditions in the field, will articulate
cleanly with those of their counterparts, and they are able to craft quality decisions.
In this model they have mastered the varied types of knowledge required of an ex-
pert but. perhaps more importantly, they have learned those strategies that enable
their organization to continue to operate in the absence of perfect knowledge while
maintaining the belief that complete knowledge is both desirable and at least hypo-
thetically possible. When they encounter failures, the response of these professionals
is to reinvent their field. The continual interplay between recognizing shortcomings
and the resulting reinvention has produced a held that is in a constant state of flux
and this change is not limited to what they do in the held. Development professionals
are constantly developing new knowledge and shifting their practice accordingly.
4.4.2 Learning as Discipline
The best way to talk about the second kind of learning that we do in CIDA
is by using the example of what we do with some of our beneficiaries. Of
late development has been enamoured of something called microcredit.
Some of these programs, like the Grameen Bank, are huge, and other pro-
grams that we've funded are a good deal smaller. What these all have
in common is a set of practices that members learn around saving, de-
positing. record keeping, calculating interest, and repaying loans. More
recently some of these microcredit activities have been coupled with lit-
eracy training. Now. as we've known for at least a hundred and seventy
years, education is not a neutral sort of intervention . 8 The context, the
methods and the content of education are all significant. In the context
of microcredit activities, women take part in literacy education classes
TlacCaulay's infamous Minute on Indian Education delivered in 1835 is exemplary. He asserted
that the purpose British sponsored education in colonial India was to "to form a class who may be
interpreters between us and the millions whom we govern; a class of persons. Indian in blood and
colour, but English in taste, in opinions, in morals, and in intellect" (Macaulay. 1979).
that both provide them with the skills that they need and, significantly,
they also quite directly teach these women what they ought to be doing
with the money that they save. They, for example, say that women ought
not to be using their funds for expenditures but. rather, they should be
doing things like buying goods wholesale that they can then turn around
and sell in the market. This combination is. then, providing these women
with the financial means, the technical skills and the inclinations that
they require in order to act in wavs that I. as a developer, will recognize
as developed. We. to be clear, are teaching these women a set of skills
and we are instilling them an understanding of the world that we hope
will incline them to use these skills in a way that we think is good.
Taking this to the question of my own formation, when I started at C1DA
I had some pretty interesting ideas about the ways things should be done.
Over the years I have had the opportunity to learn how to make all of
the various procedures that we have in this place work for me. Learning
these procedures has two parts. First, like driving a car. there is the
fairly mechanical relationship between the brake, gas and steering wheel
and where the car winds up going. Just as important, however, is of the
almost infinite variety of paths that lie in front of us. learning to pick
out the road that we should drive down and. on that road, being able to
identify what to avoid. I've said a number of times that the world we work
in is impossibly complex. This is true. So. like driving through the mix
of pedestrians, bicycles, motorcycles, gutters, potholes and buildings in a
big city, a good part of what we learn in our first few years working here is
more or less what direction we should be travelling in and. while driving
there, what to notice and what to ignore. Over time, as my superiors have
figured out that 1 have learned how to drive in the right direction and to
avoid main' of the hazards in the way. I have been given responsibility for
guiding the movement of more money. Like the women participants in a
microcredit program, not only have I learned a technology. I have been
changed. By the time I get to a position of serious responsibility I have
been trained to recognize the road, to see hazards, to ignore things that
are not relevant and to want to drive in the right direction. It is not that I
have lost my desire or ability to innovate, but rather, that what I see and
my idea of innovation has changed. I have all the freedom that I began
my career with and I want to do what makes sense. W hat has happened
is that I now have a much better idea of what makes sense.
This, the second of the learning narratives, is fits well within the Foucauldian post-
development conversation. As discussed above, it is concerned with the process by
which a discourse comes to shape individuals into its subjects. In this second read-
ing learning is not a process through which an independent subject masters bodies
of knowledge on which he or she later acts. The subject, instead, is gradually pro-
duced by the discourse of development. In the case of development, the subjects so
produced are formed in a manner that compels them to recognize as natural and as
good actions whose effect is to subject the beneficiaries of development to an ever
expanding Western hegemony. Within the work of Foucault this gradual process by
which an individual becomes a subject within a discourse is identified as discipline. In
this narrative development professionals experience themselves to be free. Contrary
to their subjective impression of being free, development professionals are understood
to be recognized and promoted to the extent that what their will anticipates exactly
what the law of the discourse of development requires of them. They have all the
freedom in the world because they are unable to desire anything other than that de-
manded by the law of the discourse of development. This understanding of learning,
in which individuals are fitted to serve as professionals in development institutions.
is consistent with the vocational practices introduced by Johnston and Usher (1997).
The two narratives that I have presented, concerned respectively with subjects'
mastery of bodies of knowledge and subjects' production by discourse, were both
presented to the development professionals interviewed in the course of this research.
On hearing each narrative these development professionals affirmed their truth. That
is. on hearing that learning for them was a process of gradually mastering new bodies
of knowledge, these development professionals affirmed the truth of the narrative. 9
Similarly, on hearing that learning is a process by which they gradually become
produced as development professionals and that they, ultimately, are promoted when
their will has conformed to that of the law of the discourse, they also affirmed the
truth of the narrative. These professionals found that each of these narratives helped
them to make sense of a particular segment of their experience. Neither of these,
however, captured a range of concerns that they identified to be crucial. This surplus
had largely to do with the topic of the relationship between development professionals
and their knowledge.
4.4.3 Shifting relationships to knowledge
At the outset research for this study was to be conducted entirely within the con-
versations found within development and within the Foucauldian postdevelopment
literature. These two did not adequately capture a range of concerns expressed by
the development professionals interviewed. These concerns had to do with the sources,
manifestations and effects of shifts in the relationship between themselves and their
knowledge. The narrative below contains material that is subsequently placed within
both of the traditions from which mainstream and postdevelopment approaches to
‘’This affirmation poses an intellectual conundrum. The question is how am I. as a researcher, to
understand my subjects’ assertion that they are the spoken moment of the discourse of development?
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the study of development have emerged. Finding that these understandings do not
well accommodate important aspects of the narrative, this section concludes by intro-
ducing a third framework. Lacanian psychoanalysis, which appears better to capture
the features of this narrative that are taken up neither in mainstream nor postdevel-
oprnent discussions.
Before starting to work for CIDA I thought development was a good thing.
When 1 was junior there were parts of what we were doing that didn't make
much sense to me but I assumed that they made sense to somebody. So
early on. and this is true for most folks. I learned and learned and learned
about development and about how CIDA works. Over time I began to
find areas both that didn't make sense and for which nobody seemed to
have answers. This is different than my just not knowing. In these cases
the way we do things is just broken and nobody that I talk to seems to
have a good answer for the way things are supposed to work. For example.
I've talked to you about risk. We can't know everything so we have to
make decisions under conditions of a certain degree of uncertainty. This is
not something fundamental to development that is broken. If we had the
time and energy some folks who work here would argue that we could close
those knowledge gaps. That is an example of where, by finding a hole and
putting some energy into it. we were able to come up with a pretty good
patch. As I have also mentioned, however, there is this whole question
of intent. We persist in all of this hand-waving at the level of technology
and program and we consistently and systematically refuse to look at the
intentions of the people we are working with. This is a substantial failure
in development that is creating all sorts of problems. A few people will
acknowledge this question in passing, but nobody, and I mean nobody.
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has a clue how to bring that into the picture. No amount of energy that
I put into the question of intent is going to patch that hole.
At some point in their career almost everybody who works in the field
of development will encounter an issue like intent. A problem that few
people even want to acknowledge as existing, for which nobody has a
viable solution and which, if considered seriously, might tear the guts out
of most of the house of cards that we call development. When we meet
this question there are a number of different ways that we go. Some folks
just go back and try harder to fix things, some people bail, some people
look at development as a half broken tool and others change how they
relate to development.
For the people who just dive back in and try harder the best metaphor is
the Emperor who has no clothes. It is like we finally realize that develop-
ment does not and can not work and. being too terrified by that prospect,
we dive back in and try really really hard to believe that if they could
just fix a few things that are broken development would actually work.
This might, in part, explain the pretty frenetic rate of innovation both in
head office and in the held and why people, after working in head office
for a while, might want to go someplace where they are immersed in the
details of doing the good work and mercifully be spared the discomfort
of working in close proximity to the fundamental contradictions that are
more visible from head office.
Turning to the second possible reaction, there are a number of ways that
we bail out. Some commit suicide, some just lose faith in development
and quit the held, while others, and this is the most dangerous kind, stay
in the held but become cynics. Cynics are kind of like the dark reflection
of the people who get the notion that the Emperor has no clot Ires and dive
back in. Instead of diving back in cynics basically completely disinvest.
Their bodies stay at their desks, they go through the motions, they bitch
and moan a lot. and for all intents and purposes they are pretty much
dead. These people do what they are supposed to do. but so much of
what is needed in order to make development work is between the lines
and these people no longer make that effort so these people are a real
danger.
A third set of responses kind of builds on where a lot of us come from. I
said earlier that a good number of the people who work in development
come to the field from some sort of prior conviction. . . religious, social,
political, whatever. For those people development is an instrument that
they use in the service of their commitments. While it might be a bit
frustrating to find that development is not as good an instrument as they
originally thought, it isn't earth shattering. We can continue to do our
work recognizing the limits of the tools that we have. In this way we
re-discover our roots and emphasize, for ourselves at least, that our en-
gagement in development is purely instrumental.
The last group, those who change their relationship to development, is
the most interesting. The way the religious types make it through their
crisis is by believing that they are somehow outside of development and
that they are using development in the same way that a carpenter uses
a hammer. What these people don't think about is that even swinging
a hammer changes both the shape of the hammer and the shape of the
hand. At a minimum the head of the hammer gets bruised and the hand
grows calluses. What I mean by that is that it is kind of naive to think
that we can sit on our throne of religious or political sanctity and move
the chess pieces through the game called development in a way that serves
our own noble ends without ourselves being transformed. No. We are up
to our patuties both in development and in whatever motivated us to get
into the held. They are what we breathe, they are what we swim in.
they are who we are. The trick for these last people is to recognize that
development is flawed, recognize that where they are also coming from is
also flawed, that they are deeply marked, if not shaped, by these and the
other similarly flawed environments we come from, and somehow neither
to give up nor become cynical. These people give up on the delusion of
becoming masters of the universe and they, if they don't go nuts, develop
something called epistemic humility.
4.4.4 Enlightenment Interpretation
Within the Enlightenment tradition this narrative fits most comfortably within
the work done by Mezirow and Freire on transformative learning. On those terms
this narrative describes the conditions that lead up to and the consequences of a
development professionals' encounter with a disorienting dilemma. This disorienting
dilemma forces the development professional to step back from their practice and to
think deeply about, perhaps, the institution within which they are working, the his-
tory that has produced that institution, the relationship between that institution and
the culture out of which it has emerged, their own history, and the effects that the}',
individually, and the institution within which they work have had on those both claim
to be attempting to serve. During this reflective moment these professionals are likely
to feel profoundly uncomfortable in their professional roles but they may recognize
that others have suffered this uncertainty before and have found a framework that
has enabled them to continue their practice. In this process these development pro-
fessionals develop a critical consciousness, one that is aware of their position, of the
history that has produced that position, and of the degrees of freedom that they have
to reach out and to collaborate with their 'beneficiaries.’ The challenge for these
development professionals is to transform the naive mental models that previously
structured their understandings and their actions such that they are better able to
recognize and engage productively with those whom they claim to be serving . 10 The
transformative learning perspective provides a plausible though incomplete reading
of the narrative. This perspective can account for the initial learning, the production
of new knowledges and provides an account of the disorienting event. Following this
disorienting event, however, the transformative perspective seems to suggest that the
subject moves into a naive state within a new (perhaps critical) discourse.
Postdevelopment authors, who take issue with both the content and the structure
of development knowledge, would find this transformative account to be inadequate.
W ithin the transformative learning model discussed in this chapter, development pro-
fessionals would be understood to move from a naive to a critical consciousness. This
critical consciousness, which they discover that others have also developed, enables
the emergence of a constituency of like-minded people who are able collectively to
take action. While the political effects of this shift can Ire considerable, the process
would not have stopped the extension of western hegemony. At the end of the day
we are left with subjects within a powerful institution moved by convictions born
of a discourse. The problem with this arrangement is the blood soaked history that
has attended the marriage of power and the conviction that ones actions serve the
oppressed. The actions of the powerful, independent of the content of their convic-
tion. will necessarily extend the hegemony of some combination of the mainstream
11 The application of critical pedagogy to powerful populations has been well explored. Initial work
in this area inverted Freire's Pedagogy of the oppressed (1973) to render Pedagogy of the Oppressor
(Breault. 201J3: Rasmussen. 2001). The principles that underwrote this inversion have been taken
up in conversations that are concerned better to understand so that they may undermine the naive
consciousness of the powerful. White studies in a well developed example of this trend. One objective
of this pattern of work is to support the emergence of people who are traitors to their privileged
identities (Alcoff. 1998).
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discourse of development (which they are strategically engaging) and the critical dis-
course within which they are now subjects. 11 If they wind up spreading the critical
discourse the people they work with will be in the position of being required to subor-
dinate themselves to the new knowledge that, while purportedly critical in content, is
once again colonizing in its structure (Edwards and Usher. 1998: Johnston and Usher.
1997).
4.4.5 Foucauldian Postdevelopment Interpretation
Within the Foucauldian postdevelopment approach, the transformations of the
subject described are not politically significant. As stated at the conclusion of the
chapter on knowledge, independent of the transformation experienced by the subject,
he or she will be required to act on terms that are recognizable as legitimate within the
discourse of development. Those actions will reproduce and extend western hegemony.
There is nothing that can be done that is politically interesting from within the
discourse of development. Taking a step back to the poststructuralist tradition on
which this postdevelopment reading rests presents us with a slightly different picture.
Within that poststructuralism there are always a number of discourses that stand in
relations of mutual super- and subordination. While the actions of a development
professional would be recognized necessarily to reproduce and to extend the discourse
of development, those actions may also have effects that also strengthen competing
and subordinated discourses. For example, within microcredit activities women are
formed into mutual assurance groups. They collectively guarantee the loan granted
to a single individual. While this requirement is imposed in order to secure return on
u Manthia Diawara has identified Foucault himself as one of these new masters (1997). This means
that both the critique and its object are artifacts of the master and that if the critique is successful
then nothing structurally interesting lias happened: one master (who invokes the good of the op-
pressed) has displaced her predecessor (who. incidentally, also invokes the good of the oppressed). I
have not yet found this critique reflected within postdevelopment authors' interventions. My hope
would be that a response to this observation would look beyond the increasingly dangerous notions
of colour and geography.
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investment and is most often couched in poststructural critiques as the first step in
inducing the emergence of subjects fit for integration into peripheral locations within
a global capitalism, the forcible mutualism of these interventions can be also be seen
to encourage women participants to develop communal subjectivities (Sato. 2004).
This competing discourse (communism) would be strengthened in a manner that
may enable its subjects later to challenge the hegemony of the neoliberal discourse
of development. Instead of arguing that this communal discourse should replace
that of neoliberal development, as would be expected within humanist critical theory,
the Foucauldian poststructural critic would argue for the the displacement of the
hegemonic discourse in favour of the emergence of a radical plurality of discourses
that are linked in relationships of perpetual though mutually respectful contest. 12
While the Foucauldian theory that has heavily influenced the postdevelopment
intervention does allow for an understanding of this narrative that is not available to
students of an Enlightenment persuasion, both apologists for development and many
of its critics find this approach unacceptable. The work of Foucault has long been
identified as able to offer a powerful critique but to be politically barren. That is. the
proposals that truth is subsequent to discourse and that these discourses, themselves,
are effects of history are understood to deny theorists the grounds they require to form
and justify the pursuit of universal political ends. With this. Foucault is understood
to have stripped subjects of the ability to form precisely the sorts of claims that
authorized colonialism at exactly that historical juncture when the formerly colonized
are gathering force sufficient to be able meaningfully to produce claims required to
challenge the mechanisms of their own oppression (Cole. 2003: Diawara. 2000: Eyben.
2000: Fraser. 1989). These authors, predictably, argue for a return to a critical politics
12 This proposal holds constant the poststructural assumption that a hegemonic discourse will
necessarily domesticate all critical engagements. As such, change within poststructural approaches
can only be realized through external influence (Zizek. 2000. p. 256).
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of an Enlightenment bent within which they are able to produce the universal claims
they find necessary in order to challenge inequity.
The Enlightenment and the Foucauldian postdevelopment responses each bring
their respective contributions. The Enlightenment perspective helps us to recognize
how an agent of an oppressive organization can recognize the harms inflicted by their
organization, can accept the knowledge of its objects as legitimate, and then advocate
for ends that they propose. The postdevelopment perspective allows us to see. first,
how the processes that such an advocate is required to use ultimately harm those
on whose half they are advocating and. second, how the space for maneuver that
such interventions create may allow for the emergence of alternative discourses which
may displace that currently dominant. Each of these is capable of accounting for
a portion of the narrative offered, but neither provide grounds from which we may
understand the positions, such as cynicism, or the shifts in the relationship between
development professionals and the discourse of development. These features are well
accommodated within the Lacanian psychoanalytic tradition that is discussed next.
4.4.6 Lacanian Psychoanalytic Interpretation
In the Lacanian psychoanalytic approach subjects are not identified through their
mastery of something external or through their being a spoken by discourse. Instead,
the development professional is recognized as the effect of successful identification
through the fantasy of development . 13 An incomplete rendition of a fantasy that we
might find in the field of international development could read as follows:
Following the end of the colonial era. former colonies were left in a state of
economic disarray lacking the human, the economic and the social capac-
13At this point the commonsense notion of fantasy as a made-up story that 1 (i.e. individual
fantasy) or we (i.e social fantasy) tell ourselves that helps us to make sense of our experience is
sufficient. These terms will be explained in greater detail later.
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ities required for them to join the developed world as equal partners. It is
the moral obligation of the First World, faced with their lack, to divert a
portion of the wealth of our nations to assist those who are less fortunate.
Given that many of these Third World nations lack the ability to govern
themselves it is proper that the activities made possible by the charity
of the First World be directed by state agencies of donor nations whose
task it is to ensure that the funds allocated for foreign development are
responsibly spent. These agencies will act from the best knowledge avail-
able in a manner that raises up the poor in those nations and transfers to
their middle class both the capacities and inclinations necessary for such
nations to emerge from their state of relative backwardness. The most
effective means to secure this outcome is to ensure that those who are to
benefit from our efforts are involved as active participants in the planning
of and the execution of the activities that we fund, that we attend to the
questions of human rights, that we ensure that gender and other forms
of discrimination are reduced, that we not tolerate any forms of corrup-
tion and that we focus our energies such that the effect of our admittedly
small resources do not dissipate. This mission is both good and necessary
and my role in this is to ensure that we. together, can move towards the
development of the Third World.
In addition to securing range of positions (e.g. the First and the Third world) it
posits their relationship (e.g. plenitude and deficit) and points to the nature of the
interactions that will obtain between them (e.g. charity and gratitude). Individuals
are invited to take up subject positions within this social fantasy (e.g. development
professionals and beneficiaries) and. in that identification, to occupy positions within
the tapestry that it suggests. In this context, learning that reproduces development is
the process by which it becomes possible successfully to identify through and occupy
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a location within that tapestry. Coupled with this learning, which is anticipated
both in the Enlightenment and the poststructural learning narratives, there is a third
dimension. In addition to learning from and being formed by their experience there
is also a relationship between subjects and this social fantasy which is only rarely, if
ever, made visible through studies framed on Enlightenment or Foucauldian terms.
In this third narrative the pattern of learning that is associated with shifts in the
relationship between a subject and the social fantasy through which they identify
is discussed in terms of interference. Unlike the mainstream Enlightenment vision,
where the process of acquiring mastery is understood to allow the subject to approach
an objective vision, and contrary to the second narrative, in which discipline reduces
the subject to a spoken moment of discourse, in this third perspective gradual mastery
of the content within any social fantasy is found inevitably to traumatize the subject.
The source of this trauma is related both to our origins as subjects and to the nature
of social fantasies (such as that of development).
Within the Lacanian approach, a distinction is made between the individual and
a subject. When a child is born, and even prior to her birth, she is taken up in the
fantasies of those who surround her. She. however, is not a subject. She is an object
in others' fantasies. At some moment every infant conies to recognize themselves as
distinct from their mothers. With the formation of the notions of 'me' and "not me'
the child is understood to enter into the symbolic order. The price of that entry is
that the infant is no longer one with his or her parent (the primordial experience).
The loss of the pleasures of the primordial experience is traumatic and it is at this
moment that we become split between the conscious and the unconscious . 14 At some
later date a child will begin both to produce their own fantasies and to become an
active participant in the social fantasies that surround them whose purpose is to
14As pointed out by Spivak (1988). within Foucault there is no unconscious and this, as will later
be explored, imposes fundamental limitations on the productivity of his theory.
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salve the trauma of their loss of the pleasures of the primordial condition. It is at the
moment that a child is understood to become a subject . 10
Within the Lacanian approach, subjects are recognized as necessarily formed in
relationship to fantasy. These subjects, however, are both never able fully able to
escape completely the memory of trauma of the moment of their identification nor
bury completely the memory of pleasures available to them prior to that identifica-
tion. The memory of the trauma of their entry both into the symbolic and. later,
into a particular fantasy are made tolerable through the production of reparative
narratives. These narratives provide the subject with a sequence of actions whose
execution is promised to salve, if not resolve, the residual disquiet of those traumas.
These narratives often take the form of prescriptions. For example, one might be the
belief that 'if I could only get into Harvard, then everything would be perfect.’ This
framework tells us that these reparative narratives are manifestations of the impos-
sible desire to reclaim the enjoyments of the primordial condition. Were the subject
fully to be able to realize the objective of this narrative, she would have to forsake
her position within the fantasy and the symbolic order on which her existence as a
subject is dependent. The source of the disquiet that this impossibility produces is
identified in this perspective as the unconscious. The unconscious lies outside of the
symbolic order and serves as a constant and unpredictable fount of instability. The
interference of the unconscious will always perturb the surface of a fantasy and these
moments, when recognized, force the subject yet again to produce, pursue and derive
pleasure from an infinite cascade of ultimately inadequate reparative narratives.
To this point I have been focusing on the fantasy held by an individual. This same
approach can Ire used in the study of collective, or social, fantasies. The fantasy of
development presented above is an example of what might serve as a social fantasy.
1
’For a far more rigourous introduction to the Lacanian subject, see Bruce Fink The Lacanian
Subject (199G).
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For these social fantasies there is. of course, no moment of collective and traumatic
subjectsvation nor the memory of prior enjoyments. This perspective holds that we as
subjects and the institutions we collectively create are effects of our position within
and concerted pursuit of the reparative narratives formed subsequent to the perceived
failures of a social fantasy. One example in development is the incredible proliferation
of subjects, knowledge and practice formed following the assertion that 'development
will work if we can learn how to handle gender.’
Like individual fantasies, these social fantasies are also radically impossible (Sato.
2006). We hold unconscious both the knowledge that reparative activity is futile and
that the consequence of realizing the end postulated by a social fantasy would be the
elimination of the fantasy and all of its dependencies. These dependencies include, of
course, an impressive collection of reparative narratives and the subjects who are their
authors and executors (Byrne. 2003. p. 198). If. for example, there was development
(the end state), there would be no more development (the remedial effort). The end
of social fantasy, on this reading, is not resolution. Its end is the utterly natural
unending proliferation of activities that belief in its possible resolution enables.
As in the case of individual fantasies, intrusions of the unconscious constantly
trouble the surface of social fantasy. These, again, occasion the production and pur-
suit of reparative narratives. The continued failure of these reparative narratives
ensures that development professionals continually suffer the discomfort of brushing
against the recognition of the impossibility of development. Development profession-
als continued public pursuit of reparative narratives serves as a patch that maintains
the integrity of the social fantasy. So long as the subject is repairing, the viability
of the social fantasy is sustained for that individual, the collective effect of many
professionals’ pursuit of these narratives is the stability of the social fantasy and. as a
fringe benefit, there is often a substantial psychic reward involved for those involved
in this sort of innovation (Sato. 2006).
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Within this approach education can be thought of in two senses that are relevant
to this study: learning as induction and learning as disruption. In the first the process
of education is the mechanism by which an individual is introduced to the dictates of
a particular fantasy and. through that instruction, invited to become a subject. In the
second, education is understood to be the process by which an instructor conspires
with the unconscious of a subject to perturb the surface of fantasy and. through that
perturbation, hopefully precipitates a radical reconfiguration not only of the fantasy
itself (the goal of transformative learning) but also of the relationship that binds a
subject to their fantasy. These two are discussed in greater detail below.
4.4.6. 1 Learning as Induction
Education is recognized by students of Lacan as one process by which individuals
are assisted in their transition into becoming subjects of a particular fantasy . 15 This
form of education is well exemplified by the university. At a university, incoming IDS
students are invited to become subjects within a number of new fantasies. The role
of their seniors, administrators, and professors is to address incoming students in a
manner that induces them to become subjects within the fantasies from which they
respectively hail. The directors of IDS programs provide students with programs of
study whose successful completion marks students as credentialed subjects of a par-
ticular fantasy, the administration withholds the financial aid. housing and food that
incoming students require unless they present themselves in a particular manner and
the IDS students' association reaches out a hand which, when grasped, requires that
the incoming individual in some ways transform themselves before they are recog-
nized fully as subjects within that fantasy. In each of these the incoming individual
1(>For an excellent discussion of education as functional apprenticeship see Renata Salecl's Defer-
ence to the Great Other: The Discourse of Education (1997).
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is invited to identify in a manner that enables them to enjoy the pleasures that mark
them as subjects of a particular fantasy.
Moving this reading of learning from a reproductive to a critical mode, an educator
may speak from a position in a different fantasy from whose standpoint the effects of
the dominant fantasy are both visible and abhorrent. That is. an educator may have
recognized the failures of the fantasy in which she was a subject, may have shifted
to a new fantasy and may be deriving considerable pleasure from the self-described
critical practices of that fantasy. Based on that recognition, then, she may be in the
position forcefully to call attention to the failings that she has identified in the hope
that, with her. the learner that she is addressing will recognize the failures of that
fantasy and will, of their own volition, set about crawling out of that fantasy and
both identify through and partake of the pleasures available within the fantasy now
endorsed by the educator. The work of critical pedagogues, discussed above, would
be recognized as an attempt to induct individuals into an alternative fantasy.
What distinguishes the psychoanalytic vision of education as induction from the
Enlightenment and postdevelopment perspectives discussed above is the assertion
that this induction can never be complete. Within a psychoanalytic understanding,
no subject!vation can ever be total. Every attempt to induct an individual into a
position within a fantasy, such as that of a development professional, will produce an
unconscious remainder that escapes symbolization and this remainder will inevitably
return to trouble that subjectivation (Sato. 2006). Neither Enlightenment nor postde-
velopment approaches make allowance for this constant escape and perpetual return
nor do they make the suggestion that the reparative narratives formed subsequent
to the perturbations produced by that intrusion are ultimately futile. This excess
and the futility of reparative narratives forms the foundation of an understanding of
learning as disruption.
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4. 4. 6. 2 Learning as Disruption
A second understanding of learning that is available within the Laeanian psy-
choanalytic perspective draws on the recognition that the surface of our fantasies
are consistently though unpredictably perturbed by the intrusions of the unconscious
and that the social fantasies in relation to which we identify necessarily fail. Within
this approach the focus of study is not the content of knowledge or the links that
bind knowledge and power, but on the relationship between subjects and fantasy.
The narrative above, which discussed shifts in the relationship to knowledge, noted
that these shifts were precipitated by disorienting events that would be familiar to a
transformative pedagogue. That narrative suggested that development professionals
enter the field as naive subjects, that they encounter a question that they can not
resolve, that this results in a crisis, and that as a result of that crisis they may fall
into a state of desperate conviction, they may become cynical, they may develop an
instrumental relationship to development, they may entirely dis-identify or they may
change how they relate to development entirely. The following few paragraphs discuss
each of these postures in turn.
When an individual is invited into a fantasy by a professor they, in this narrative
at least, enter as a naive subject who believes that she lacks knowledge. In interviews
this subject was discussed as being a bit 'polv-annaish' about development. As this
individual learns about the fantasy within which she is gradually becoming a subject
she. inevitably, will encounter problems that she can not solve. In these cases a naive
subject will assume that these failures must be the product of her own lack of knowl-
edge. Recognizing that these failures are her own. the student will then set about
identifying an appropriate authority (e.g.. World Bank documents or their workplace
mentor) she may approach in order to have this failure resolved. As this individual
spends time working within the fantasy, she may begin to generate reparative nar-
ratives both for herself and her juniors. These subjects may persist in this pattern
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of encountering a slightly troubling question, assuming the fault is theirs, and iden-
tifying an authoritative remedy for a number of years. At some point, however, this
naive subject will eventually encounter a problem which will fundamentally disturb
the surface of their fantasy (Sato. 2006) for which the remedial action she devises
and recommended by her mentors is inadequate. It is at that moment, identified
by transformative pedagogues as 'disorienting.' that the relationship to fantasy may
shift.
The first posture that a subject is likely to shift into on having a traumatic en-
counter with the failure of fantasy is identified that of the hysteric. Hysterical subjects
(ibid.) are understood to have been confronted by the failure of their fantasy but do
not recognize that such failure is unavoidable. They, in desperation, turn to individ-
uals who they identify to be authorities, describe in excruciating detail the nature
of the failure they witnessed, and demand that this authority provide for them some
sort of ritual that will resolve their trauma. These authorities, if they are to avoid
becoming hystericized in turn, are required to provide appropriate reparative narra-
tives whose acceptance ideally returns the subject to the comfort of a naive state. In
interviews the hysteric subject was discussed as somebody who had 'lost faith in de-
velopment.' When the authority provides the hystericized subject with an adequate
reparative prescription, that subject's pursuit of its dictates will return them to a
naive relationship to the fantasy.
If a hysterical subject is unable to stabilize their subject ivation through pursuit
of the dictates of a reparative narrative provided by an authority, he or she may
move into a cynical posture or absent themselves entirely. A cynical subject no longer
accepts that pursuit of reparative narratives will ever adequately patch for the failures
of her fantasy but remains in the field. In the case of development an individual may
recognize that no amount of innovation will ever enable development to succeed but
she. for whatever reason, must remain in the field. In their work cynical subjects
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go through the ritual motions required by that fantasy. Where naive and neurotic
subjects identify their freedom in and derive enjoyment from their identification and
pursuit of reparative narratives, cynical subjects find their freedom and derive their
enjoyment from complaint. Each of the development professionals consulted for this
dissertation identified cynicism as a particularly dangerous posture. Their contention
that cynicism is dangerous is consistent with work in organizational studies that is
well summarized by Flemming and Spicer (Fleming and Spicer. 2003). Referencing
the work of Zizek (Zizek. 1989. 1995. 1997) and Eagleton (Eagleton. 1991). they
argue that cynical subjects suffer from the erroneous conviction that somehow their
entirely enjoyable cynical posture is politically significant. The irony of this situation
is that the cynic’s subjective experience of freedom is most often accompanied by their
performing actions that reproduce the very apparatus whose failure precipitated and
now sustains their cynicism. For example, a development professional may be cynical
about logical framework analyses (LFA). 17 Independent of what this individual says
or thinks while preparing this analysis, the mere fact that she has produced a LFA
constitutes public testimony as to its legitimacy. These subjects, returning to the
Foucauldian postdevelopment critique, are the literal spoken moment of the discourse
of development
.
If a development professional is discomfited sufficiently by their traumatic en-
counter they may exit the fantasy. This was discussed in a number of different ways
in interviews with development professionals. First, head office staff may find that
the work required of them obscures their ability to see the benefits of development
(i.e. the fantasy of development fails irreparably in head office) so they may actively
look for opportunities to return to the held where the reparative narratives prescribed
more effectively stabilize the fantasy of development. Accounts of this move ranged
11 The results based management framework used within CIDA.
from the naive 'you know, in the held that is where we can really see the benefit of
our work' to 'going to the field is how developers get their rocks off.' Second, the
development professionals interviewed reported that when peers lose faith in devel-
opment. they may apply for transfers to other departments within the federal civil
sendee or change careers entirely . 18 Third, a few of the professionals consulted men-
tioned. though it was not possible to corroborate, that there are fairly high rates of
suicide and self-destructive behaviours such as alcoholism among CIDA staff. All of
these can be recognized as attempts of development subjects to resolve their 'crises
of faith' by absenting themselves.
Fourth, instead of absenting themselves entirely, these professionals may shift into
another fantasy. From this position they engage development as an instrument in the
service of ends that they conceive within their new fantasy. Two examples of this
are particularly pertinent. One of the development professionals consulted for this
study mentioned that most of the folks from his generation came to international
development from a religious conviction. For them, and for him. development was
initially a good way to do the Lord's work. The second example of an instrumental
relationship to development is identified as corruption. Corruption was presented as
the diversion of resources to ends other than those officially sanctioned within the
fantasy of development. While this corruption was initially discussed in the context
of financial misappropriation, one of the development professionals in this interview
process was quite clear that the desire of developers for psychic rewards (e.g. 'aren’t
we wonderful and generous people for giving you this aid?') was an equally pernicious
distortion. Again, the instrumental subject engages the field of development as a tool
that she is bending to purposes conceived within a different fantasy.
ltvThis subject position is identified as the psychotic. From the perspective of those who remain
subjects of development, this person has moved outside of the social fantasy and is no longer a
subject of development.
The last posture discussed by these professionals is best summarized in the state-
ment 'We can’t know, and you know what? Nor can anybody else. Get over it.’
Rather than working with the tacit belief that given adequate time and resources it
would be possible to resolve all of the tensions internal to development, these subjects
accept that the fantasy of development, like all fantasies, is necessarily incomplete.
They recognize themselves as products of these fantasies and as necessarily marked
by the same tensions. These subjects, therefore, accept as inevitable the perturbing
intrusions of the unconscious and recognize as necessary the failures of development.
For example, a development professional may recognize that development is strug-
gling with questions that can not be resolved on the terms available within that
fantasy. Contrary to the position adopted by ideal subject of a critical pedagogue
or the leaders of a social movement championed by a postdevelopment author, this
professional also recognizes that the second fantasy within which they are forming
their counter-claims is similarly incomplete. This posture is referred to as being in a
process of traversal. The subject has not escaped fantasy, an utter impossibility, but
has radically reconfigured her relationship to fantasy.
Paralleling my finding in exploring the question of knowledge in Chapter 5. the
five relationships to the fantasy of development that I have just presented could
be bent into a stage theory complete with a hypothesized links to life experiences
and attended by a formal training program that will move individuals to the ‘ideal’
posture of traversal. This position is not compatible either with what I found in
the interviews nor with Lacanian psychoanalytic theory. In my interviews I found
that my subjects moved fairly quickly between these perspectives. They were not.
as one would expect from a stage theory, speaking dominantly on the terms of a
single relationship. Second, within Lacanian psychoanalysis the intent is not to have
students move beyond fantasy. That is impossible. The objective, instead, is to have
students develop the inclinations and ability required to when appropriate recognize
that we are subjects of fantasy, that fantasy will be disrupted by the intrusions of the
unconscious, that we will set about producing and pursuing reparative narratives, and
that all of this is necessary. What shifts with traversal is the underlying conviction,
a conviction that need not be held foremost in the mind at all times, that we can get
development right
.
The fundamental pedagogical challenge for this moment of psychoanalytic in-
struction is not to enable students to master new bodies of knowledge (learning as
mastery), to dispossess them of the knowledge that enables them to be subjects
in a particular fantasy (critical pedagogy) or to force them to realize that the)' at
the moment of education are being formed by a disciplinary pattern of relationships
(poststructural). Education that recognizes the psychoanalytic contribution will con-
tinue to place students in the functional apprenticeships of which Lacan spoke so
disparagingly (Felman. 1982. p. 23). The challenge is to complement this necessary
education so that in addition to being able to perform adequately as subjects of their
respective fantasies they come to recognize and to explore their passion for the forms
of ignorance that enable them to cleave steadfastly to their belief in the possibility
of realizing their fantasy (ibid.. 30). The objective in this education is to precipi-
tate in students the recognition that the fantasies through which they are living are
necessary, that they necessarily fail, and that those they work with are also equally
necessarily engaged in similarly impossible efforts (Byrne. 2003. p. 218).
Adding a disruptive pedagogy to those forms of education that induct and produce
subjects of a particular fantasy may have the consequence of shifting the disposition
of those subjects when they approach phenomena that challenge the integrity of their
and its constitutive reparative narratives. The)' may hesitate before they launch
desperately into the production of reparative narratives whose pursuit is promised,
for example, to resolve the recognition that micro-credit for women further subjects
them to the exploitation of their husbands. This hesitation, though it may be slight.
may create an opportunity for the exploration of alternatives and the formation of
alliances between agents of donor organizations and those their work is supposed
to benefit that are impossible on the terms suggested by both Enlightenment and
postdevelopment approaches that have been discussed in this dissertation.
4.5 Conclusion
The Enlightenment tradition allows us to consider the processes by which indi-
viduals come to master bodies of knowledge and suggests that the path forward is
through improving knowledge. Development professionals within this tradition tend
to argue that the correct approach to alliance is to be found in drawing on the expe-
rience of the oppressed to extend the knowledge of development while radical critics
who advocate transformative learning hold that a more appropriate path would be
to privilege the knowledge of the oppressed.
Foucauldian postdevelopment authors offer a lens through which it becomes possi-
ble to recognize how the beneficiaries of development who are engaged collaboratively
by development professionals would recognize themselves as free despite their grad-
ually becoming disciplined by that encounter. Constrained by their understanding
of learning as a purely conscious activity, postdevelopment authors are unable to
recognize ant’ circumstance under which alliance with the powerful would not in-
volve the extension of their hegemony. The Foucauldian theory from which this
critique emerges, however, makes it possible to see how the actions of these agents
may strengthen subordinated discourses sufficiently so as to displace the hegemonic
narrative. In its stead this argument advocates for the emergence of a radical plurality
of mutually respectful though perpetually contesting discourses.
The psychoanalytic approaches discussed in this chapter provides a framework
that allows us to recognize the phenomena described both in the Enlightenment and
the postdevelopment literatures and it extends their reach through the language of
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fantasy. Paralleling the role of discourse within poststructuralism, in the Lacanian
psychoanalytic theory discussed in this study we are always already subjects of fan-
tasy. These fantasies, unlike discourses, necessarily fail. In order to avoid the trauma
associated with this failure we are understood to produce ultimately futile reparative
narratives from whose enactment we derive considerable pleasure. Recognizing that
these reparative narratives are futile, and recognizing ours as only one of many possi-
ble fantasies, however, does not produce the nihilistic relativism of which poststruc-
turalism is accused. We. unavoidably, are subjects of fantasy. With those fantasies we
necessarily will be bearers of commitments which we are likely to endorse as universal.
With the recognition that our fantasies are both inadequate and specific, however,
we are denied the conviction required to justify systematic attempts to impose our
commitment on others. The Lacanian psychoanalytic theory discussed in this chap-
ter offers for our consideration the possibility of a tentative commitment which, while
perhaps unsatisfying for those who desire the comfort of certain conviction, may well
serve agents of powerful institutions who wish to be engaged productively as allies by
those whose good the}' purport to champion.
CHAPTER 5
CONCLUSION: ALLIANCE UNDER HEGEMONY
International social and economic development moves resources and these re-
sources must be accounted for. Accounting for these resources becomes interesting
when the donor and recipient populations are radically different and when the trans-
fers of these resources are not made pursuant to a neo-imperial or assimilationist
foreign policy. Donors have and continue intentionally to use the knowledge of devel-
opment to cloak their pursuit of narrowly conceived foreign policy agendas with the
language of beneficence. This has been a matter of public record since the inception
of the field and mapping these practices and their effects presents little challenge.
What postdevelopment brings is an inescapable critique which argues that the very
structure of development, independent of development practitioners' intentions, de-
termines them to harm beneficiaries.
In the field of development the ways in which knowledge is produced, how it can
be invoked in making decisions, how the effects of those decisions are traced and
who legitimately can be involved in these processes are all very closely regulated.
These regulations descend directly to one strand of thought we have inherited from
the Enlightenment. They embody its specific ontological, epistemological, and ethical
commitments. Postdevelopment ciritics call the manifestation of this inheritance in
the field of development the discourse of development. Development professionals'
mastery of this discourse enables them to direct and to account for the resources
entrusted to them.
157
The work of development proceeds through collaboration between professionals
and representatives of the communities served. These communities very often have
histories that do not reference powerfully the Enlightenment. They may. then, be
operating from different ontological, epistemological and ethical commitments. This
means that what counts as knowledge, whose statements count as legitimate, and
the ends to which knowledge is put in these communities may differ. Development
professionals, however, need their kind of knowledge before they can move resources.
The knowledge of communities seiwed must, therefore, be translated into the knowl-
edge of development. In this process the knowledge of development subsumes local
knowledges. The postdevelopment critique argues that this necessary and necessarily
partial translation has side effects. First, it extends the domain of the discourse of
development. Second, it stabilizes the myth of the potentially universal status of west-
ern knowledge. Third, it encourages those who receive and who mediate development
to accept t lie vision of the good embedded in the discourse of development. And
fourth, it diminishes if not destroys alternative knowledges and their foundational
discourses. These effects are harmful.
This postdevelopment critique is totalizing and poorly understood. Both con-
tribute to it being easily rejected by those who perform shallow apologetics for de-
velopment. The charges made by postdevelopment critics, when well reasoned, are
extraordinarily hard to refute. That said, the sorts of transfers of resources done in
development, the very sort that attracts the postdevelopment critique, are a neces-
sary part of governance. So long as public funds will be transferred from one region
to another, we will be faced with the struggle of how best to conduct those transfers.
This dissertation is one small attempt to think carefully about how those transfers are
handled. It starts with development professionals. Transfers of resources will always
be mediated by some form of professional class and these professionals are far from
being the most rapacious subjects of our lamentably defective order. My project asks
whether there are any links between the relationships that bind development profes-
sionals to their knowledge and the conclusion that they are condemned harm their
beneficiaries.
Following a detailed study of relevant literature, field research for this project
was conducted through I conducted a sequence of interviews with a small number of
purposively selected mid to senior level CIDA officers. My initial assumption was that
these professionals would be constrained to the discourse of development. 1 hoped
that I would be able to find interruptions in their regurgitation of this hegemonic
discourse. Building collaboratively from these fractures 1 hoped to find terms on
which these professionals could be engaged in alliances that did not inevitably result
in harm. I found that the nature and role of knowledge in development was far from a
settled question for my research subjects, that the variety of those notions supported a
diversity of relationships between development professionals and their knowledge and
that my subjects' relationship to the knowledge of development was highly mutable.
The mutability of my research participants’ accounts presented a challenge. Rather
than representing the polyphonic voices of each individual. I chose to represent the
coherent voice of each of the many subjects I encountered. This approach works
from Foucault’s assertion that subjects are effects of discourse, that there is always a
plurality of discourses and. as such, individuals may concurrently present as subjects
within multiple discourses. My research individuated these discourses.
Restating what I have argued thus far. I attribute the cancerous nature of develop-
ment in part to the naturalized place of one stream of Enlightenment knowledge in its
operation and I find that the moment of alliance is key in regulating the propagation
of this cancer. I assume that global redistributions of resources will be necessary for
decades if not centuries. 1 assume that the resources transferred will be accounted for
on the terms of the knowledge of the donor and I assume that these allocations will
be mediated by professionals working in alliance with representatives of the recipient
communities.
In my research I found that how professionals engage the knowledge of develop-
ment shapes powerfully the terms on which they can be engaged as allies and that
this has significant implications both for how we educate development professionals
and how we structure the institutions within which those professionals work. The
following sections look at the structure of. the effects of and education for three ap-
proaches to alliances that were explored in the course of my research: those borne
of one strand of Enlightenment thought, those derived from work of Michel Fou-
cault. and those that emerge from the work of social critics who are indebted to the
psychoanalytic theory of Lacan.
5.0.1 Enlightenment Approaches to Alliance
The tradition that development has inherited from the Enlightenment clearly
bounds discussion of knowledge, of learning and of the potential for alliance. Knowl-
edge is understood to consist in mental representations of an external real and the
quality of these representations is thought to improve through an unending iteration of
methodological innovations executed by properly credent ialed and experienced pro-
fessionals. Possession of the best knowledge available confers on professionals the
right, if not the obligation, to make decisions. The outcomes of these knowledge
based rational decisions are acted on in a world that is assumed to Ire amenable froth
to human understanding and control. Good development decisions are based on the
best knowledge available and will produce predictable effects.
Within this approach alliances can be formed when the infinite resources of a
methodologically sound, politically neutral and potentially universally valid knowl-
edge are contextualized as appropriate through the incorporation of local knowledge.
If a group of people who are identified as legitimate beneficiaries by the discourse of
development wish to secure the support of a development organization, they need to
state their interests on the terms required by the knowledge of the donor. In return
for their contribution of this local knowledge, these individuals and those they rep-
resent will gain access both to the resources of these organizations and opportunities
afforded to those who are involved in development. Within this approach (and speak-
ing from the perspective of development) knowledge is legitimate if and only if it can
be stated on my terms. This approach dominates practice in the field.
Rather than privilege the knowledge of the developed, critical humanist scholars
argue that we should privilege the knowledge of the oppressed. Where this knowledge
is not critical of the relations through which oppression is effected, critical educators
work with those populations to help them learn about those inequalities. The actions
of these communities, then, is built on the foundation of an oppositional knowledge.
In this approach the role of those who work in donor organizations is to provide tools
that enable the oppressed to form a critical knowledge, to privileged that knowledge
and then to respond and to support the movements that are formed around that
knowledge. This approach can be found in the work of Paulo Freire who provided his
students with a language that revealed to them the contours of their own oppression.
Both the assinrilationist and the critical models of alliance suggested here share
their foundation in joint action being taken on the basis of common understanding.
Parties to an alliance may enter with perhaps different goals and varied understand-
ings. but over time these goals and their attendant understandings will properly come
to cohere.
The assimilationist approach to alliance has been well critiqued. Critical scholars
argue that the assimilationist model gets the knowledge wrong. They argue that if
development really wishes to serve the interests of the marginalized, that development
must work with their knowledge (Chambers. 1983). Foucauldian postdevelopment
authors argue that this model requires the subordination of the knowledge of the
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junior party within an alliance. This subsumption is argued to result in the extension
of the discourse of the historically dominant.
The critical humanist approach presents two challenges. Operationally, donor
agents must justify their actions on the terms of a dominant knowledge. This requires
either that they find a manner of representing the knowledge of the oppressed that is
consistent with dominant knowledge or that they find mechanisms by which they are
able ethically to corrupt the dominant discourse. These approaches have risks. First,
the language initially associated with oppositional practices may be appropriated by
dominant institutions and its associated practices may gradually be transformed such
that they no longer have the effect of encouraging the oppressed both to recognize
and to act against the structures that are instrumental in their oppression. This has
happened in the case of Freirian approaches to literacy and Empowerment. Second,
development professionals may appropriate as their own the ends identified by the
oppressed. With this development professionals are possessed of both the knowledge
of the ‘right’ things to do and the power required to take action: a combination
that has not historically well served those who suffer inequity. Examples of this
can be found all the way back to the sometimes inadvertent role of Churches in
preparing Indigenous populations for colonization. Third, development professionals
and their counterparts who engage in practices of ethical corruption constantly hazard
discovery. If their ruse is revealed, both parties are liable to suffer substantial sanction.
5.0.2 A Foucauldian Postdevelopment Approach to Alliance
Within the Foucauldian postdevelopment critique knowledge production is un-
derstood to be the gradual accumulation of assertions that are formed within and
are consistent with the law of a particular discourse . 1 This law may. for example,
assert that valid knowledge will always discuss phenomena in beneficiary countries in
'An exemplar of this is identified by Edward Said in his classic Orientalism (Said. 1978).
a manner that makes the range of policy (e.g. democratization) and program instru-
ments (e.g. three to five year projects) available to development officers appear to be
relevant. Learning is the gradual process by which an individual conies to accept and
to internalize the law of the discourse within which he or she is becoming a subject.
This process, over time, is understood to produce professionals who act freely yet
never deviate from the law of the discourse of development
.
Within a Foueauldian postdevelopment approach, when a local organization chooses
to seek support from a donor organization like CIDA they are not understood to be
taking up the role of a junior partner in the production of a neutral knowledge that
will justify the distribution of resources. They, as stated above, are recognized as tak-
ing up a subordinate position within a disciplinary relationship that will inevitably
transform those individuals and their organizations such that they become subjects
of and functional to the extension of western hegemon}'. There is no escaping this
end. The alternative proposed is to champion social movements which are thought
to emerge outside of the shadow cast by development (Escobar. 1997b).
Looking past the Foueauldian postdevelopment intervention to the Foueauldian
post-structural theory from which it has emerged there are a number of ways in which
it may be possible to understand how social movements might invite development
professionals into alliances in a manner that reduces the probability that the}' will
become part}’ to the extension of western hegemon}'.
First. Foueauldian postdevelopment authors argue that development professionals
are determined by the structure of the discourse of development. This argument is a
specific comment on the laws that both enable and constrain knowledge production
in development. While a critic could lament that the laws of the discourse of devel-
opment den}' its professionals room for maneuver that encompasses the actions the}'
advocate, a post-development- author might map the pattern of those constraints in
a manner that offered social movements something of a users' manual for those who
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wanted to get money from but did not want to become subjects of development . Such
a manual would provide the information that putative counterparts would require in
order to be able strategically to constitute themselves as legitimate. This would en-
able them to pursue ends that they have conceived elsewhere and which they need
not discuss with donors. Where I grew up this is called playing the white man for
the fool.
Second, advocates can make use of Foucault’s observation that we are concurrently
formed through multiple discourses. The strategy for alliance that this suggests is that
members of social movements attempt to engage development professionals within
discourse communities other than that of development. They may. in these alternative
discourse communities, be able to come to agreements about desirable courses of
action that then can be translated by the development professional into terms that
are acceptable within the law of the discourse of development. Folks who work in
head office call this ‘going native' or iocalitis.’
These two patterns of strategic engagement are ethical corruptions of develop-
ment. Given the remarkable ease with which individuals and groups manage to Irene!
development to serve their own purposes, it appears that such strategic corruptions
of development is an entirely plausible strategy.
Approaches which make strategic use of the discourse of development suffer the
contradictions of stabilizing the object that initially attracted critique and of exposing
the instigators of this strategic engagement to considerable risk. If a social movement
approaches a foreign donor and presents that donor with precisely what they need
to hear in order to release funds, and if the resulting activity is again strategically
represented as a success, then the discourse within which that donor initially justified
the release of funds and later found them well spent is reinforced. Conversely, if
the initiative is found to have failed, that failure can quite easily Ire attributed to
a corruption rather than to a failure of development. The second risk that these
1G4
movements run in all activities that involve strategic representation is that if they
are 'discovered' they may be marked as 'dishonest' and likely barred from receiving
future funding. Thus, while the theory that under-girds the postdevelopment critique
does afford opportunities for strategic engagement with development professionals, it
exposes its executors to considerable risk and. as is argued by Zizek. it does not help
us to understand how those engagements might subvert the relations of power and
knowledge within development that are recognized as fundamental to the extension
of western hegemony (2000).
5.0.3 Lacanian Psychoanalytic Approaches to Alliance
A basic reading of authors who have been influenced by French psychoanalyst
Jacques Lacan suggests a form of alliance that closely parallels that available within
a poststructural approach. Following this simplistic reading, the relationships that
bind development professionals to their fantasies would be understood to be shaped
by a variety of factors some of which may be associated with the immediate context in
which they find themselves. These relationships, in turn, shape what the development
professional is able to recognize as legitimate. From the perspective of an organization
looking for funds but not interested in being overly constrained differences between
these perspectives may be quite significant. The standards applied, for example, by
a naive subject attempting to assess the full range of impacts of a project in accord
with a results based management structure and those invoked by a cynical subject
who has given up on the imaginary of predicting results may be radically different.
Recognition that these development professionals can be called into these relationships
to the knowledge that is their brook and trade may make a valuable addition to
the informal knowledge of donor agents that circulates in NGO communities. This
knowledge might, for example, suggest that with a particular donor representative
it is most productive to induce a cynical posture by pursuing a particular pattern
of conversation at an informal event. Paralleling suggestions that emerge from the
Foucauldian postdevelopment analysis, research done in this win would effectively
contribute to the enhancement of the existing informal 'user's manuals' that concern
themselves with how to work with particular development professionals. A literature
review on this topic did not reveal any discussion of the prevalence, successes and
mechanisms by which counterparts act in manners that constrain the subject position
and posture taken up by development professionals but anecdotal accounts from a
number of peers in the field suggests that this practice is fairly common.
One fundamental problem with this approach, again as found with that of post-
development. is that formal representations and actions must ultimately be presented
on terms that are consistent with the discourse of development. If the development
professional fails to speak on the terms of that discourse, their contribution is con-
sidered illegitimate and they hazard their status as development professionals. And
if the development professional speaks on the terms of that discourse, they re-affirm
its legitimacy. There is. therefore, no reason for the critic to suggest alliance with
development professionals. Similar to the parable of the Emperor and his clothes,
whether or not they privately believed, public representations of the townspeople
supported the official narrative that the Emperor was well garbed and that public
representation secured the continued viability of the fantasy spun, deftly woven and
impeccably tailored by the Emperor’s couturiers. This pessimistic- conclusion points
to a fundamental limitation of poststructural approaches which is overcome when we
recognize the place of the unconscious.
Within approaches informed by Lacanian psychoanalysis we are understood to be
subjects of fantasy. These fantasies, like discourses, posit ends, structure knowledge,
delimit action and produce subjects. In discourse the exercises of power to which
the knowledge of a discourse determines its subjects is understood to stabilize that
discourse. By way of contrast , the actions to which fantasy determines its subjects will
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never realize their promised ends. Subjects of fantasy unconsciously recognize and are
terrified by this fact. As a result we produce an unending cascade of ultimately futile
reparative narratives. The perpetual creation and pursuit of these futile reparative
narratives constitutes the field of development . It secures the stability of the fantasy,
stabilizes our identities as legitimate subjects, and diverts attention from its ultimate
and necessary failure.
We subjects of development, however, may stand in a variety of relationships to
that fantasy. We may. for example, be the spoken moment of that fantasy, fully en-
grossed in its reparative narratives: we may be cynically going through the motions
required of a development we regard to be futile: we may instrumentally invoke the
language of development in order to pursue ends that we have conceived elsewhere:
or. of particular interest to this dissertation, we might recognize fantasy to be both
necessary and necessarily impossible. Contrary to Foucauldian postdevelopment au-
thors' contention that all engagements extend western hegemon}', engagements on
terms other than the official fantasy of development divert resources from the pro-
duction and pursuit of the reparative narratives required to stabilize development.
That is. instead of investing their energies in repairing the fantasy of development,
professionals who have been engaged in alliances structured on the terms of subordi-
nated knowledges are far more interested in determining how best to fit what they
wish to do to the terms of the official knowledge of development . The effort here is not
how to reinforce and stabilize the fantasy of development, but how. to borrow a term
from the transgender literature, to pass. Stripped of its subjects' investment in pro-
ducing and pursuing the narratives fundamental to its continued stability, the failures
intrinsic to the fantasy of development will gradually utterly disrupt its hegemony:
a condition necessary for the emergence of alternatives. Returning to the parable
of the Emperor and his clothes, this strategy may produce a myriad of communities
composed of those who surround and. by virtue of their occupation in other eonver-
sations. speak with inexorably diminishing frequency and attenuating conviction of
the glory of their Emperor's raiment.
While perhaps strategically interesting, the discussion of alliance that I have just
offered suffers the weakness of reserving for the author and his chosen agents a position
that differed markedly from its objects of analysis. Development professionals are
represented as being subjects of fantasy in a manner that rendered them susceptible
to manipulation while my chosen agents were able, on the model of Enlightenment
subjects, to understand and control these professionals. This is not an acceptable
position. Everybody party to this discussion, the author, the reader and all the
subjects discussed in this text, should be able to be recognized as subjects of fantasy.
This suggests a very different and equally interesting approach to the formation of
alliances.
Within the Enlightenment model discussed in this paper, alliance was understood
to be possible when participants' goals and their understanding of reasonable paths
for their realization coincided. Foucauldian post structural approaches held that the
goals should be commonly identified but that their understandings could diverge.
Within the limited discussion of the Lacanian psychoanalytic perspective offered in
this dissertation we are not drawn together on the basis of our joint acceptance of the
knowledge produced within a common fantasy, nor to we come together in pursuit of
objectives that we may commonly identify though differently understand. Alliance,
instead, starts from the recognition that development professionals, like those with
whom the)' work, are necessarily subjects of a fantasy that is specific to a particular
history and which is necessarily impossible. What unites us is our common efforts to
avoid confrontation with the failures of our respective fantasies (Byrne. 2003. p. 218).
When the dominant accept the necessity, the specificity and the necessary failure of
their own fantasy, they lose the grounds that naturalize the imposition of that fan-
tasy on others. Further, this may make it possible to recognize as interesting social
168
visions that focus on producing conditions that support the equitable and perpetual
disharmony of mutually incompatible visions rather than the pursuit of remedial sto-
ries required to realize an ideal end state (ibid., p. 221): a politics that underlies
the debates between those who are concerned with radical democracy (Laelau and
Mouffe. 1984). In the context of development, where we have development profession-
als whose collective activity produces institutions inherited from the Enlightenment,
the politics of disharmony that this final reading of psychoanalysis may lead to the
emergence of an epistemic humility that will shift fundamentally development profes-
sionals’ participation in the alliances that must characterize the transfer of resources
between areas of radical cultural difference. Rather than entrapping beneficiaries in
the collapse of our failing order, they may perhaps become subjects who bridge in a
manner that enables the transfer of resources between a fantasy of development that
is collapsing under the weight of its own contradictions and a global order that has
yet to emerge.
5.1 Education for Development Professionals
The education that development professionals receive, both in university and on
the job is located firmly within the Enlightenment tradition. Individuals are intro-
duced to knowledge whose mastery fits them for service as professionals in the field
of development. Poststructural critics contend that this education prepares develop-
ment professionals unwittingly to extend to their beneficiaries the opportunity to be
peripheral subjects within a bankrupt global order blit provide no alternative other
than the endorsement of social movements. Lacanian psychoanalytic understandings
of the subject, of knowledge and of their relationship provides educators with a range
of options that may enable us to train development professionals such that they can
avoid this unfortunate situation.
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Lacanian psychoanalytic approaches offer a variety of understandings of learn-
ing. The first looks at the process by which an educator acquaints a learner with
the terrain of a particular fantasy and finds in that interaction that the individual
is transformed ever more completely into a subject of that fantasy, 'kite closest ana-
logue for this function of an educator in the poststructural tradition is the process of
government alization by which in individual becomes disciplined by the discourse into
which she or he is emerging. Within the Enlightenment tradition the analogue for
this first psychoanalytic understanding of education would be that of the educator
responsible for preparing students for their careers in large public or private bureau-
cracies. They are instructed in that knowledge they require in order to be recognized,
taken up and incorporated into the operation of those organizations . 2 This kind of
education can be found in Northern university programs which specialize in training
individuals to become development professionals . 3
Moving this reading of education from a reproductive to a critical mode, an edu-
cator may speak from the position in a different fantasy. That is. an educator may
have recognized the impossibility of the fantasy in which she was a subject and shifted
to a new fantasy. Based on that recognition, then, she may be in the position force-
fully to call attention to the failings that she has identified in the hope that, with
her. the learner that she is addressing will recognize the failures of that fantasy and
will, of their own volition, set about crawling out of that fantasy and identifying, in-
stead. through the fantasy now endorsed by the educator. Both critical pedagogues,
who work with notions of false consciousness, and those Foucauldian postdevelop-
ment authors who take the step of describing and endorsing a fantasy that ought
'This mode of education would be located in what is identified as the University discourse. For
an excellent discussion of education on this model, see Renata Salecl’s Deference to the Great Other:
The Discourse of Education (1997).
5 Higher level education seems to focus on providing students with critical content sufficient to
enable them to author the reparative narratives that stabilize the field.
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to displace development would be recognized through this moment of the Lacanian
psychoanalytic approach to learning and education.
A third understanding of learning that is available within the Lacanian psycho-
analytic perspective draws on the recognition that we are necessarily subjects of
inevitably flawed fantasies. Rather than argue that we ought either to amend the
fantasy of which we are a subject or that we ought to shift to a better fantasy, this
approach asks that we transform our relationship to that fantasy. The research un-
dertaken for this dissertation found that professionals can be understood to stand
in a number of different relationships to their fantasy of development. These were
summarized in chapter four and suggested that development professionals may be
naive, instrumental, cynical, hysterical, neurotic, absent and/or traversing subjects
of development: each of which is discussed in the next paragraph.
Naive subjects are confident that the fantasy of development works and that any
disquiet he or she suffers is product of ignorance. The solution for this disquiet is
for the subject to improve their understanding of the fantasy. Instrumental subjects
of the fantasy of development naively affirm a second fantasy and use development
instrumentally to pursue ends that were conceived within that second fantasy. A
good example of this can be found in people who come from and pursue ends they
identify as good within their religious community through their work as development
professionals. These individuals are quite happy to bend the instruments of devel-
opment. such as results based planning, to serve their own ends. Cynical subjects
no longer believe in Development but. bound to their positions for whatever reason,
they go through the motions required by that fantasy. Ironically, one effect of their
listless execution of the tasks required of them is likely the reproduction of precisely
those conditions and effects that initially precipitated their cynical disposition. The
hysterical subject is best exemplified by the field worker who returns from a project
site traumatized by its utter failure despite its having been executed in a manner that
was entirely consistent with the fantasy of development . This hysterical subject then
delivers his cry development doesn't work! to a superior in the hope that he or she
will re-affirm the stability of the fantasy. Following such a livstericizing incident a
professional may rededicate themselves with born-again fervour to the production and
pursuit of reparative narratives internal to development that hold out the promise of
stabilizing the fantasy of development. This caricature of the naive relationship to
knowledge is a neurotic subject. If the hysteric subject does not regress into a neu-
rotic state, they may absent themselves entirely from the field. Participants in this
research project identified these psychotic subjects as individuals who 'burn out and
bail out' in one of a number of ways. Finally, on encountering a livstericizing crisis a
subject may just accept that the fantasy/fantasies within which she is a subject are
necessarily flawed and that this hold true for everyone. Their response is one of ‘We
can't know. And you know what? nor can anybody else. Get over it?
Within this third approach to learning within psychoanalysis, one role of an edu-
cator is to listen carefully to his or her students and to not allow them to pass or patch
over the fissures that they will inevitably encounter within their fantasy. The hope in
this approach is that in addition to deriving pleasure from the impossible practice of
pursuing the dictates of the reparative narratives that these subjects find or produce
within a fantasy, that they. also, learn to derive pleasure from preeiselv the disquiet
that prompted the formation of those reparative narratives. With this the hope is
that, while individuals are mastering those knowledges that enable them to become
subjects of a fantasy such as development, they also come to regard themselves and
their fantasies as the product of a necessarily futile attempt to remediate the failures
inherent in fantasy.
The pedagogical challenge for this moment of Lacanian psychoanalytic instruction
is not to enable students to master new bodies of knowledge (learning as mastery) or
to dispossess them of the knowledge that enables them to be subjects in a particular
fantasy (critical pedagogy). Education that recognizes the psychoanalytic contribu-
tion will continue to place students in the functional apprenticeships of which Lacan
spoke so disparagingly (Felinan. 1982. p. 23). The challenge is to work with them to
explore their passion for ignorance: the ignorance that both enables them to continue
to cleave steadfastly to their belief in the possibility of realizing their fantasy (ibid., p.
30) and justifies their imposition of this fantasy on others. The objective is to precip-
itate in students the recognition that the fantasies through which they are living are
necessary, that they necessarily fail, and that those they work with are also engaged
in similarly futile efforts (Byrne. 2003. p. 218). These shifts may enable development
professionals better to inhabit the bridge identities (Ferguson. 1998) that will alter
profoundly the terms on which development professionals can be engaged in alliances.
The Lacanian psychoanalytic theory discussed in this study offers for our consider-
ation the possibility of a tentative commitment which, while perhaps disempowering
for those who have long suffered oppression, may well befit the powerful who would be
their allies. It argues that we. unavoidably, are subjects of fantasy. That with those
fantasies we necessarily will be bearers of commitments which we are likely to endorse
as universal. With the recognition that our fantasies are specific and will ultimately
fail, however, we are denied the conviction required to justify systematic attempts
to impose our commitment on others. The challenge here is how to institutionalize
the recognition that the fantasy within which the field of development is composed
necessarily fail. The bureaucracies which regulate the movement of public resources
in development are children of the Enlightenment. They require truths. These truths
are born of a relationship to knowledge that results in their agents inevitably harming
their putative beneficiaries. The question with which this dissertation ends is how
can bureaucracies operate in the absence of truth.
5.2 Future Research Directions
5.2.1 Institutionalizing the Lack
This dissertation concluded with the observation that integration of insights de-
rived from Lacanian psychoanalysis may provide terms on which development profes-
sionals and their beneficiaries can engage in more mutually productive alliances. The
challenge this presents is that the institutions that development professionals' col-
lective activity produce are formed on terms that descend from the Enlightenment.
The insights that may render development professionals more effective allies strike
directly at the foundations of those institutions: it denies the possibility of the sorts
of truths now needed to move resources. There has been a fair amount of work done
that explores how it is possible to pursue a politics of the lack (Appadurai. 2002: La-
clau and Mouffe. 1984) (and which 1 have engaged inadequately in this dissertation).
This work has focused on how we might engage in collective activity that does not
descend either from a common identification of an ideal state or a shared understand-
ing of how best to realize that goal. This politics, instead, focuses on coming together
in joint recognition of the inevitable failure of our diverse attempts successfully to
remediate the failures of our respective fantasies. This failure, the lack, is what we
share. The work that has been done around the formation of alliances around this
lack needs to be complemented by a study which explores the possibility for creating
hospitable conditions internal to those bureaucracies that may be engaged as allies
by those coalitions which are pursuing a politics of the lack.
5.2.2 Disruptive Pedagogy
This dissertation concludes by suggesting a pedagogy that is founded on the im-
possibility of fantasy and the necessity of commitment to its reparative narratives.
I have not found concrete examples how how this pedagogy might be productively
incorporated into training programs for subjects such as development professionals.
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I would like to explore how the insights borne of this analysis may be integrated into
the learning that prepares individuals to serve as development professionals.
5.2.3 The Practices of Disposition
The development professionals interviewed for this dissertation were clear that
their disposition is significant. For example, they argued that cynicism is danger-
ous. The disposition of the development professionals interviewed towards their field
shifted radically within and between interviews. This suggests that the disposition
of development professionals may be malleable which opens the door for a range of
political interventions that would rely on the possibility of this malleability. Research
for this dissertation, however, was conducted entirely by reflective interviews. These
interviews provide a context that is substantially different than the day-to-day work
of these professionals. It is not possible, therefore, to extrapolate from the fiexibil-
itv of disposition evidenced by these development professionals in these interviews
that they are similarly flexible in their practice. In order to test for this it would be
necessary to undertake a research program of long-term participant observation.
5.2.4 Location and the Hegemony of the Discourse of Development
Research for this dissertation focused on a very narrow strata of development
professionals. It was concerned almost exclusively with desk officers in a donor or-
ganization. These officers were chosen because they would be depicted as the most
abject of development subjects by the postdevelopment authors whose intervention
this dissertation was concerned to recuperate. Early in the research process it became
clear that the hegemony presumed within the postdevelopment literature was sub-
stantially more fragile than initially expected and that the approaches provided both
within mainstream and postdevelopment approaches did not adequately capture the
representations offered. It would be productive to engage development professionals
at other levels in the chain linking donor governments with recipients to determine
whether this fragility is characteristic of the discourse of development present at other
locations within the field. This engagement should both use interview and participant
observation.
5.2.5 The Places of the Researcher as Effects of Theories
A fundamental difficulty with this dissertation is the place of the researcher. How
we understand the researcher is. unavoidably, an effect of the theory being deployed
in that research. This research did not operate exclusively within a single theoretical
frame. It. rather, shifted between three frames without presuming a fourth perspec-
tive from which it was possible to assess the relative worth of those three approaches.
Rather than engage the complications produced by this recognition, this disserta-
tion does not study the author of the text with the same tools that are deployed in
the study of the objects of analysis. I have refrained from explicitly painting myself
into the story of the research that was undertaken for this dissertation. I would like
to see theoretical work done that explores how we might productively think about
how to discuss the place of the researcher when the representations produced pur-
suant that research are the product of the interference of those actions with mutually
discontinuous theoretical approaches.
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